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Since independence, ever-growing is the plight of the Somalis. In the first decade of independence, according to Economist Ozay Mehmet of Carleton University, Somalia was one of the largest recipients of foreign aid. During 1964-69 alone, he says, Somalia “received an annual average of about $15 per head of her 3 million populations” [1]. Despite this, if one ethnic group that seems today to be consistently subjected to life threatening abuse, legal disenfranchisement inside Somalia and in neighboring countries such as Yemen, Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia, it is the Somalis. Some Western donors and NGOs have kept responding to many incidents in the fate of the Somalis. These Somali predicaments which have been given an extensive coverage by the Western media also requires some inquiry on qualifications of the role and contributions of Western donors which maintain that their goodwill imagination have seized by the never-ending Somali dilemma. Many conferences that were endorsed under the auspices of humanitarian grounds have endeavored to make a more dignified way to assist the millions of Somalis impoverished by civil wars. Somali leadership and elite have often been blamed for their failure to improve the lives of their people. Without passing the blame from Somali leaders to any other donor nations/agencies, I will point out that some NGOs’ humanitarian tasks have been rendered insignificant by either the difficulties of aid process (especially, its implementations and follow-ups) or the reality of Isbaaro fiefdoms in parts of Somalia. A Noble Motive It was the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Margaret Thatcher, who said: “No one would remember the Good Samaritan if he’d only had good intentions. He had money as well [2].” The idea of “humanitarian intervention” is therefore a concept that fully developed late in the 20th century by the Western rich nations. It has been encouraged by the Security Council to play a major role within the security concerns of all nations and attempt to put pressure on nation-states to prevent human calamities when genocide, ethnic cleansing, or as in the case of Somalia, clan-cleansing is occurring [3]. The International Community has also formed a rationale to adopt certain humanitarian policies that “assist the victims of humanitarian crises when the victims’ government either failed to act or instigated the suffering” – as the case is now in Somalia [4]. It was under this blanket that enabled the United Nations to opt for direct intervention in Somalia, when more than 300,000 people died of famine caused by civil war and drought in 1991-92 [5]. However, each donor agency/country might have a different agenda of motivation, which may change the original intention of ‘humanitarian’ motives aimed to alleviate poverty and misery in places like Somalia. Some skeptics, however, argue that certain donor activities are not only driven by charitable motives, but also reflect a number of donor priorities. Some NGO may embrace their socio-religious and cultural values, while other NGO activities might translate the political explanations of the donor country – which could be a national security issue or a pure self-interest. Still, the good intentions of many NGOs cannot be ignored. Many NGO activities are more likely driven by charitable motives. These NGOs feel to have humanitarian moral responsibility to assist the poorer countries. They feel that it is their duty to help the poor. Such a motivating force for aid-giving is the primary cause that warring Somali faction groups compete endlessly to access and, if possible, to control NGOs’ aid supplies and activities. As Carole Collins comments on the impact that the early 1990s United Nation’s humanitarian intervention had on Somali civil wars, “Clans intensified their competition for aid resources, the only significance source of income and wealth amid shattered ruins of Somalia’s economy.” [6] Subsequently, Isbaaro fiefdoms represent permanent reminders of the difficult task which NGOs are facing, trying their best to deliver aid to the needy Somalis. Not surprisingly, many critics thus argue that aid relief supplies and services, designated to the target group/region, are not being delivered or properly distributed to the intended recipients. Critics however forget that certain environment (as areas controlled by warlords) makes NGOs difficult to operate; and not meeting the demands of needy people will certainly increase. Nonetheless, in the records of these NGOs, the relief supplies and projects were not wiped off; and in fact, aid workers are hoping that one day their charity will be delivered, fulfilled, and hopefully received in good fashion. For the needy Somalis, it has become a hope at the end of the tunnel to hear from aid workers full of grace utterance like: relief supplies transported by ship or trucks will be sent as soon as possible to the victims. Charity Covers a Multitude of Sins One of the fundamental tenets of Western NGO philosophy is supposed to be against all forms of warlordism, anarchy, and hegemonic forces; and instead, it should promote working directly with the needy people [7]. Conversely, incompetent clannish groups in Somalia are mainly the sole collaborators, waiting to exhaust the limited aid supplies. The delivery and distribution of aid supplies inevitability involve working with conniving people: warlords, mooryaans (young clan-based gangsters), and cunning local NGO/civil society organizations. Much worse, aid supplies are often transported, guarded, and distributed by warlords’ vehicles and mooryaans. This will allow local NGOs to sell aid supplies in open markets, in front of the intended recipients. It seems that donor agencies have no choice but to work with these people, despite the numerous failures that their aid activities encountered. The supposedly proposition is not that donor agencies favour these conniving local kin-based groups on any pretext; their act simply reflect the