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In January 2011 the Somali civil war will be exactly twenty years old. Though hopes are dim, for there are no silver linings, and people – analysts and all – will be cynical as usual, we cannot dismiss altogether the possibility of a slim chance in this year for things to turn dramatically around and surprise us with a cessation of hostilities. The Almighty works in mysterious ways and He alone can change hearts and minds within the blink of an eye. That is something immeasurably far above the capacity of mortal human beings to do or even attempt. Those who read the Qur’an know full well that Prophet Muhammad (SAW) was told: “ had you spent all that is in the earth, you could not have united their hearts, but Allah united them; surely, He is Mighty, Wise.” (Surah No.8,Verse 63). However, before the change of hearts and minds, which is an essential prerequisite for genuine reconciliation, it may well be possible for one or the other of the currently incompetent combatants (the combined forces of the TFG and AMISOM on the one hand and the united forces of the two Islamist factions - Shabaab and Hizbul-Islam - on the other) to end the stalemate in Mogadishu in the course of the year and emerge victorious. However, a TFG/AMISOM victory in Mogadishu is not likely to change the situation much in the immediate future because much of the surrounding areas and all the contiguous regions are in the hands of the Islamists, and these latter can always retreat, regroup and relaunch their attacks on the capital. If they fail to retake the capital they will at least resort to a war of attrition and prevent TFG/AMISOM from expanding into the hinterland; consequently, TFG/AMISOM will hardly have a day’s rest. If, conversely, the Islamists manage to overrun the combined forces of TFG and AMISOM (which is possible but not probable) it will be much easier for them to unite the country under their rule. It appears that, if the Islamists overrun Mogadishu the north of the country will also fall to them like a house of cards. Although Puntland and ‘Somaliland’ Administrations have shown awareness of the common threat coming to them from the Islamists they have been reluctant to co-ordinate their security policies, much less unite their forces, in order to face that threat. Almost everyone agrees that they are sitting ducks for the Islamist forces should these latter succeed to overpower the TFG/AMISOM forces in Mogadishu. Alternatively, the Islamists may possibly change their strategy and decide not to wait for the fall of Mogadishu after all before capturing the north, in which case the entire country, except for the few TFG-occupied blocks in Mogadishu, will be virtually in their hands. On the surface, the Islamists do not enjoy much popular sympathy in Puntland and ‘Somaliland’. Beneath the surface, however, it is suspected that they have a large number of followers who have been trained, organized, and equipped and are simply waiting for their marching orders. The security situation in Puntland has been shaky for some time and the Islamist contingent in Galgala proved difficult to disgorge and is still there. Meanwhile, terrorist activities are still going on in both Bossaso and Garowe, though more in the former than in the latter. In ‘Somaliland’ not much has happened since the terrorist incident of October 29, 2008 in which the Presidential Mansion was car-bombed, the casualties being 23 dead and 28 injured. That same day simultaneous bombing rocked Bossaso as well. It seems that the two bombings were synchronized. Burao has been a constant source of worry for the authorities in ‘Somaliland’, for it is believed to be the locus where the crypto Islamists are concentrated; and every now and then houses are searched, caches of arms are found and people are arrested. From the outset the TFG was encumbered with huge and impossible tasks as if it was intended to fail. Those tasks were to: (a) establish peace and restore law and order; (b) recreate the institutional machinery of the State; (c) solidify the gains of the reconciliation conferences by engaging in further reconciliation on the ground; (d) prepare a draft constitution for the country; (d) provide services; (e) establish a federal system in the country; and (f) prepare the country for a general election including the formation of political parties. Quixotically, all these monumental tasks were supposed to be achieved within a short transition by an interim government that had no army, no police, no resources, no political and managerial skills, no wholehearted external support, and was, above all, unable to provide its own security. As the responsibilities were Himalayan in proportion, so were the failures. Instead of encouragement, criticisms were incessant, insincere and merciless. Hardly anyone had any sympathy for the ‘poor TFG’. But the TFG and TFP (Transitional Federal Parliament) did for their part