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Editor's Note: Following is paper on Somalia and the Horn of Africa region. Dr. Ruth Iyob is an Eriterian Scholar and a Political Scientis at the University of Misouri . Dr. Edomon Keller is former Director of the African Studies at UCLA and current chair person of the center for Global Studies. We will be featuring the contribution of Dr. Keller towards understanding Somalia-US relations as well as the whole question of the Horn of Africa region. The purpose of this chapter is to critically assess the respective security challenges of the United States , the countries of the Horn of Africa, and the sometimes inter-connected, contradictory policies that have emerged in the era of globalization. Although such challenges are present in all parts of the continent, the greater Horn region has been singled out for special attention in this volume because of the high priority accorded it in the U.S. global war on terror. Globalization in the Horn is a multidimensional process with differentiated impacts on the region and the wider international state-system. This region is both linked and fragmented by its history and geo-strategic location as the bridge between Africa and the Middle East . Its contemporary hybrid nature—made more visible in the conflicts over identity, ideology, and resources—demonstrates the effects of long-term globalization with far-reaching regional and international repercussions. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, the United States has selectively engaged with and disengaged from the countries of the Horn, all of which are also involved in intra-state and intra-regional conflicts. These relationships tend to be conducted mainly on the basis of considerations of real politik , rather than on an appreciation of the interface of their respective national interests with those of the United States . In the post–Cold War period, U.S. policymakers have adjusted their former focus on combating communism largely to accommodating the new threat of international terrorism. The older focus in the United States ' policymaking process failed to pay adequate attention to “the interplay of the regional, social forces at work at a given moment of history.” The collapse of the Somali state triggered the global dispersal of its people. The multiple crises in the Sudan , the unraveling of the Ethiopia-Eritrea alliance, and the insertion of Djibouti into the “war on terrorism” all indicate the need for a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the impact of globalization in the Horn. This chapter examines how the Cold War militarized both the states and societies of the Horn, and seeks to shed light on the complexity of the security challenges that characterize U.S.-African relations not only in the particular case of the Horn region, but also with the other regions of the continent in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The Horn of Africa and the United States : An Introduction Although the United States never had close relations with any African country ( Liberia excepted), the onset of the Cold War and the strategic location of Eritrea and Ethiopia astride the Red Sea led to U.S. development of a strategic alliance with Ethiopia that lasted for twenty-five years. In fact, after the Second World War, Ethiopia became the cornerstone of U.S. involvement in the Horn of Africa. Following the Italian fascist occupation of Ethiopia , which lasted from 1936 to 1941, the British reinstated Emperor Haile Selassie and assisted him in administering part of modern-day Ethiopia until 1952. However, after 1943 British influence and involvement in Ethiopia declined rapidly. The Emperor systematically cultivated a relationship with the United States , and when the last vestiges of a British presence in Ethiopia disappeared, the United States stepped in as Ethiopia 's main superpower patron. Beginning with the inclusion of Ethiopia in President Harry Truman's Four Point Program, a reciprocal relationship developed between the two countries. The United States was interested in gaining a strategic presence in the Horn, and Ethiopia allowed it to establish a naval base and radio tracking station at Asmara in Eritrea . The presence of the Asmara tracking station enabled the United States to improve its ability to monitor the telegraphic traffic in the emerging Communist Bloc countries to the northeast. Ethiopia in turn received economic and military assistance from the United States . In May 1953, two diplomatic agreements were signed formalizing the relationship between the two countries: The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and the Agreement for the Utilization of Defense Installations within the Ethiopian Empire. A significant by-product of this new relationship was the political support Ethiopia received from the United States for its claims to Eritrea in the aftermath of the War. The United States ' desire to maintain its access and presence in the region of the Horn led to its becoming more deeply involved in Ethiopia 's domestic affairs than strategic planners had ever imagined. Thus, American policy concentrated on keeping Haile Selassie in power and on keeping the Horn relatively stable and free from communism. In this way, the strategic interests of the United States came to intersect historically with Haile Selassie's domestic and regional interests. A series of secret agreements between the two governments between 1960 and 1964 resulted in the modernization and dramatic expansion of the Ethiopian military. The stated purpose of this venture was to prepare Ethiopia to be able to respond successfully to whatever military challenge might come from independent Somalia , which claimed the Ogaden and Haud regions of southeastern Ethiopia . The U.S. presence in the Horn has to be considered against the backdrop of the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union , particularly in the aftermath of the USSR 's pronouncement in the mid-1970s of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which established the Kremlin's commitment to support fledgling socialist states. Earlier, the United States and Ethiopia had held the balance of power in the Horn when the extent of armed conflict there involved armed militants in Eritrea and Somali irredentists, the latter aided by the Government of Somalia. In the mid-1970s, the USSR drew close to Somalia when the new regime of General Siad Barre proclaimed its commitment to governing on the basis of scientific socialism. Despite the United States' displeasure with the military junta that overthrew Emperor Haile Salassie in 1974 because of its gross violations of human rights, the United States felt compelled to “draw a line in the sand” against the expansion of communism in the Horn. The United States continued to maintain a relationship with Ethiopia despite its turn to the left under its new ruling military junta, the Derg. However, this changed with the election of Jimmy Carter to the American presidency in 1976. On assuming office, Carter did withhold military sales and grants to Ethiopia because of its human rights record. This in turn led to a severing of relationships between the two countries in April 1977. In the process the door was left open for the USSR to step in as Ethiopia 's main superpower patron. The United States countered by increasing its efforts to woo Somalia away from the Soviets. From this point on, the United States saw its vital national interest as broadening its access and presence in the Horn. It actively considered direct military assistance to Somalia , though this assistance never became significant. What did become significant was the indirect military aid the United States provided via friendly third-party countries in the region (for example, Egypt , Saudi Arabia , and Sudan ). Also of significance was Carter's decision to pursue an encirclement strategy with regard to Ethiopia . This strategy was designed to provide countries surrounding Ethiopia with economic and military assistance, and thereby to hold communism at bay in the Horn. The United States asked Kenya, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Oman to allow their territories to be used as staging grounds for the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), which could be used to project U.S. military might into the Middle East and Persian Gulf. In the process of pursuing what they perceived to be their own vital interests, the superpowers contributed to the escalation of a regional arms race in the Horn. While the United States and the Soviets competed for clients, the Ethiopians and Somalis stepped up their hostilities toward one another. Consequently, the military capacities of all the countries in the region, except