The Somali Joint Needs Assessment: Recent Developments
   - Part Three of the Critique -
By:Buri M. Hamza
August 30, 2006

1.0     Introduction

Buri M. Hamza

The challenges presented by the emerging Somali Islamic Courts might have blinded us to and diverted our attention from developments affecting the JNA process. But I believe that our readers do still recall the salvos of criticism that have rained down on the TFG and the JNA Secretariat over the way the process was initially managed. The most pointed accusations came from the natives of Benadir, Lower Shabelle, Bay and Bakool, Juba Valley, and Gedo, inside the country and in the diaspora.  The wrath of the Somali people from these regions has been stirred by, among other important issues, JNA’s lack of inclusiveness, the tampering and redrawing of the regional boundaries in the country, and the legitimation and empowerment of the self-declared “governors” or “regional authorities”.

Feeling the heat, the TFG and the JNA Secretariat have wavered and bowed to pressure from the brickbats that have been hurled by the critics inside the country and in the diapsora. In fact, the January 2006 Update of the JNA Secretariat reported:

“At a Coordination Support Group meeting on 12 January, it was agreed that these workshops be postponed until such time that the Coordination Support Group had ratified the JNA overall work-plan, including the Cluster team composition and the methodology and purpose of the workshops”.(1)

Moreover, the February 2006 Update released by the JNA Secretariat in Nairobi revealed:

“The JNA Senior Technical Coordinators and the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation of the TFG agreed on actions to strengthen the involvement of Somali counterparts in cluster teams. Both parties agreed also on the expansion of the TFG counterpart group to include Dighil and Mirifle”.(2)  

The Somali JNA critics contacted have hailed the above decision despite their contention that the TFG had initially turned a blind eye to Benadir, Lower Shabelle, Bay and Bakool, Juba Valley, and Gedo, and was literally oblivious to the plight of its indigenous stakeholders.

Furthermore, the March 2006 Update of the JNA reported, among other things:

“On 3rd March, 7,200 questionnaires prepared by each of the six JNA clusters were sent to the Somali National Technical Counterpart teams working for the JNA. The teams carried the questionnaires to the most inaccessible corners of Somalia. The purpose of the questionnaires are to engage many stakeholders from civil society, women, youth, religious leaders, traditional leaders, business groups, parliamentarians and regional authorities to ensure all voices are heard and included in the JNA and to obtain much needed information and data from all areas”.

The paragraph in the “Update” reads well. The questionnaires have ostensibly been dispatched to inaccessible areas with the view to securing reliable and accurate data. We understand the cluster and cross-cutting draft reports are being discussed in consultative and validation workshops. While we applaud this genuine effort, we are nonetheless concerned about the authenticity of the data that have been provided, purportedly by the religious leaders, traditional elders, business groups, and parliamentarians and “regional authorities” in Benadir, Lower Shabelle, Juba Valley, and Gedo.The indigenous civil society organizations in these regions – if they at all exist – must have found it extremely difficult to work on the said questionnaires under duress.  Most of the parliamentarians and cabinet members in the TFIs who have been selected to represent Benadir, Lower Shabelle and Juba Valley, have yet to visit their constituencies for fear of violent reprisals and retaliations from the occupying warlords and their militias.

2.0     The Rationale for the Critiques

Many of our readers would by now probably wonder why all these continuous critiques of the Somali JNA, and why we insist that the TFG had initially mismanaged the process through its exclusionary policies and its political insouciance vis-à-vis the people still struggling with social injustices and human right violations. Those who have kept themselves abreast of developments affecting JNA assert that the leadership in the TFG is partly to blame for the blunder initially committed. The Ministry of International Cooperation– still in its infancy with limited or no institutional capacity – had taken upon itself the difficult tasks of overseeing the Somali JNA process. These limitations and institutional inadequacies, at this juncture, preclude the possibility of providing the leadership needed and the skills and expertise required for such a multi-dimensional undertaking.