everything possible to deserve all the opprobrium. An unwieldy unicameral parliament comprising of five hundred and fifty members (doubled overnight in Djibouti from two hundred and seventy-five without any rhyme or reason) proved to be nothing but a national disgrace. Instead of using its oversight powers to take the government to task and curb corruption it became the source and the epitome of corruption. Its members, by and large, are unschooled, unprincipled, and unscrupulous. They are also unrepresentative because they have neither been elected nor even really selected by their respective clans which is the reason why they do not – perhaps cannot – visit their putative constituencies in order to make the connection between the government and the people. They use their votes as a commercial commodity to be bought and sold, and they cast them, as is publicly known, not out of conviction (for they have no convictions), but to the highest bidder. That is precisely why the government insists on the show of hands in any crucial parliamentary voting in order to avoid the possibility of the votes it had bought going astray; and, as often, the Speaker precipitates a crisis by equally insisting on voting by secret ballot. The Speaker himself, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, is the same venal and vulpine man who had wrecked the previous parliament as a speaker and, consequently, ran away to Asmara because of fear of retribution from the man he tried to frustrate and bring down - Abdullahi Yusuf, the then President of the TFG. He was succeeded by Shiekh Adan Mohammed Nur (Adan Madoobe) a man of the same genre who also hails from the same region as Sharif Hassan. The two men were bitter rivals and their rivalry contributed immensely to the destabilization of both the Parliament and the Government. Most of the members of Parliament spend most of their time and the money they earn illicitly in hotels and coffee-shops in Nairobi gossiping and scheming. As a result, achieving a quorum for meetings is always difficult. Their salaries, which are paid once in a long while in arrears, are an obvious drain on the meager resources available. This is no doubt a rogue parliament led by rogue individuals, and this is the great misfortune of Somalia today. Instead of seeing to it that there is ‘good government’, it destroys any chance of achieving it. For instance, it calls on the prime minister to form a ‘small but competent’ cabinet and then turns around to bring down the government by denying it the vote of confidence under the pretext of not being ‘all inclusive’, all this being a ploy to force the government to bribe some of its fierce opponents with meaningless ministerial positions and also buy the votes necessary for it to survive. Furthermore, whenever the TFG is bound to seek parliamentary assent or confirmation of new ministers it has also to buy the necessary votes in order to get it. The confirmation of the current prime minister, Mohammed Abdullahi Mohammed (Farmajo), had to go through the usually long and unsavory process. Part of the ordeal is the fact that the Speaker himself has to be placated – through ‘palm greasing’ - so that he would order voting by the show of hands in lieu of secret ballot. Surely, a rogue parliament can only lead to a rogue government and the TFG plays dirty politics exactly the way Parliament and its Speaker (the master manipulator who has been dubbed as Sharif Xariif – Clever Sharif) want it played. It is well known that President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the Transitional Federal President, has been under the spell of the Speaker ever since both returned from exile in Asmara two years ago, and the President himself has admitted in a speech to the Somali Community in Washington, D.C that he and Sheikh Hassan, the Speaker, were ‘inseparable’. Like his predecessor, Abdullahi Yusuf, Sheikh Sharief has never, understandably, limited himself to the restrictive role of the elder statesman he was supposed to be as a ceremonial president. For he has been acting, in like manner, as an executive president to whom the prime minister and the cabinet were responsible. He has been jumping from crisis to crisis with the Speaker and the Prime Minister and he dismissed the former prime minister, Omer Abdurashid, (his own appointee) twice, admitting the first time that he had erred in dismissing him, but insisting on the second time that he should go. In so doing he ignored the fact that a precedent had been established in Nur Hussein Hassan (Nur Adde) vs. Abdullahi Yusuf that the president could not dismiss the prime minister as long as the latter commanded the confidence of Parliament. But, precedents are meaningless in this muddled, lawless and ipse dixit situation. The new prime minister, Mohammed Abdullahi Fermajo ((appointed only recently after prolonged consultations) has produced, to his credit, an impressive array of highly qualified