for Djibouti , increased significantly between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s. What was also significant by the mid-1980s was the growth in strength and activity of the armed nationalists in Eritrea , the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), and armed opposition groups inside of Ethiopia and Somalia . This created a widespread sense of physical insecurity in the Horn, with devastating effects on human security in the region. Border tensions, civil wars, and the natural catastrophe of drought compounded the problems of Ethiopia , Sudan , and Somalia . The collapse of the Somali state demonstrated the multiple and deleterious effects of both the irredentist campaigns against Ethiopia and the civil war. Shifting Terrains: The End of the Cold War and Political Islam in the Horn The end of the Cold War was accompanied by the escalation of intra-state conflicts and an upsurge of environmental and humanitarian crises in the Horn. The events of the mid- 1980s and early 1990s amply demonstrated the political, economic, and social repercussions of the end of the Cold War on intra-state and intra-regional relations. In Sudan , the post-Numeiri regime signaled the death knell of the prospects for pluralist democracy and secularist government. Numeiri's successors, Suwar al Dahab and Sadiq al-Mahdi, cemented the coalition of traditional and radical Islamists, and they embarked on a foreign-policy path that relegated the United States to a secondary position vis à vis Sudan's new patrons in North Africa and the Middle East, Libya and Iraq, respectively. This course marked a defiant articulation of anti-Americanism that gradually culminated in 1996 in a break of diplomatic relations. The regime of Sadiq al-Mahdi (1986–1989) was beset by the traditional rivalry between the two major sectarian parties and a civil-military coalition comprised of militant Islamists who until this period had been kept on the periphery of the political arena. Political assassinations and acts of terror became almost commonplace in Khartoum . Also, unrest raged in Darfur and the civil war in the South continued unabated in the absence of a real commitment to a just peace. It was during this period, 1986–88, that the tribal militias of the Baggara of the west-central part of the country—precursors of the now infamous Janjaweed militia who operate in the Darfur region—were formed at the initiative of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. The multiple crises that have engulfed contemporary Sudan —from the western borderlands of Darfur to the eastern Red Sea Hills and the war-ravaged southern regions —can be understood as the regionalization and internationalization of domestic problems long left unaddressed. A coup d'etat that took place in 1989 led to the establishment of a theocratic Sudanese state. On the one hand, the theocracy was a culmination of the long struggle of Islamists against local communists and liberal capitalists, and on the other hand, it indicated the opening of a new chapter of open animosity against the West in general and the United States in particular. An escalation of violence in the late 1980s in Somalia between armed rebels and the government forces operating from inside as well as outside the country led to the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. As a result of treaties with the regime, the government forces as well as the various rebels groups all had access to arms from both the United States and the USSR . More than any other country of the Horn, Somalia demonstrates the negative impact of the Cold War's simultaneous militarization and globalization of local and regional conflicts. The post-1969 modernizing Somali state under Siad Barre “banned” ethnic and clan-based affiliations as ways of mobilizing political support. It introduced “scientific socialism” 20 as the only official ideology, which led to resentment on the part of the majority of inhabitants who continued to practice traditional forms of eclectic, Sufi Islam. The dominance of the country's strongman, Siad Barre, stultified the fluid socioeconomic and political modes of organization and resulted in the alienation of Somalis, except, of course, those enjoying the favors of the ruling elite. A result of this societal disengagement was the economic and political exodus of Somalis to the Middle East and Italy. 21 The growth of the Somali diaspora and the community's exposure to the outside world led to the creation of expanded links between Somalis in the homeland and in the rest of the world, and in the process integrated all Somalis into the escalating process of globalization. This was done not only through remittances of foreign currency but also utilized modern communication technologies new ideologies and concepts of political alignment. In fact, the large-scale migration of Somali workers to the Middle East and elsewhere from the 1970s until the early 1980s led to the growth of a remittance economy (much like that of the Sudan during the same period) and the emergence of a diasporic community with political clout. 22 However, the decline in the Middle East's oil boom led to a shrinking of remittances that had enabled many communities to survive while avoiding confrontation with the state. It was at this juncture that new converts to Wahabbi Islam through the Somali Diaspora clashed with the indigenous Ahmadiyya and Quadriyya tariqas (religious brotherhoods) to be later expressed as inter-clan conflicts. The north, historically linked to the Wahabbists because of the preponderance of adherents of the Salihyya (one of three Sufi orders that dominate Somali Islam and personified by the anti-colonial hero Muhammad Abdille Hassan who had studied in Saudi Arabia under Wahabbi tutelage) proved more amenable to the gradual Islamization of its society. Meanwhile, southerners viewed this revival of faith-centered conflict as a continuation of internal differences among Somalis. 23 The growth of Islamic charities, established by adherents to local tariqas as well as new Somali converts to Wahabbism , 24 loosened the hold of state institutions on both urban and rural communities. These Islamic charities proved adept at evading the reach of the state 25 and competed with Western NGOs, whose links with corrupt governmental institutions rendered them useless to the majority of impoverished Somalis struggling to survive on the margins of the state. Such factors created a new political space that linked Somalis to the outside world and highlighted their subaltern relationship to the West. They also displayed the potential for political renewal and religious redemption in the revival of Islam. In an environment where the boundaries of the Somali body politic had been shattered by violence, chaos, famine, and the ineffective yet disturbing presence of foreign troops, Somalis divided along clan lines, ideologies, and religious tariqas throughout the 1990s. They were plunged into a Hobbesian world, where communities were turned against each other in the pursuit of power, resources, and legitimacy. Submerged historical conflicts, which had been subordinated to the larger goals of Pan-Somalism and nationalism, re-emerged with the collapse of state institutions and superpower patronage. Such forces had held the country together for three decades. The north-south divide—between the former British Somaliland and Italian Somalia—exploded into full force, bringing with it the religious-cum-clan cleavages that had characterized the two regions' relationship in the colonial and postcolonial period. 26 Thus the “globalization” of Somali political and ethno-regional conflicts was therefore accelerated by the UN-sponsored and U.S.-led humanitarian intervention in 1992. This resulted in numerous new security challenges for the Somali state, the region, and the international state-system. 27 By the turn of this century, thousands of Somalis had fled to neighboring countries, spilling over the country's borders and presenting numerous security and economic challenges to the host countries. 28 Inside the country Somalis did not fare better, as they were victimized by the arbitrary violence meted out by warlord-directed youth gangs known as Moryan , 29 which, like the Sudanese Janjaweed , vied for control of territory and resources. As the Somalis became ungovernable, their traditional modes of consensus no longer functioned, so too did the universalizing ethos of Islam prove unable to unify the nation. Islamists continued to succeed in communal reconstruction projects, but they did not attract international attention until the events of September 11, 2001 . Following this event, it was common for U.S. policymakers to consider all radical Islamists as security threats. On September 26, 2001, Al Itihaad al Islami (The Islamic Union), which had been in existence since the 1980s, was put on the United States' list of terrorist organizations as well as the Somali company al Barakaat, a financial clearing house for diaspora remittances to the homeland using the age-old network of disbursement known as hawala. 