Our readers might also wonder why all the fuss about Benadir, Lower Shabelle, Bay and Bakool, Juba Valley and Gedo vis-à-vis the Somali JNA process. Well, we are still concerned about the participation of the legitimate indigenous populations of these regions in this process, and we insist that its scholars in the diaspora should have also been given the right to be part of it. The exclusionary policies and the political insouciance that we had initially witnessed, which we contend were deliberately orchestrated by the TFG’s leadership, had undeniably undermined the process and unnecessarily weakened its momentum.

Ameen Jan, in his contribution on Somalia: Building Sovereignty or Restoring Peace for the volume Peacebuilding as Politics, Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies, edited by Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar, argues,

 “since the termination of the UN peacekeeping operation, the dominant political trend in Somalia has involved a consolidation of divisions of territory along clan lines and the creation of sub-national political units that are dominated by one or other of the major Somali clans. A rough balance of military power now exists among these clans, and this has resulted in a cementing of the frontlines dividing the territories that they respectively control”(3).

While this is in fact the case in certain regions of the country – not knowing the geo-political consequences of the emergence of the Islamic Courts in Mogadishu – we argue that the reality in Benadir, Lower Shabelle, Juba Valley, and Gedo has not been consistent with the writer’s argument. We have witnessed the steady infusion of warlords and their militias into these regions, from predominantly the central parts of the country, to enhance occupation by force. We have also noted the implantation of “civil society organizations” that are alien to these regions and that are tacitly or overtly supported and sustained by the occupying forces. The establishment of the so called free media networks, such as Shabelle Media Network and HornAfrik Media Inc. which claim to be “Somalia’s most trustful local information sources” is an outright mockery intended to mislead the international community, and a travesty, which aims at portraying the image of the underdogs intimidated by the enemies of democracy and social justice.

The JNA Secretariat has some time back lured Somalilanders to endorse and support the JNA process. In an unprecedented move, Mr. David Bassiouni, the UN Senior Technical Coordinator, addressed Members of Parliament of Somaliland and the House of Elders (Gurti) at a joint session of the two houses of Parliament during which these two bodies pledged their commitment and support to the process.(4) During his intervention, Mr. Bassiouni stressed, inter-alia, that JNA is “a non-political process that will remain inclusive, substantive and participatory for all Somalis”.  

But the reality is that the UN and its operations have had a great deal of difficulty functioning apolitically. Attempts to insulate the operations of the UN agencies from politics have always been unrealistic. The mandates of the UN agencies and international non-governmental organizations, in addition to humanitarian and relief works, have been characterized by their massive participation in issues pertaining to social justice, democratization, and the promotion of peacebuilding and reconciliation in post-conflict settings. For instance, Alex Costy, in his research work on the NGOs and aid during Mozambique’s transition to peace, stated, “many international NGOs have sought to play a significant role, not just in the delivery of material assistance to acutely distressed Mozambicans, but in combining humanitarian aid with measures to promote reconciliation, and the (re) activation of a dynamic civil sector within the country. They have done so by using considerable amounts of funding to engage directly with local communities in efforts to mould new forms of post-war identity and social interaction.”(5)

The political content of the Somali JNA process is articulated in its vision statement and in its priority clusters and cross-cutting issues. The introductory part of the JNA’s Concept Note affirms that the proposed Somali JNA is “nested within the current political reality”.  In other words, JNA is not only a technical process, but also a political process. The priority cluster related to governance, safety and the rule of law, for instance, include the establishment of the decentralized legislative, executive and judicial institutions; the promotion of conflict-resolutions mechanisms; the promotion of participatory strategies in decision-making processes; and the implementation of demobilization and disarmament strategies. Likewise, the cross-cutting issue related to peacebuilding, reconciliation and conflict draws upon the existing drivers of conflict analysis. In fact, prior to the commencement of the JNA works, the World Bank had conducted a conflict analysis to better understand the sources and dynamics of the Somali conflict and to ensure the undertaking of a “conflict-sensitive JNA programme”.