ministers. He, an educated man himself, has mustered enough courage in trying, in vain, to do away with the unpopular but perfectly reasonable 4.5 formula of power sharing and to limit his cabinet to 18 ministers. But these proved to be non-starters. Anyhow, he and his cabinet are expected to prove their worth on the ground. The difficulties staring them in the face are daunting, for they are extremely difficult to surmount. First, the Prime Minister and his ministers are novices in the field of practical politics, which in Somalia, as in the rest of Africa, is both dirty and dangerous. Secondly, dealing with a rogue parliament is bound to frustrate any honest effort. Thirdly, they can hardly bring about change in the military theatre even if they abandon all their other responsibilities, as they should, and concentrate on bringing the Islamists to their knees. As the Islamists are not amenable to compromise, everything must be subordinated to the requirements of restoring peace and security to the country; for only then, will it be possible to undertake the necessary work for recovery and reconstruction. In the meantime, one big change is supposed to occur in 2011. The mandate of the TFG and the Parliament will end in August. That presents an opportunity for substantial change and is only eight months from hence. There are signs from Djibouti already, albeit faint at this juncture, that another ‘National Reconciliation Conference’ – yet another exercise in futility - may be held. There are suspicions too that this may just be a stratagem to extend the life of the current TFG and Parliament; and there are allegations also that both the TFG and Parliament are planning to do so on their own and thereby dispense with the need for a national conference. Should the latter be the case there will be vehement protestations and condemnations that will rob the TFG and the Parliament of the semblance of legitimacy, which they currently enjoy. Whatever the case may be the signs do not augur well so far for a meaningful and welcome change. In view of the general situation remaining dire, and disappointments with the TNG, successive TFGs, and parliaments. there is perceptible lack of interest in more ‘reconciliation’ conferences that will likely produce more of the same. Nevertheless, we may still see a flurry of activities in the coming few months for a June or July conference in Djibouti and prospective presidential candidates may then emerge and as usual the election will be on sale and the highest bidder will win the presidency of the presidency of the Republic. In 2011 also we are likely to see renewed vigor in Puntland’s fight against piracy and an armed group deeply entrenched in the hills of Galgala and on whom the frequent breaches of security is blamed. The group is said to be an appendage of Shabaab, and Puntland authorities have in fact launched attacks on it in the course of this year but could not manage to expel it from the area. It has now transpired that, owing to these main concerns, Puntland will shortly receive from external sources some help to train and equip a military contingent numbering about 1500 and comprising both marine and land forces. Not surprisingly, the Administration in Hargeisa has expressed fears that Puntland is being aggrandized at the expense of ‘Somaliland’. Ordinarily, secessionist ‘Somaliland’ should maintain and strengthen the bonds that exist between its people and the people of Puntland and should recognize the security interests it shares with Puntland. ‘Somaliland’, however, is still under the illusion of being a sovereign state and is thus blind to the reality on the ground; namely, that there are actually no borders between it and Puntland so far as the people are concerned. Goods, services, and people criss-cross on a daily basis the imaginary border, and the port of Bossaso in Puntland serves ‘Somaliland as well. However, this artificial quarrel between these neighboring and autonomous regions is symptomatic of the senseless situation prevailing in Somalia as a whole. However, so far as ‘Somaliland’ is concerned I do not expect the year 2011 to bring any change at all unless of course the fighters of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC) manage to wrest their land from the clutches of ‘Somaliland’, which is always a possibility. In October this year the U.S.Government announced a “Dual Track Approach to Somalia”. This policy was undoubtedly borne of the need to give peace dividends to and encourage those regions that have established peace and order in their areas and are struggling to improve economic conditions for their people. Puntland and ‘Somaliland’ are obviously the immediate beneficiaries of this policy. Under this policy efforts will be deployed towards local development so that successful areas will provide needed demonstration effect to those other areas that have not found peace and are therefore lagging behind. It seems that emphasis