30 It appears that policymakers lumped the Islamists together without regard to their objectives or actions as a “terrorist threat.” They proved unable to decipher the factors that would result in either the “fusion” or “fission” of Somali communities. 31 Somalia, lacking a political center and beset by vying warlords supported by their regional and international supporters, demonstrates a key feature of a highly globalized society where “political space and political community are no longer coterminous with national territory, and national governments can no longer be regarded as the sole masters of their own or their citizens' fate.” 32 If Somalis cannot effectively lead their country out of this morass and if the United States and the international community remain unwilling to contemplate a new role other than a watered down version of encirclement by neighboring allies, they risk alienating Somali citizens inside and outside the country. In doing this, they lend credence to the call from militant Islamists for an Islamic alternative to Somalians' Hobbesian existence. It remains apparent that the key to reducing the multiple security challenges posed by an unstable Somalia lies within the Somali nation. American relations with other states in the Horn—notably Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Eritrea—also need to be conducted with an awareness of regional dynamics , particularly in light of the practice of incumbent regimes in arming dissidents from neighboring countries. 33 In Ethiopia , the reduction of Soviet aid to the Marxist regime in the late 1980s had gradually weakened the regime's capacity to win the war against the coalition of Ethiopian and Eritrean armed opposition groups. The regime took harsh reprisals against the Ethiopian officers who launched an abortive coup in 1989. The brutality against the coup makers had the unintended effect of turning the usually stalwart Ethiopian society against the regime's heavy-handed approach and fueled the wars in Eritrea and the central part of the country that had dramatically escalated in 1988–1989. The rural majority, from whose ranks were drawn the soldiery of the Ethiopian Armed Forces, quietly withdrew its support from the regime's unitary policies. Desertions became more frequent in the army as well as defections to one of the guerrilla groups with bases in the northern, central, and southern parts of the country. The U.S. involvement in negotiations between the warring parties provided much coveted legitimacy for the Ethiopian and Eritrean guerrilla groups and altered the balance of power relations between the Menghistu government and its opponents. A number of factors contributed to the establishment of new regimes in both areas, and in the case of Eritrea , a new state. These included: (a) the demise of the Soviet Union and its attendant consequences for client states; (b) the guerrilla groups' abandonment of their anti-American ideologies; and (c) rebel success in holding on to territorial gains from which the Ethiopian army was evicted. Key agreements were reached between the Ethiopian government and its main adversaries, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF)/Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in numerous negotiations held in the United States , the Middle East , and Europe . In May 1991, the victorious armies of the EPLF and EPRDF marched into the capitals of Eritrea and Ethiopia , respectively, after having secured an agreement for post-war reconstruction U.S. assistance. The guerrillas' long experience in dealing with international aid agencies as well as with the representatives of both the United States and the USSR had provided them with knowledge of how to parlay their position as former so-called secessionists and terrorists to the laudable category of a “new breed of African leaders” now gaining influence on the continent. 34 Past recipients of Soviet largesse, they were now showered with praise as the saviors of their respective countries from both the old threat of communism and the new threat of Islamist terrorism emanating from neighboring Sudan. By 1991, it appeared that the lessons of the past, especially those learned from the cycles of U.S. engagement and disengagement, had been understood and applied to their respective “national” interests by the Islamists of the Sudan , the warlords of Somalia , and the guerrillas-turned-statesmen of Ethiopia and Eritrea . Radical Islam, Regional Alliances, and International Terrorism in the Horn The ending of Cold War competition between the superpowers in the Horn coincided with the emergence of a clash between secular and religious nationalism. This new global struggle came to be most pronounced with respect to how the secular state related to radical Islamists. Radical Muslims supported by the United States had succeeded in ousting the forces of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan . The end result of this unlikely alliance between the multinational forces of the mujahadeen —which included Africans— was the dissemination of jihad and the mujahadeen's acculturation into the shadowy world of international terrorism. 35 The new leader of an international network espousing an anti-Western mentality and a radical transformation of Islam was a Saudi, Osama Bin Laden, who upon his return home, was regarded as a threat and stripped of his Saudi citizenship. He was granted asylum in the Sudan in 1991, where he stayed until 1996 when he moved his headquarters to Afghanistan . Bin Laden established a number of commercial enterprises as well as his global radical network, known as Al Qaeda . 36 Sudan's clear endorsement of radical Islam in 1993 landed that country on the United States' list of states harboring terrorists. 37 Bin Laden himself claimed to be committed to the purest form of Islam, and he asserted a preparedness to wage a holy war against its enemies, including the United States and Israel. 38 Bin Laden developed close relationships with similar groups such as the Egyptian Islamic Group, 39 also present in Sudan and associated with Hassan Turabi's Islamic Charter Front. 40 The increased appearance in the early 1990s of radical movements seeking to create Islamic states in such countries as Egypt , Eritrea , and Ethiopia had become a concern for the secular governments of the region. This became patently evident in 1995 with the failed assassination attempt against the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, in Addis Ababa on the occasion of the annual summit of the Organization of African Unity. The responsibility for the failed assassination attempt was placed squarely on Sudan 's shoulders by Ethiopia , Egypt , and the United States . However, Sudan claimed it was not harboring these individuals, and therefore it could not honor a request to extradite them in order to stand trial. From this point on, relations between Sudan and its neighbors in the Horn became strained, and even led Ethiopia and Eritrea , along with Uganda , to support movements attempting to bring down the Bashir government. The United States was also concerned over the growing influence of Sudan-based terrorist organizations, particularly Al Qaeda. In February 1996, fearing for the safety of American citizens, Washington made a decision to shut down the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum . Increased human rights violations by government troops and their associated militias led to Sudan being castigated by its European allies, which created the conditions for a possible international consensus that could strengthen the effects of U.S. sanctions on Sudan . Sudan 's NIF-led government came under increasing pressure to provide its global partners with concrete evidence that it did not harbor terrorists and that it would negotiate in good faith with the southern rebels to bring about a lasting peace. Diplomatically, the Sudanese government agreed to “turn over” Bin Laden to the United States , but in fact it allowed him to move his network to the staunchly anti-American Taliban-led regime in Afghanistan. 41 From Sudan , Bin Laden created a system of cells that were dispersed throughout the Horn and East Africa . Cell members became active in local Islamic communities in the countries where they lived; they developed businesses, held jobs, got married, and had children. It was from cells on the coast of Kenya and Tanzania that Al Qaeda launched the deadly 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam . When it was discovered that Al Qaeda had been behind these attacks, the United States assumed the complicity of Sudan and launched a cruise missile attack on a pharmaceutical factory near Khartoum suspected of producing key chemical ingredients that could be used in terror attacks. 