Drawing upon the above facts, which emphasize the underlying political nature of the priority needs of post-conflict Somalia, I believe that it is important not to classify this process as a technical process only.

But Mr. David Bassiouni must be commended for securing the legitimacy and support for the JNA from the Parliament and the House of Elders in Somaliland. We believe that the involvement of this part of Somalia and its people in this important endeavour was very cogent and compelling.  The Parliament and the House of Elders (Gurti) in Somaliland have welcomed Mr. Bassiouni and expressed their unwavering support and confidence in the effort of the UN and the World Bank. And very recently, the President of Somaliland has inaugurated the Somaliland JNA Consultative and Validation Workshop(6). The objective of this workshop was to “review and validate the preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations presented in draft cluster reports; as well as provide clarity and understanding of the goals and expected outcomes of the JNA process”. The participants of the workshops – Ministers, MPs, and other stakeholders – have welcomed the findings of the cluster reports and have asserted that they would fully commit to the process.  

However, some critics in Hargeisa argue that the JNA and RDP are being targeted solely for “Mbagathi’s Transitional Federal Institutions”. They insist that these processes (JNA and RDP) are undermining the integrity of Somaliland as an independent state.  Moreover, some members of the Parliament and the House of Elders have expressed their skepticism over the way the JNA process deals with the issue of Sool and Sanaag regions. The World Bank and the UN have not been able to provide any plausible explanation to the MPs in Somaliland as to whether Sool and Sanaag regions were being treated as part of Puntland or Somaliland within the context of the JNA and RDP processes. Besides, the JNA, as a political process, and not only a technical process as alleged by the UN and World Bank Coordinators, must have a clear vision with regard to the sensitive issue of the Somali territorial integrity and national unity.

4.0     Conclusion

The challenges presented by the emerging Somali Islamic Courts might have blinded us to and diverted our attention from developments affecting the JNA process.  Nonetheless, we are glad that some headway has been made in the Somali JNA process.  The strengthening of the involvement of Somali counterparts in cluster teams was a good step in the right direction. We concur with the idea of engaging different stakeholders with the view to obtaining information and data from all areas of Somalia.

We, however, assert that the data that have been compiled from Benadir, Lower Shabelle, Juba Valley, and Gedo for the cluster and cross-cutting reports can by no means represent the reality on the ground in these areas. We have attributed this to, among other things, the gruesome unjust reality of occupation, and the inability of the people in the regions to exercise their legitimate rights as stipulated in the underlying fundamental tenets of the Federal Charter of the Transitional Federal Institutions.

We are aware that the cluster and cross-cutting draft reports are ready. We are also aware that a series of “consultative and validation workshops” have already been convened. We do not, however, believe that the workshop recently convened in Baidoa has provided, as alleged, the opportunity for Somali stakeholders from Bay, Bakool and Lower Shabelle to review and validate the findings presented in the draft cluster reports.

The Nairobi Secretariat is nowadays talking about the “participation of a wide spectrum of the Somali society in the consultative and validation workshops”. But we would like to request the Secretariat to provide us with the names of the participants who have represented the “regional administration, traditional and religious leaders, business community and professionals, women and youth groups, and the civil society” from the Lower Shabelle region at the Baidoa consultative and validation workshop.
  
The new cabinet of the TFG and the JNA Secretariat must endeavour to constitute an independent panel of Somali scholars to undertake a thorough review and evaluation of all the reports. At stake here is the credibility of the TFIs and its leadership, the UN and the World Bank, and the donor countries, which are painstakingly committed to helping the beleaguered people of Somalia recover from the quagmire of the 15 years of misery and instability.

Buri M. Hamza
Toronto, Canada
buri.hamza@gmail.com
           
previous articles by the same author.:

The Somali Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) and Reconstruction and Development Programme – A Critique
Part One   

The Somali Joint Needs Assessment and the Controversy
- Part Two of the Critique -

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