Watching the Aden Declaration with Guarded Caution:
A Personal Perspective

Faisal Roble

January 13, 2006

Having closely watched Somalia’s reconciliation efforts for some time now, it is too early to tell what could come out of the positively framed Aden declaration of understanding between President Abdulahi Yusuf and Speaker Sharif Hassan, which was signed on January 5, 2005.  However, caution is advised, only because past agreements have not met our expectations.

Aden Declaration
Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed(L) signs the Peace Agreement with Shariff Hassan Sheikh Adam, the Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament.

As we look back now, the disappointing results of past multiple reconciliation attempts and how they ended up dashing the hopes of millions of Somalis have disgusted the entire world.  As far back as 2004, the hopes of Somalis have been put on a roller coaster.  My hopes regarding the Mbagathi talks were highlighted by the rare visit which Kofi Annan, General Secretary of the United Nations, paid to the site of the Somali talks (see Faisal Roble, “To Fail or Not to Fail: The Mbagathi Conference.”)  Annan at the time reminded Somali delegates of the responsibility they shoulder in the eyes of the world opinion.

But, Annan’s mighty weight did not sway the culture of conflict, and, in the end, Somalia’s recalcitrant warlords failed to honor the call of the world’s Number one diplomat, who is also a guardian of a purse with a vast amount of reconstruction monies.  As a result, the government that was established at Mbagathi was divided on arrival. 

Do Somali warlords and its contemporary politicians really hear what the world community and friends of the Somali people say, be it threatening words, or words of sympathy, like those uttered by Kofi Annan? No, they do not listen to anyone at all.

Mr. Shariif and company childishly made the President’s delayed schedule for not moving into Mogadishu right away their reason-de-tour, or rather lame alibi, to fight him, despite that he was elected by over 70% of the representatives at Mbagathi. The President should be the last one to move into the Mogadishu of today, especially if the security conditions remain tenuous, and if the gang-of-four (warlords Caato, Qanyare, Yalaxow and Abdi Qasim) remain more powerful than the nascent government itself. 

Out of the pack, only Yalaxow is indigenous to Mogadishu and he is the weakest of the gang-of-four.  The other three are marauding invaders from Galgudud and southern Mudug regions. 

To underscore how dangerous Mogadishu is, we all recall how close death came to Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi, when he visited Mogadishu (his own birthplace).  In light of that, why on earth does Mr. Yusuf move to Mogadishu?  To be hostage to the gang of four?  These criminals are individuals who function outside any civilized norm, and no one, spare Mr. Yusuf, who wants to live for a few more days, should be in their mercy. One of them, Mr. Caato, is long suspected by the US government as the mastermind of the brutal killings of 18 US soldiers in 1994, the subject of the melancholic Hollywood movie, “Black Hawk down.” 

Almost over one year has been cheated out of the Somali populace since the Transitional Federal Government was established.  This is so due to unnecessary infighting and bickering between two wings of a government, which was established to stamp out inter-clan infighting.  Most of the blame in this infight goes to Shariif Hassan's side.

Unlike in the past, however, let us hope that this time that the Aden declaration will be put into practice.

But, are things really that different this time to warrant our optimism? Not really.  The declaration signed in Aden, Yemen, between the two sides is very general and empty clauses are sugar coated with diplomatic languages that can be interpreted in many ways.  For example, it calls for both sides to “reconcile their differences.”  Doesn’t that sound like an empty diplomatic phrase, especially when you have a Speaker of a divided house who does not know what his responsibilities are, where the ultimate executive powers of the President rest, or where his own powers end?

The Aden declaration also calls for a parliamentary session held in 30 days inside Somalia.  If past experience is a lesson, organizing such a gathering could pose a serious challenge.
 
For example, how does selecting Baydhabo as the venue sit well with the wrath-filled, destruction-prone Mogadishu’s gang- of-four?  What would happen if the gang-of-four tries again to derail the Aden declaration?  Is Sharif Hassan going to go against them and help Mr. Yusuf finally isolate these marauding invaders who have terrorized Mogadishu for so long?  Would Mr. Yusuf this time consider marching into Mogadihsu with the help of regional governments, Geedi’s people and with the support of Baydhabo and Kismayo militia forces?
 
There are no answers to these questions, especially in light of how much we do not know about the Aden declaration, and how devastatingly the mercurial nature of Somalia’s unreliable politicians have contributed to the crisis in the past.  All we know in the interim is that the Somali people are tired of being stateless and that sad saga, which has lingered for too long and too painfully, must come to an end.

The Aden declaration, at least as it has been revealed to us so far, is a toothless instrument, except the explicit warning that says the world will not fund a divided government.  But past threats of regional governments and other international entities did not help resolve Somalia’s purposeless “infantile disorder.”   How much can this threat persuade both sides to work to gather for the Somalia people’s sake remains to be seen. 

One particularly hopes that the language in which the Aden declaration is written (the world will not fund a divided government) does not mistakenly embolden Shariif's side.  If Shariif's side reads the above clause to mean that the world would treat him at equal footing with the President, then the Aden declaration is in jeopardy.  Why?  Because Shariif’s side may wrongly decide to play the role usually reserved for the executive branch of the government and that would create a conflict between the real executive body, i.e., the President, and Shariif himself.
   
One must hope that, besides the declassified diplomatic text, which does not say much, there are behind-the-scene warnings, where each side was told what they ought to hear and what not to do to derail the Aden declaration.  We should also hope the meek supportive statement released by the US government, on Monday, January 09, 2006, which was more of a reflection of the absence of any coherent post-Iraq invasion US foreign policy, may nonetheless get audience in Mogadishu and elsewhere.   

This time, though, we watch with extra caution whether the Aden declaration and the expressed sprit of cooperation between President Yusuf and Speaker Shariif are implemented.  We equally need to watch the reaction of the notorious gang of four, that had already sent out its fillers to oppose this latest effort of peace and reconciliation. Although hopes are high this time, we have to welcome the Declaration with caution until real movements towards tangible cooperation is seen between President Yusuf and Speaker Shariif.

Faisal Roble
Los Angeles, CA
E-Mail:Fabroble@aol.com

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