42 Al Qaeda cells operated throughout the Horn and East Africa , undetected by the various intelligence units of the countries in the region. This was made evident when the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa , Kenya , was hit by a terrorist attack in November 2002. At the same time, terrorists attempted to bring down a plane filled with Israeli tourists with a shoulder-held surface to air missile. 43 This drove home the urgency of stepping up the development of the capacity to effectively combat terror in the region to the governments of the Horn, East Africa , and the United States . While domestic and regional horror hung over the carnage that the operation might have entailed, grassroots resentment grew among impoverished local communities who felt victimized by the global wars and “counter-wars” taking place on their own terrain between the United States and its adversaries. The bombings of American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam clearly targeted symbols of U.S. power in the world. The attempt on Israeli tourists in Mombasa further demonstrated how the Horn had become the site for the proxy battles between the United States , its allies, and its new enemies. Thus far, the emphasis by analysts has been on “international terrorism,” but they have tended to ignore the impact of such issues on local communities and how grass-roots perceptions affect U.S.-African relations. Failure to understand “local” perceptions and responses to the American use of power within those countries may well have led decision-makers to overlook the ways by which “international terrorists” have gained footholds among the local populations. Misuse of aid funds by ruling elites results in the inflation of local currencies, which curtails the buying power of the average citizen already suffering from low wages and chronic impoverishment. The George W. Bush administration's dramatic policy shift—from one of disinterest in African affairs to the unprecedented declaration that African oil constituted “a strategic national interest” 44 — left different African constituencies bewildered and feeling betrayed by the superpower that had promised to support economic development and democracy in the new millennium. 45 Although different constituencies responded differently to the socioeconomic and political reverberations of superpower policy decisions, the U.S. support given to authoritarian regimes that joined America's coalition against “terror” may well have fueled local resentment. In doing so, it created the conditions for the emergence of a counter-coalition of those who take umbrage at being victimized by the strategic priorities of an angry and threatened superpower. 46 U.S. – African Relations in the Post 9/11 Period Even though the United States has considered the Horn of Africa to be a major source of international terrorism for more than a decade, its efforts to combat terrorist activities were not galvanized until after the events of September 11, 2001 . In 2002, demonstrating its resolve to develop partnerships with the countries of the Horn and to assist them in developing the capacity to fight terrorism in the region, the United States created the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), to be headquartered in Djibouti . This represented a major shift in United States policy, since until this time, relations with Djibouti had been minimal. 47 A military base was established for U.S. personnel at Camp Lemonier near the Djibouti International Airport . Some eighteen hundred troops are now based there, but an additional four hundred task force troops are aboard the USS Mount Whitney, a so-called fighting command ship anchored in the Gulf of Aden . The mission of CJTF is to gather intelligence on an ongoing basis and to deter, preempt, and disable terrorist threats from wherever they may emanate in the region. Presently, the most serious threats would seem to be found in Somalia , Kenya , and Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula . In June 2003, President Bush announced a $100 million package of counter-terrorism measures that were to be disbursed over a fifteen-month period. Half of these funds were for coastal security programs and other border security programs, including those in Africa. 48 CJTF personnel have been involved throughout the Horn, operating as liaisons to governments and their security establishments. U.S. military personnel work closely with counterparts in Ethiopia , Kenya , Eritrea , and Djibouti , providing counter-terrorism training. 49 In Kenya, for example, support is provided under the State Department's Anti-terrorism Assistance program, which has been in place for more than two decades. This is a law enforcement program that includes detection and the disarmament of bombs, post-blast investigation, VIP protection, crisis management exercises, and hostage negotiations. 50 In addition to training, CJTF's work involves information sharing. In the case of Ethiopia , the information shared relates to the “long porous border that exists between Ethiopia and Somalia to assist in locating potential places where terrorists may or may not attempt to cross.” 51 Cooperation with Djibouti grows in part out of U.S. concerns about a threat from the activities of al-Ittihad , a terrorist group based in the former Somalia . As of early April 2004, the efforts of CJTF had begun to bear fruit. In testimony before the U.S. House Sub-committee on Africa , terrorism expert and former U.S. ambassador to South Africa Princeton Lyman noted that CJTF had recently reported the arrest of members of terrorist organizations in Ethiopia , Eritrea , Sudan , Kenya , and Djibouti. 52 The United States now finds itself unable to ignore a new reality that emphasizes the garnering of local and regional support for what it calls the “war on terror,” and the need to acquire more reliable energy sources that would lessen its dependence on its traditional Middle Eastern oil-producing allies. At mid-decade, the United States finds itself supporting ruling elite(s) who are manipulating American strategic interests in order to consolidate their objectives of security and access to resources. 53 The Horn's geo-strategic significance for U.S. national interest during the Cold War has not receded. Rather it has attained an important economic dimension with the development of Sudanese oil and the threat that global terrorists will close off access to new sources of energy. It is this convergence and divergence of domestic, regional, and international interests that have led to the formulation of policies that may engender more conflict and therefore result in policies inimical to the American quest for secure access to energy sources and the elimination of the new threat of international terrorism. Contemporary “terrorists” in the Horn have taken the place of the previous “communist threat.” 54 This has prompted the passage of anti-terrorist legislation in the countries of the region and to the issuance of public pronouncements by their leaders that they are willing partners in the global war on terror. Since 9/11, the United States has increased its delivery of technical and military assistance to its allies in the Horn predicated upon their “willingness” to sign on to the U.S. strategic priority of “combating global terror.” 55 Although some Africans might grant the urgency of the terrorist threat and the necessity that lay behind the alliances created during the 2001–2005 period, they nonetheless expressed doubts. For example, how, in fact, is U.S. assistance to the regimes of the Horn being utilized to “combat global terror”? What, in fact, is the nexus between American aid to incumbent regimes and the security of both the states and societies of the region? Does the shift in U.S. policy from one of emphasis on democratization and development (1992–2000) to a focus on the securitization of strategic resources such as oil and the enhancement of the capacity of anti-terrorist forces (2001–2005) signal a relapse to Cold War priorities of ensuring the stability and security of allied regimes? At present, the United States is developing significant relationships with the countries of the Horn regarding regional and global security matters. Given the eruption of new and old conflicts that threaten to engulf the region in humanitarian crises as well as political imbroglios, U.S. engagement—diplomatic, humanitarian or economic—appears to be unavoidable. But, in order to be effective at meeting its objectives, the United States may need to revisit the not-so-distant past and reexamine lessons learned as well as lessons yet to be learned. A gross omission in the calculus of contemporary U.S. policymakers dealing with the Horn remains the inadequate attention to the widespread problems of poverty and general human insecurity. It almost goes without saying that no state and no regime can be secure, the well-endowed anti-terrorist alliance notwithstanding, if its citizens are mired in poverty and perpetually insecure in their homes, lives, and livelihoods. The truth of that proposition is starkly evident everywhere in the Horn. overty and Human Security in the Horn of AfricaThe countries of sub-Sahara Africa and the Horn of Africa are among the poorest in the world, with an average annual per capita income estimated at $450. Among the countries under consideration only Djibouti ($900) is ranked among the lower middle-income countries of the world. 