famous proverb: charity covers a multitude of sins. They know that these people (i) do not represent the victims; (ii) do have however mooryaans who can either guard or raid the supplies; and (iii) have the ambition to present themselves as a legitimate political authority. Foreign donors also are aware that almost all Somali civil society organizations amount to clan networks distinct from that of the Western NGOs, which transcended family/kinship ties. Somali civil society are products of anarchy and statelessness and therefore inseparable from clan factions and warlords. The noble ideas of humanitarianism, Good Samaritan, or fī-sabīlillāh efforts are not there; in fact, many of these so-called civil society organizations are against the establishment of effective government institutions in their domain. The mushrooming of local NGOs does not therefore reflect the blossoming of Western-type NGO ideology – an ideology which defines its tasks as a defense of the poor, child protection, the safe-guarding of women’s interests and the preservation of the environment, etc [8]. The flourishing of these local organizations simply represent as an evidence of the cunning adaptability of the warlords to ensure their access to the only remaining main sources: foreign aid supplies and services [9]. In addition, Western donors know that warlords are currently engaging in all kinds of illegal and shady business, including Khat (Catha Edulis, a popular stimulant) business. Nothing progressive can be expected from these warlords in their capacity as humanitarian aid facilitators. Yet, a marriage of convenience that donor agencies are seeking is now obligatory scenario that could reveal itself in 50-50 chance of success. Many agencies were forced to bribe and turn a blind eye to the warlords’ violations of aid processes. To suggest further, some agencies’ involvement with the warlords is well known within the intended recipient communities. Relief aid is therefore becoming the blood line of the warlord’s Isbaaro fiefdom; and aid agencies hope to translate this relationship, as it seems, as leverage which in the long run could play paternalistic role in favor of the victims – hoping that the day when warlords no longer rule will come. Even at the height of the International humanitarian military intervention, NGO aid supplies have suffered grand scale pillaging. For example, a UN official announcement (December 20, 1992) stated that “thirty ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross]-chartered trucks, carrying rice, have been hijacked 112 kilometers north of Mogadishu [10]. Within that month, CARE relief vehicle was hijacked in Mogadishu and three of its occupants were shot [11]. All these incidents occurred when more than fifteen thousand International army forces (UNITAF) led by the US army were in Somalia. The purpose of the military intervention was obvious: to hasten relief supplies to reach the starving Somalis. Yet, after three months, humanitarian Assistance Conference for Somalia, held in Addis Ababa by the United Nations, warned that “two million Somalis were still vulnerable to death by starvation”. [12] To facilitate the delivery of food aid, this military intervention was supposed to crush with brute force the clan-based armed factions that had been fighting for a merciless war, devastating the country’s infrastructure and causing the death of many Somali civilians. From historical perspective, this civil war was the culmination of many local factors, including an existing animosity between Somali clans which predates, as I believe, the nation-state of Somalia, going back to our ancient nomadic rural way of life. However, among the many clan-warfare that have raged in the Somali Peninsula since its modern history, this ongoing civil war is by far the most ruthless one in terms of human loss and material devastation. There are many reasons that are attributed for this misfortune. Firstly, the conflict involves the usage of modern weapons; and it is fought mainly in urban areas, unlike the rural warfare of the nomads. The other major feature of the unending Somali warfare is the involvement of the notion of nation-state in which Somalis view as the she-camel, maandeeq, which every clan rightly deserves to own and milk – which aid donor agencies and its activities now correspond to the she-camel. In the midst of the Somali civil wars, the relations between the needy Somalis and the International Communities, particularly the NGOs and neighboring countries, did suffer. The neighboring countries violated the arms embargo imposed on Somalia [13], supported certain clan-factions/warlords, and continued their ambitions to weaken Somali nation-state – all are actions contrary with the spirit of IGAD, AU, and UN. Beside the political ambitions of our neighboring countries, the activities of some Western NGOs also became in direct conflict with the international norms of impartiality in the affairs of Somali clan warfare. Neutrality Helps the Warlords For more than a decade, only seldom have NGOs’ aid activities been talked about without mentioning some sort of delays, hijack, or theft of aid convoys. So far, NGO activities and assistance were mainly reduced as booty (billiliqo) waiting belligerent mooryaans to claim. Somali victims are so tired and could really caretheless about warlords being annoyed. They ask themselves since the whole aid process is in the hands of the donor agencies, why don’t these donors utilize their aid as leverage and force the warlords to abandon warlordism? Donor agencies are in a position to discriminate people and places; and as the Noble Peace Prize Winner, Elie Wiesel, speech marks: “Take sides. Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim. Silence encourages the tormentor, never the tormented.” NGO operators have the opportunity to exercise leverage, unless they have a self-interest that is different from that of the needy Somalis – which could be summed up as part of treason against the Somali people. Here, we are not trying to simply draw a picture of the sequence of events that some Somalis may describe relief efforts as the negative work of the International Community. No doubt that many Somalis who have been through refugee camps and are now in the Diaspora greatly appreciate the efforts and activities of NGOs in helping Somali victims of the civil war. To tell the truth, there are many agencies, governments, and individuals who wholeheartedly helped Somalis, and virtually have no blame in this context. Strange Bedfellows In my discussion, I will also attempt to detail of what I call “the politics of marqaamid” with a plausible analysis, in order to improve the understandings of the problems of aid programs and the prolonged Somali civil war. Here, the term marqaamid refers to the mild stimulating effect of Khat-chewing. As I have mentioned in my previous literature, One factor that comes forth in my assessment, again and again, is the fluidity of Somali politics and its justifications in which clannism in general was employed by the warlords as a rallying force for manipulation. Recently, we are however beginning to uncover another contribution that made Somali warlords non-discardable. This contribution, which has already made many progressive Somalis disappointed, has been how these warlords have cultivated themselves in the import-export business; and how easily they have integrated themselves into the Khat (Somali stimulant) trade. These warlord monsters who turned into stimulant importers/ traders now seem untamable; and any genuine government or national reconciliation project appear beyond our reach. Historically, this popular stimulant was used by the Somalis in many different ways. Khat-chewing are used to keep one awake during long trips or long hours of working/fighting. Even during colonial period, as Charles Geshekter notes, Khat-chewing “became popular among small groups of poets known alternatively as the buugaan bug or qaraami, who emphasized social solidarity and community of purpose. . .” [14] – i.e. Khat-chewing places became the source of agitation and resistance for the Somali youth. When the British colonial governor, Gerald Reese, attempted to ban the use of Khat in late 1940s, “his efforts simply stimulated its consumption as ‘chewing’ became symbolic of one’s refusal to accept colonialist authority”.[15] The British not only failed to curb Khat but also made it a popular stimulant that accelerated liberation political thoughts. Similarly, when Siyaad Barre’s government also prohibited the trade or consumption of Khat in late the 1980s, Khat-chewing became more prevalent in the southern parts of Somalia; and subsequently, more armed political factions emerged from its prohibition. The NGOs are aware of the significance of this popular stimulant in today’s Somali society; they know how Somalis embrace this plant; and what it means to those impoverished by the civil war whose only hope is to afford a bit of “xalaal” exciting pastime. Therefore, reflecting the current state of frustration, the problem of “Marqaan politics” remains real and formidable. The International Communities are unable to effectively coordinate development initiatives while terminating warlordism and reducing Khat-chewing habits, which are real challenges to nation-building. As it seems, the International donor agencies are willing to cohabit with these warlords/Khat traders and, if possible, join hands with them in their effort to restore Somalia and assist the millions of Somalis that are in dire situation. After all, to borrow Shakespeare’s line, misery acquaints a man with strange bedfellows – which I would equate with the Somali saying: baahiyi nin kuu daran bay kuu geysaa. That is, an environment has been created where the politics of food aid do adjoin with “the politics of the marqaan”. This undesirable interrelation will furnish the warlords to buy support from the impoverished and displaced Somalis. Some warlords have mastered the art of manipulation and deceit, offering NGO workers to even use their facilities (airports, mooryaans, and transportations, etc). For the moment, such co-existence and relationship can hardly be described as “progressive” conduct. The existing goodwill intent but ill-coordinated donor aid is more likely to prolong warlordism in Somalia. Aid supplies could strength the Isbaaro fiefdoms and could lead to the balkanization of Somalia, which guarantees the ‘merit’ for the NGOs’ involvement forever – i.e. establishing the biggest market of suffering. A. S. Faamo References: [2] Television interview, January 06, 1980. [3] The Limits of Sovereignty, U.N. DOC. DPI/1178 (1992). [4] Edward Perkins, “An International Agenda for Change,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, Vol. 4, No. 3 (July, 1994), p. 381. [5] The Security Council has passed Resolution 794 which defines the first-phase of the intervention: to establish security conditions in order to provide for uninterrupted flow of relief supplies. [6] Carole Collins, “U.N. chaos-fixing failure is NGO challenge; multinational groups meet to plan strategy,” National Catholic Reporter, March 24, 1995, v31 n31 p8 (2). [7] Patrick Chabel and Jean-Pascal Daloz, “The Illusions of Civil Society,” in Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 24. [8] Ibid., p.23. [9] In less than a decade, more than one thousand so-called Civil Society Organizations are registered in Somalia. See: http://www.somali-civilsociety.org/directories/csoall.php [10] Source: AFP in English, Paris, December 20, 1992. [11] Source: AFP in English, Paris, December 29, 1992. [12] Statement made by The United Nations coordinator for humanitarian affairs, Jan Eliasson. Source: PANA in English, Dakar, March 11, 1993. [13] UN member states were supposed to be responsible for the implementations of UN’s 1992 arms embargo (Resolution 733). [14] Charles L. Geshekter, “Anti-colonialism and Class Formation: The Eastern Horn of Africa Before 1950,” The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1985), p. 26. [15] Ibid, p. 27.
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