will be laid on what has come to be known as a ‘Bottom-up Approach’. I actually prefer the phrase, ‘Development from Below’ coined by Nehru and adopted by Ursula Hicks as a title for her 1961 book on comparative local government. The policy will be set on foot in 2011 and if both Puntland and ‘Somaliland’ show a decent absorptive capacity resources, including technical expertise and training, will be pouring in and if both get busy with their development they will have no time for the senseless and artificial dispute that continues to poison their relations. It is my fervent hope that such will be case. There has been some Somali opposition to the “Dual Track Approach” - an opposition grounded on the false premise that it is a disguised prelude to the ultimate balkanization of Somalia. This opposition comes from two quarters: those who genuinely fear that the Approach may lead to the separation of both Puntland and ‘Somaliland’ from the rest of Somalia; and those others whose regions are still in the throes of the civil war, are envious about the progress achieved in both Puntland and ‘Somaliland’ and would wish this progress to be arrested until such time that their areas find peace and can catch up. They fear that if these two regional entities are too far ahead they will negotiate from a point of strength when arrangements for the federal structure are laid on the table. But really, these are the very people who strongly advocate for a unitary system in which all authority emanates from Mogadishu, but are willing to settle, as an alternative, for a weak federation in which the residual powers lie with the federal government. The debate and haggling on how Somali federalism should be shaped are a long way from hence but there is some posturing going on. I can not help but conclude that the sad fact and the bitter reality staring us in the face is that neither in 2011, nor even a decade after, will Somalia see good governance so long as those in office do not only betray their public trust but loot the treasures of the country in broad daylight with impunity and without suffering social sanctions. The country’s politicians and bureaucrats have no compunction at all and the public did not only acquiesce to them but they even encouraged further improprieties and promoted a putrid culture of immorality by bestowing respect and honor on those criminal elements that grow rich by looting what genuinely belongs to masses perennially suffering from abject poverty whose symptoms are disease, hunger and illiteracy. Whilst this is true no respect or honor is accorded to those few who remain impecunious by refraining from looting the public coffer: sadly, they are even condemned as fools. The country cries out for the restoration of its erstwhile culture of decency, religious piety, and its moral compass. This is what the Islamists purport to provide and this is what gets them a large following. Some deeply concerned people would argue that the Islamists would at least unite the country; that they would ban clanism; and that they are clean and honest and would be above corruption. Some of them are even blind to the faults of the Islamists. Others, though equally hungry for the restoration of their collective conscience, are disappointed by the Islamists whom they thought were in the best position to inculcate values of probity and religious piety that would ensure obedience to the unenforceable. The majority , however, are frightened of them because they apply draconian, un-Islamic and un-Somali measures. Their rule runs counter to what Allah had revealed to His Messenger, Prophet Muhammad (SAW) in Surah III (Aal-Imran) Verse 159:
Mercy and forgiveness are the cornerstones of Islam when it comes to human relations. But the Islamists are too eager to punish and are cruel and barbarous. Furthermore, they are blatantly ignorant of statecraft and governance much as they are untutored in the complex issues of international economic relations. Here, one may jump and think of the educated class as the would-be saviors of the country, but one does not need a university degree for moral rectitude. Surely, the country needs highly educated people, technically sound but morally upright - too proud and self-respecting to steal from their own country and rob its resources. Somalia has been in a moral crisis for a long time and its salvation lies in the purgation of its soul. Good governance needs good people, over and above all else, and the right human spirit to make it work. That is a long investment, which needs a good beginning and, to my mind, a good beginning is made when we truly decide to climb out of the cesspool of immorality into which we have fallen. ______ Related Articles:* Heesta Saadaal ee 2011 _____________________________________________________________________ We welcome the submission of all articles for possible publication on WardheerNews.com
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