56 The other four range from Kenya ($560) to Sudan ($350) to Eritrea ($160) to Ethiopia ($100). 57 Such grinding poverty is at the heart of the human security dilemma. Poverty is closely related to a myriad of other social problems such as disease and lack of educational opportunity, adequate shelter, and food. Food insecurity is intimately tied to environmental insecurity, and it is widely believed that these problems must be addressed simultaneously. An effective approach would involve a broad assault on interlinking issues of political and economic insecurity and a lack of social justice and equity throughout a given society. Food security requires that all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet their fundamental dietary needs for a healthy life. 58 Throughout the Horn, this is not the case. Many people who live in the Horn suffer from chronic hunger, malnutrition, and dislocation brought on by natural catastrophes such as drought and flooding and manmade problems associated with war. 59 Food insecurity is particularly severe in places that are being ravaged, or that have recently been ravaged, by civil wars and border conflicts. For example, a 21-year civil war in southern Sudan created massive human dislocation and human misery in the south of the country. In 2003–04, Sudan had a record cereal crop, up 63 percent over the previous year's harvest. However, over the same period a new civil war front opened in western Darfur Province where more than three million people are affected and more than one million have been driven from their land and into exile as refugees. 60 A recent UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) report indicates that people in the region have lost the bulk of their last harvest and the next planting season will no doubt be negatively affected if the conflict continues. 61 During the 30-year war for independence waged by Eritrean nationalists against Ethiopia , hundreds of thousands of Eritreans were driven into exile in Sudan . Over the past ten years, one hundred thousand have been repatriated by the United Nations. Most of these returnees are expected to be farmers, but they are immediately confronted with the fact that Eritrea is in the midst of a four-year drought, and presently 1.9 million people, more than half the population, face food shortages. This compares to 1.1 million who faced a food crisis in the previous year. The root cause of this problem is clearly related to war—the war for independence and the more recent border war with Ethiopia . The border war has been over for four years, but the Eritrean government remains on a military footing, stretching its meager resources in order to be prepared for the possible renewal of fighting. This situation naturally affects the ability of the government to address problems of food insecurity and poverty. 62 Civil unrest in the former Somalia is also at the heart of a current food security crisis. It is estimated that at least 123,000 people in the area face a food security crisis, with 95,000 people in a “critical emergency situation.” The main reason for this situation is a serious shortfall in the production of cereal crops. 63 A deeper examination of the food security crises, though, points to the larger issues of the absence of sovereignty, coordination of the institutions of governance, and the inability of the current regime to obtain regional and international recognition. With sovereignty and the right to rule being contested by different groups and with these groups vying for international aid as well as recognition, U.S. policy on Somalia has tended to fail to take the wider dimensions of the food security crisis into account. It focuses solely on humanitarian aspects and disregards the role of Somali society and its particular forms of democratic institutions. 64 As a consequence, it is unable to face up squarely to the failures of its 1992 intervention which culminated in the withdrawal of U.S. and UN forces in 1993–94. In 2003, Ethiopia experienced its worst dry spell since the devastating 1984–85 drought and famine, in which one million people died of starvation. In this most recent drought, fourteen million people were at risk of famine and malnutrition. This compares to one to three million in the average year. The food crisis was the result of interplay of many factors: • Inadequate and erratic rains over short and long rainy seasons, which resulted in widespread crop failure in eastern and southwestern Ethiopia • Slow recovery from the 1999–2000 food crisis that impoverished many communities • Rapid rise in grain prices • Nonavailability of short season produce • Nonavailability of seeds • Significant livestock deaths and poor terms of trade for livestock • Deterioration in the nutritional status of people living in the affected area 65 Another factor that must be taken into account is the historic inappropriateness of Ethiopia's agrarian system. 66 Berhanu Abegaz argues that the agrarian systems set up by the imperial as well as the Marxist regimes in Ethiopia led to a failure of the national economy and thus to abject poverty in rural areas. He goes on to argue that two-thirds of children are malnourished and nearly half of the population falls below the national poverty line. 67 During the border conflict with Eritrea , the international donor community did not respond as readily to the food security needs of Ethiopia as the situation demanded. Although Ethiopia's relations with donors had improved by 2003, other factors have placed a drag on development and consequently food security (for example, Ethiopia's heavy debt burden, tensions over the final demarcation of the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the slow pace of trade liberalization, and charges of continued violations of human rights by the EPRDF government). Given the warming of relations between Ethiopia and the United States , how has the United States responded to the current crisis of food security in Ethiopia ? In late October 2002, the United States declared a disaster in Ethiopia as a result of the continuing drought situation. The USAID Famine Early Warning System has noted a seventeen-year trend of insufficient rainfall in Ethiopia that has had a negative impact on crop production. 68 In 2003, the United States provided Ethiopia with almost a half billion dollars in food aid, accounting for half of the total donor contributions. However, this must be considered against the backdrop of Ethiopia 's non-food development assistance needs. Over the same period the United States provided Ethiopia with only $55 million in non-humanitarian assistance, and only $6 million of this was for agricultural development. 69 Donors and the Ethiopian government alike realize that Ethiopia's problems with chronic famine are never going to be dealt with adequately unless its underlying causes (for example, poverty, poor health care, education, infrastructure, water, roads, soil erosion, and so forth) are addressed simultaneously. 70 One Ethiopian official, Dr. Tewolde Egziabher of the Ethiopian Environmental Protection Authority, recently asserted that the Western donor community was in part responsible for the slow progress the country was making toward food self-sufficiency. For example, he said, Western governments and international financial institutions insist that government get out of the business of controlling the food supply and leave this task to the private sector. 