| |
|
|
|
Lessons From Somalia's Civil War By Ali A. Fatah Washington D.C. Jan. 28, 2005 Many international actors that have had entanglements with the so-called Somali civil war of the 1990s were able to draw veritable lessons from their experiences in that turbulent country. (A good deal of information concerning those lessons learned could be easily accessed through a cursory search of the Internet). The governments of the United States and Canada have gleaned strategic information from their brief military incursions into that conflict, while United Nation's agencies were able to develop how-to plans for operating humanitarian missions under similar circumstances. Not so with the central characters of this conflict: Somalis. For Somalis, the situation is markedly different. From the outset it appears that all were thinking alike, and therefore no one was thinking outside the box. But in close examination, the analogy of life as a tin of sardines in which all are looking for the key does not capture the essence of what really happened. Perhaps, the prevailing condition was akin to a case in which the sinister mind-set that ignited the destructive flames of civil war in the early days of the conflict took a dim view of searches for common ground and worked even harder to prevent rapprochements thereafter. Because, in those mad days the illusion of clan power politics—the tenets of which were, “Friends come and go, but enemies accumulate”—was in full swing. Only those scenarios that fit well with the transient outlook of the warlords—the arch typical neo-clanists of the times— were entertained. Generally, the neo-clanists had been preoccupied, first and foremost, with temporary security and self-aggrandizement to the exclusion of all else. To them, society guarantees of justice for all, to say nothing of freedom and liberty, represented risks that they were not willing to accept freely (as they were heavily indoctrinated to recognize stark choices in a world made up of winners and losers). Yet, it was not uncommon even then to hear the mantra of national unity and equal justice repeated, rather routinely, by peacemakers and hardened warlords alike. The difference is that for many faction leaders such utterances were (and continue to be) largely platitudes for public consumption. The problem is made worse by the fact that the warlords almost never had much of a reason to fear suffering the consequence of their fondness for studied duplicity. Instead, in the hitherto polarized Somali society, warlords often wore their most egregious behavior as patches of honor before their respective constituencies to cultivate tough guy images. That is why religious imagery, earthy bravado, unethical dealings and outright corruption have co-existed for years without provoking the least bit of shame from the practitioners of deplorable acts nor an occasional outrage on the part of the populace at large. It is important to note, however, that neo-clanism did not insinuate itself into the Somali national consciousness during the civil war period; it has been a feature of the Somali national life (and death) for more than a generation. As a result, a palpable fear of the “other” that engendered an all-encompassing atmosphere of mutual suspicion began to engulf the nation over period of several decades. The unhappy legacy of this practice has been and continues to be the lack of any appreciable common understanding, among Somalis, of where the affairs of the clans end and those of the nation begin. In this context, the recent conciliatory sounding pronouncements of the offending faction leaders are for the most part nothing more than tired clichés that would change direction with the xagaayo winds off the Benadiri Coast. In truth, these characters neither aspire to the ideals of western-style democracy nor do they adhere to edicts of the traditional, Xeer-based governance, which is still used by many Somalis in their daily lives. The faction leaders, and their sidekicks amongst the urban elite, follow an improvisational approach to national politics that, at its best, produces ad hoc solutions. Needless to say, the resultant makeshift policies have failed time and again to be a realistic substitute for the need to identify and subscribe to a set of shared principles that can guide the nation to the next stage of social development. Hence it is imperative to recognize and examine the lessons of the many years of internecine wars and chaos in the nation's recent past to be able to help forge a better future. Lessons Learned• The clans are infinitely better off socially, politically and economically in a cooperative arrangement, namely federation (or even co-federation) rather than being in each other's throat in atmosphere of perpetual conflict. This win-win arrangement has the added benefit of bringing about a long-term solution through the evolutionary process attendant to individual Somalis inevitable exercise of their God-given freedoms of movement and association, among others (outside of the clan structure). It is such an incremental approach that holds the key to meaningful social integration. Instantaneous transformation of the current antagonistic relations cannot be imposed from above, no matter how well intentioned its proponents may be. • As a nation of clans, Somalia has to be properly understood as a society in which the sum total trumps the parts (i.e., clans) from the standpoint of creating viable political entity(s). Thus it is safe to predict, here and now, that the issue of succession is as good as dead for it contravenes important signposts of the Somali society: the clan order and the national raison de tat. • The restoration of governmental prerogatives at the national level, as in the case of the current struggling federal dispensation, would mean the absence of warlord-inspired wars, but it would also signify the dawning of hard-won peace (albeit on a gradual basis). • The socio-economic picture of the Somali society as a whole has, during the years of civil war, changed in ways more important than material wealth; a culture of self-reliance seems to be taking root throughout the country and it is supplanting the system of utter dependence on foreign aid that prevailed in years past. • As faction leaders' mafia-like grip on captive communities passes into the ash-heap of history, a major source of toxic energy that heretofore fueled much of the inter-clan and intra-clan conflicts in the country is beginning to dissipate. • Somalis have come to the realization that the nation does not belong in the Arab Middle East, but it is firmly planted in African soil and, if it avails itself, through good governance, the opportunity to play a leading role in its Horn of Africa neighborhood is well within its grasp. Finally, the oft repeated axiom, “Those who cannot learn from history are condemned to repeat it” is an apt metaphor for the extent to which Somalis would decide to learn from and incorporate into the national life the lessons of the recent horrific civil war, some of which are recounted above. For good or ill, the civil war would remain a seminal event in the history of the nation. It came about as a result of colossal mistakes and quickly degenerated into unspeakably horrendous campaigns of self-destruction. Yet the atrocious events associated with that conflict carry with them important lessons that clearly demonstrate cause and effect. These lessons bring into sharp focus the detrimental effect of blunders against the nation and why they should never be repeated. In the end, it is the ability to understand our link to the past that would enable us to build a bridge to a more hopeful future. Ali A. Fatah Washington, DC
|