71 In the process, according to one report, the Ethiopian government is being prevented from building granaries and food depots that could store grain from one year to the next. 72 The gap between U.S. humanitarian assistance to Ethiopia and developmental assistance is obvious to even the casual observer. As noted earlier, what seems to drive U.S. involvement in Ethiopia , as well as in the Horn in general, has more to do with the United States ' own perceived national security interests related to international terrorist threats than with Ethiopia 's real needs. On the other hand, Ethiopia has developmental needs at least equal to its security needs. Ethiopia receives about $1 billion a year in development assistance from all sources. It is estimated that to begin to see real progress, the country would need to receive at least $5 billion in international development assistance each year. 73 Conclusion In the context of the changed global environment since the end of the Cold War, the Horn of Africa has assumed renewed importance in the foreign policy calculations of the United States International terrorists may find fertile ground in countries such as those located in the Horn of Africa plagued by chronic poverty, underdevelopment, and social inequalities. It is imperative that the United States deny international terrorists the opportunity to use poor countries as incubators for their destructive agenda. Given the current circumstances, it is in the interest of both the United States and the countries of the Horn to enter into a wider partnership of mutual benefit to overcome vulnerabilities these countries face in coping with insecurity and lack of development. More specifically, both the United States and the countries of the Horn must come to see the problems of political insecurity and human security in the region as being critically intertwined. 74 Poverty and underdevelopment not only inhibit the development of political democracy but also economic progress and human security in general. Unless these two dimensions of the security threat emanating from the Horn are simultaneously acknowledged, neither problem will be adequately addressed. It is interesting and important to note that the United Kingdom and France have gone on record making African poverty and environmental degradation as top priorities during British Prime Minister Tony Blair's tenure as the Presidency of the Group of Eight (G-8) in 2005. 75 Blair has promised to take the lead among the leaders of the major industrial powers to work toward the complete cancellation of African debt, not only for the countries most heavily indebted, but also for all African countries. At the same time, this would involve increased trade with African countries and increased development assistance. The Bush administration has indicated that it is willing to be a part of this movement. 76 Although the United States has signed on to the Millennium Development Goals and set up the Millennium Challenge Account and Corporation, the requirement of strict conditionalities being applied to countries wishing to take part in its programs serves as an obstacle to the effective implementation of its ambitious goals. 77 However, clearly what is needed is for the policies of rich countries toward poor ones to be dedicated toward enhancing all aspects of poor countries' security: physical, political, economic, and human. The United States and its partners in the G8 are key to the success of any efforts in this direction. Currently, the United States is working with several countries in the Horn to improve their ability to root out and fight international terror in their region. Military and police officials are acquiring new skills, equipment, and technological known-how for this effort, and the United States is coordinating its own anti-terror activities in the region. Even so, while increased attention is being paid to halt the spread of international terror in the Horn, much less is being done to address the problems of poverty, underdevelopment, and social inequalities. To be sure, these problems are enormous, and not as easy to address as the military and intelligence challenges. Yet, unless international donors such as the United States make a concerted effort to commit substantial material, technical, and human resources, the root causes of domestic conflict and international terrorism in the region will continue to be major drags on political and economic development and democracy, and thus human security. Even if the international community makes the necessary commitment, not much progress can be anticipated unless the political and economic elites in the region demonstrate the necessary political will to put the needs of their citizens first, backed up by good governance and effective policymaking. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Notes 2 . See, Jim Fisher-Thompson, “Panel Makes Recommendations to Fight Terrorism in Horn of Africa ,” United States Department of State NEWS. ( December 6, 2004 ). http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200412060187.html This article refers to a conference held at Harvard University, November 4–6, 2004, “Examining the ‘Bastions' of Terror: Governance and Policy in Yemen and the Horn of Africa .” At that event three former U.S. ambassadors to Ethiopia recommended that the United States and its European and African allies attempt to facilitate cooperation between and among the countries of the Horn and Yemen in the global war on terror. This was said to be extremely important because of the strategic proximity of these countries to the “bastions of terrorism.” 3 . Policy analyst Michael Clough has pointed out the need for a real rather than rhetorical commitment from the United States to its African allies in order to extricate both Americans and Africans from the impasse left behind by the Cold War. For details, see Michael Clough, “The United States and Africa : The Policy of Cynical Disengagement,” Current History (May 1992): 195–97. 4 . For more details see Edmond J. Keller's analysis of how the preponderance given to ideological factors combined with a lack of historical knowledge on inter-regional relations led to outcomes that proved negative for American national interests. The same analysis holds true for the contemporary relations between the United States and the countries of the Horn of Africa which have led to similar “blinders” on policymaking in the Sudan , Eritrea , Ethiopia , Djibouti , and Somalia . For details, see “United States Policy on the Horn of Africa: Policymaking with Blinders On,” in Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar, eds., African Crises Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: The University of California Press, 1985), 178. 5 . See Harold Marcus, Ethiopia , Great Britain and the United States 1941–74 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). 6 . See Jonathan B. Bingham, Shirt-Sleeve Diplomacy: Point 4 in Action (New York: The John Day Co., 1953). 7 . Eritrea was on Italian colony from 1890–1941; an occupied territory administered by the British from 1941–1952; and a unit federated with the Ethiopian Empire from 1952–1962. 8 . See David Newsom, “Testimony,” in Hearings before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Ethiopia (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970). The United States also supplied Ethiopia with counter-insurgency training and on-the-ground advisers in connection with helping suppress the Eritrean movement for national independence after 1962. See George W. Bader, “Testimony,” in Hearings before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Ethiopia (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970). 9 . See Jeffrey Lefebvre, “ Moscow 's Cold War and Post–Cold War Policies in Africa ,” in Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 208. 10. This policy of using third parties with interests in the region in turn provided opportunities for anti-American regimes like Libya to provide support for political and armed groups considered hostile to U.S. interests. For details, see Robert Anton Mertz and Pamela MacDonald Mertz, Arab Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1983), 86–88. 11. See Henry Jackson, From the Congo to SOWETO : U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Africa Since 1960 (New York: William Morrow, 1982). Separate agreements were signed with each country. Kenya at the time had a mutual defense agreement with Ethiopia, and the agreement with the United States was seen by Kenya as more of a hedge against the communist threat. 12. Peter Woodward, The Horn of Africa : Politics and International Relations ( London and New York : I.B. Tauris & Co., Ltd., 2003), 151–59. 13. The size of the Ethiopian military grew from 54,000 in 1977 to more than 300,000 a decade later; by 1991, the Ethiopian army was estimated at more than 600,000 troops. Somalia 's army swelled from about 32,000 in 1977 to 65,000 in 1987. See International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance . 1976/77–1989/90. 14. For more details on the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M),see Edgar O'Ballance, Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism, 1956–99 (London and New York: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 2000), 133–34. 15. The evolution of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood into the National Islamic Front (NIF), a movement with connections to the army, security, and other governmental institutions as well as bases in the wider community due to the establishment of charity organizations and Islamic banks, forced the Umma Party and the DUP to present themselves as orthodox Islamic parties rather than representatives of the diverse constituencies that made up twenty-first century Sudan. 16. Kamal Osman Salih, “The Sudan , 1985–89: The Fading Democracy,” in Peter Woodward, ed., Sudan after Nimeri ( London and New York : Routledge, 1991, 50–71. 17. Ahmad Alawad Sikianga, “Northern Sudanese Political Parties and the Civil War,” in M.W. Daly and Ahmad A. Sikainga, eds., Civil War in the Sudan (London & New York: British Academic Press, 1993), 85. For an interesting interpretation of the Janjaweed as the transmogrification of the tradition of camel-raiders banditry in Darfur (with counterparts in the Horn such as the Abyssinian Shifta ) see Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim's essay, “Janjaweed: What's in a Name?” Sudan Studies Association Newsletter 24, no. 2 (September 2004): 15–16. 18. In addition to “ Southern Sudan ” the term “ South Sudan ” is also being used to refer to the region beyond the sudd - the marshy swamp area – where has conflict has raged since 1982. For details see, Jok Madut Jok, War and Slavery in Sudan ( Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press , 2001), p. (xiv). For a comprehensive understanding of the multiple conflicts on the Sudan see, Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars (Oxford, Bloomington, Kampala and Nairobi: Jams Currey and Indiana University Press, 2003). 19. Donald Petterson, Inside Sudan : Political Islam, Conflict and Catastrophe (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999), 3. 20. Scientific socialism is a term that describes an ideological wish more than a reality. Proponents of this type of ideology use the term scientific in order to justify various political and economic measures designed to catapult societies from agrarian economies to state-based industrial economies by nationalization policies, parastatal organizations, and so on. 21. In the mid-1980s Rome provided a haven for some dissidents of the Barre regime, and became a place where political networking was possible among the different diaspora communities. 22. For details, see Peter D. Little, Somalia : Economy without a State ( Oxford , Hargeisa, Bloomington : James Currey and Indiana University Press, 2003), 147–50. 23. It is also worthwhile noting that the northern herders, who had long provided Mecca with sheep and goats for the sacrifice that marks the end of the annual pilgrimage (Hajj) often found religious renewal in their contact with Wahabbism. The political and economic impacts of this interaction require more scholarly scrutiny and would yield interesting insights into the layers of conflict characteristic of the modern Somali nation, which has not proven to be immune to internal and external friction despite its vaunted homogeneity. 24. Among those who could be characterized as converts to Wahibi Islam are Jamaca Islaax and the Salafi group established in the late 1970s and 1980s. See Roland Marchal, “Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War,” in Alex de Waal, ed., Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa ( Bloomington and Indianapolis : Indiana University Press, 2004), 119–20. 25. For a detailed discussion on state-society relations, see Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, eds., The Precarious Balance: State-Society Relations in Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987). See also Markakis volumes on the victimization of pastoralists by economic and political globalization of the Horn. 26. The parallels between the legacy of the Mahdiyya and that of the Salihiyya led by Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan have long been ignored. This has led policymakers to focus on clan-style sociopolitical configurations while leaving aside the differences amongst the tariqas, which have given rise to different types of Islamist mobilization in the new centuries. For details, see Said Samatar, ed., In the Shadow of Conquest: Islam in Colonial Northeast Africa (Trenton, N.J.: The Red Sea Press, 1992), 40–45 and 61–70. 27. For a detailed discussion on the policies that led to international intervention and the collapse of the Somali state, see Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, eds., Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995). 28. The Somali diaspora, which has now developed an advanced transnational network of remittances and communications, is found in the farthest corners of the globe. The resilience of the community and its capacity to cross permeable borders in spite of all national barriers testify to the permeability engendered by globalization as well as the threats posed by unregulated immigration and xenophobic reactions to the plight of displaced persons. For an understanding of the impact of social modes of human organization of contemporary Somalis, see Nuruddin Farah, Yesterday, Tomorrow: Voices From the Somali Diaspora (London and New York: Cassell , 2000). 29. The Somali Mooryan differ from the Sudanese Janjaweed in that the former are visible in urban youth areas while the latter are unacknowledged by their patrons. Both, however, have arisen due to the lack of employment and present an enormously difficult challenge after the termination of hostilities when their services will no longer be required. 30. Marchal asserts that to date no “hard evidence of any link between al Barakaat and al Itihaad [is] available.” (“Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War,” 142). In fact, a recent BBC article titled “Telecoms Thriving in Lawless Somalia ” presents a scenario where both clan and hawala networks cooperate in establishing communications in a stateless country. For details, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4020259.stm . Nevertheless, Hawala , the informal remittance network, has been uncritically portrayed as an integral part of “Islamic terrorist networks” by popular works of literature published in the aftermath of 9/11. For a discussion of the linkage between global terrorist networks and hawala see Douglas Farah's Blood from Stones: the Secret Financial Network of Terror ( New York : Broadway Books, 2004), 113–16. 31. The words “fusion” and “fission” capture the complexity of Somali society and the futility of the readiness of U.S. policymakers to believe that “terrorists have a haven in Somalia .” On the one hand, Somali society is fragmented, with many fissures. On the other hand, Somali society is also unified in its sense of feeling besieged by its neighbors, the outside world, and the United States . The lumping together of all Islamists as those who would seek to establish a sovereign state guided by Islam as a political and religious doctrine does not necessarily translate into the making of “terrorists.” 32. David Held and Anthony McGrew, “Globalization,” in Joel Krieger, ed., The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, 2 nd ed. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 326. 33. Salih Booker suggests an approach to “unbundling” Africa that in the case of the Horn has great relevance. For details see “Thinking Regionally About Africa ,” Current History (May 1998): 200. 34. For a detailed discussion of this transformation of guerrillas into American allies, see Marina Ottaway, Africa 's New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction ? (Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution's Press, 1999). 35. Rohan Gunavatra, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror ( New York : Columbia University Press, 2002), 160. 36. See Princeton Lyman and J. Stephen Morrison, “The Theorist Threat in Africa ,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2004):77. 37. For years, Sudan had permitted groups perceived by Israel to be terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Islamic Group all have offices in the country. 38. For details see Roland Jacquard, In the Name of Osama Bin Laden: Global Terrorism and the Bin Laden Brotherhood ( Durham and London : Duke University Press, 2002), 35. 39. For the ideological underpinnings of political assassinations used by Egyptian extremists, see Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremiism in Egypt : The Prophet & Pharaoh (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), 197–204. 40 . For a concise analysis of the role of Turabi in the islamization of Sudanese society and politics see Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Politicall Islam ( Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 2003), 178–184. 41. The Sudanese “offer” to turn Bin Laden over to the United States is said to be a concocted “fable” according to Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (New York: Free Press, 2004), 140–42. 42. It was later revealed that the plant was actually producing aspirin. See David Shinn, “The Horn of Africa in International Terrorism,” Special Lectures: The Elliot School of International Affairs, The George Washington University , Washington D.C. ( January 29, 2002 ), 3. 43. See Gilbert Khadiagala, “ Kenya : Haven or Helpless Victim of Terrorism,” United States Institute of Peace Special Report: Terrorism in the Horn of Africa , Special Report 113 (January 2004). The author notes that the core of the leadership of the Kenyan cell is made up of citizens of the Gulf states , Somalia , Pakistan , and the Comoro Islands . As in other cells, these individuals have assimilated into the local cultures of coastal communities. 44. A quote attributed to Assistant Secretary of State, Walter Kansteiner during his visit to Nigeria in July 2002. For details see Michael T. Klare and Daniel Volman, “ Africa 's Oil and American National Security,” Current History (May 2004):226. 45. U.S. promises of a balanced policy linking democracy and development were the basis of its policy in the post-1989 period. For details, see Herman Cohen, Superpower Intervention in Africa ( New York : St. Martin 's Press, 2000), 16. 46. Olivier Roy makes a very important point about an “Islam of resentment” that is the basis for “acculturation.” The authors of this essay concur with Roy in his assertion that “Islamism is a discourse of protest and adaptation, thus of transition.” However, they go further to assert that if local discourse and perceptions are left unexamined, vast majorities of moderate Africans may join the “coalition of the resentful” leaving American interests to be handled by discredited regimes. This is dangerous because the efforts to build up local intelligence to be used in the war on international terrorism depends greatly on the willingness of inhabitants to cooperate with state and intelligence authorities. The bombing of Mombasa provides an excellent reminder. For details see Roy , The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 198–99. 47. To establish this relationship, the United States invested $8.7 million. See Andrew England, “ U.S. Officer Vows That the U.S.-Led Task Force Will Eradicate Terrorism in Horn of Africa ,” Associate Press Worldstream, December 17, 2002 . 48. The U.S. campaign against international terrorism in Africa recently opened a new front in the Sahel, a region that military officials fear could become the next base for al Qaeda. Special operations forces are training military units from Mauritania to the Horn, and providing them with pickup trucks, radios, and global-positioning equipment. See Craig S. Smith, “ U.S. Training African Forces to Uproot Terrorists,” New York Times (March 11, 2004). 49. Significantly, such a close relationship has not developed in the collapsed state of Somalia . The reason given is that there is no viable government there. 50. See Jim Fisher-Thompson, “ Africa Countering Terrorism with U.S. Help, Official Tells Congress,” U.S. State Department NEWS ( April 2, 2004 ). 51. See “ Ethiopia : U.S. Force Commander in Horn of Africa Interviewed.” UN Integrated Regional Information Network, Nairobi ( February 21, 2003 ). 52. See Jim Fisher-Thompson, “ Africa Countering Terrorism with U.S. Help, Official Tells Congress,” U.S. State Department NEWS ( April 2, 2004 ). 53 . For a detailed analysis on resource-driven conflicts in this sub-region, see John Markakis, Resource Conflicts in the Horn of Africa (London and Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1996). 54. Even NIF-ruled Sudan turned over “terrorists” associated more with the ideological rivalry of the two superpowers during the twentieth century while enabling the new generation of “global terrorists” to slip through its security network and seek asylum outside the continent. 55. See “African Policy,” The White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/Africa. 56. Per capita income for lower middle-income countries ranges from $736 to $2,935. 57. World Development Indicators database. World Bank, July 2003. 58. L. A. Thrupp, Critical Links: Food Security and the Environment in the Greater Horn of Africa (Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute, 1999), 2–7. 59. It should be noted that poor and malnourished people are extremely susceptible to diseases such as HIV/AIDS, cholera, measles, malaria, and tuberculosis. 60. In an effort to explain Sudan 's food insecurity one has to factor in corruption in the food distribution process as well as the lack of easy access to credit for individual farmers and farm communities. 61. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Press Release: Better Harvests Improve Sub-Saharan Africa 's Food Supplies but Millions Still Need Food Assistance ( Washington , D.C. : FAO, April 7, 2004 ). 62. See Raymond Thibodeaux, “Bittersweet Homecoming for Thousands of Eritean Refugees,” voanews.com , April 4, 2004 . 63. See UN FAO, Press Release . 64. Peter Little, Somalia : Economy without a State ( Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 2003), 167. 65. See Sue Lautze, Yacob Aklilu, Angela Raven-Roberts, Helen Young, Girma Kebede, and Jennifer Leaning, “Risk and Vulnerability in Ethiopia: Learning from the Past, Responding to the Present, Preparing for the Future” (Medford, Mass: Feinstein International Famine Center, June 2003), 21; and USAID. “Food Security Crisis in Ethiopia and Eritrea ,” http://usaid.gov/press/release/2002. 66 . For a detailed discussion of Ethiopia's agricultural potential and the lack of fit of the numerous regimes' policies see Dessalegn Rahmato, “Neither Feast nor Famine: Prospects for Food Security,” in Abebe Zegeye and Siegfried Pausewang, eds., Ethiopia in Change: Peasantry Natioalism and Democracy (London and New York: British Academic Press & St.Martin's Press, 1994), 192–93. 67. See Berhanu Abegaz, “Escaping Ethiopia 's Poverty Trap,” Journal of Modern African Studies , 42, no. 3 (September 2004):314. 68. See U.S. Agency for International Development, “USAID Ethiopia Drought Fact Sheet #15, FY 2003, August 27, 2003 . 69. See CARE, “Breaking the Cycle in Ethiopia : CARE Reaffirms Commitment to Overcome Poverty,” August 6, 2003 . 70. Ibid. The President of CARE in August 2003 asserted, “With adequate resources, we can break the cycle of poverty in Ethiopia . We can help farmers and pastoral communities to recover from the current acute crisis by providing food assistance, seeds, tools, veterinary medicines, and livestock. And if donors provide funds for projects with five-to-ten year timeframes, we can also address the roots of Ethiopia 's poverty and vulnerability.” 71. Barry Mason, “World Hunger Report: 842 Million Starve in the Midst of Plenty. Axis of Logic , http://ww.axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/article_5998.shtml . 72. Ibid. 73. Professor Jeffrey Sachs, Head of the Columbia University Earth Institute and the UN Millennium Project, has argued that instead of donor assistance being doled out without any consideration of the real needs of the country, the equation should be turned around and based not on what donors are willing to give but on what the real needs of the country are. See “ Ethiopia : Interview with Jeffrey Sachs, UN Special adviser on Millenium Goals. IRINnews.org , http://irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=35634. 74 . Policymakers dealing with the countries of the Horn are therefore urged to look at security from what Buzan has called the “integrative perspective.” For details see Barry Buzan, People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991). 75. See “Prime Minister Addresses Business Leaders: Tony Blair's Keynote Speech about Africa and Climate Change to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland,” http://www.britainusa.com/sections/articles_show.asp?SarticleType=1&Article_OD=6260 . Blair has noted that in order for the Millennium Development Goals to be Met, the international community is going to have to mobilize at least $25 billion of development assistance for Africa alone by 2015. 76. See “ Africa Policy,” The White House, http://www.whitehouse.gove/infocus/africa/ (June 2003). 77. Ibid.
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