THE FOREIGN AGENTS OF THE POLITICS OF DISINTEGRATION

In passing, I do not know Matt Bryden personally or professionally and I am wondering who is he? And, how is he connected to the Somali question? Because, studied a little more deeply, what he does not say in his article is more revealing than what he says! His analysis does not reflect the comprehensiveness which matches the depth of information he claims to have of the recent political history of Somalia. For example, Bryden fails to address the question of “Somaliland” in his otherwise conveniently contrived perspective of elitist politics ala Somalia! He does not even positively—perhaps conveniently for him—compare  “Somaliland” with what he merely dismisses as “a government of the South”—the outcome of the Impagathi Conference—the Federal Transitional Government, that is.

This behavior is suspect at best, if not intentionally concealing his true color and agenda, disguised in his self-styled role as an international expert on Somalia. Whatever the truth of this matter, Bryden’s opinion sounds disheartening for the millions of us who see a glimmer of hope in the Baidoa session of the Parliament.   

Matt Bryden’s opinion, as he presents it to the world—and similar ones—usually concocted by foreigner pseuds on the culture and politics of Somalia, highlights a very particular dimension of the protracted Somali civil and political conflict and remains an important element of the politics of disintegration in Somalia. And there are a bunch of them around, including Richard Greenfield, John Drysdale,  I. M. Lewis and more recently, Iqbal D. Jhazbhay of South Africa, among others. These birds shamelessly prey on the vulnerability and carrion of the politically rotting Somali state, hoping that it will finally fragment into smaller pieces. I. M. Lewis’ (et al) EU commissioned study in the mid nineties, which predicted [in fact advised] the breakup of the country into 4 or 5 parts, one of which was “Somaliland”, is a case in point. They conclude that it is a fair game that each entity “shifts for itself ”, since the country has, in their reasoning, broken into two parts or more. Such notion represents the creed of the separatists in the North.

These foreigners have, time and again, shown a zest for seeing Somalia disintegrate. They have over the years, muddled through the process of international assistance for reconciliation by misrepresenting the Somali cause through the deceitful avenue of pseudo-expertise on the Somali, social and political setup, while on the other hand, promoting the parochial agenda of one or the other faction and clan-based political leadership of the country. For example, when Richard Greenfield was working for the late General Aideed, John Drysdale was working for the Late Mr. Egal to help further the cause of “Somaliland” in the early nineties.

It is not the purpose of this paper to explain why the Matt Brydens and the Drysdales, etc., of this world are doing what they are doing. However it seeks to conceive their actions as an important, albeit often ignored, dimension of the politics of disintegration in Somalia. This paper argues that Somalia’s prolonged civil and political conflict is not because of a clan conflict as the world is led to believe.  Indeed, it is mainly because of the self-serving, morally degenerate, socially irresponsive and nationalistically bankrupt behavior of the post-independence political elite. It is not, therefore, an innate feature of Somali politics, as some tend to promote. The political behavior and methods of the elite, therefore, constitute another dimension of the politics of disintegration. Hence, the dual impact of the behavior of the political elite and their international counterparts has been the root cause in the existence of the politics of disintegration. It proposes that the political setup could be changed for the better. But then, how does one define the term “elite” within the context of post-independence Somalia? Even more pertinent—what does “disintegration” mean in the first place, within the context of present-day Somalia, and what, if anything, is the etiology?

THE POLITICAL ELITE—THE LOCAL AGENTS OF THE POLITICS OF DISINTEGRATION

One dictionary definition of the term “elite” reads as follows: “A small group of people within a larger group who have more power, social standing, wealth or talent than the rest of the group”. That being so, one may wish to know just who is considered elite in the current, Somali, social and political reality? Somalia, still in transition from a nomadic-pastoral socioeconomic setup to an urban society, and without any palpable class structure, existing or in the making, is difficult to recognize elitism. Generally speaking, however, former colonial staff, police officers, military officers, clerks, colonial house servants, clan chiefs and their sons an daughters, even their distant relatives, who have had a relatively early access to power, education and wealth during the colonial and post-colonial period make up the elite of Somalia.  A new addition to this group, since the fall of Barre’s government, have been some military and policemen of a very low rank who have taken the gun as a means to seek power and authority and who have, it seems, sometimes outsmarted the old guards in exploiting clan politics. The Yalahows, the Qanyares and the Mohamed-dheres of Somalia, and many others of similar rank and status in all parts of the country, fit into this new group.

In a recent feature article, in Wardheernews.com, Faisal Roble pursues the subject of the “elite’’ ever so extensively, which I consider a most sweeping baseline survey of the political situation and behavior which may have contributed to the failure of the elite to reconstitute government during the post Barre era. The author brilliantly highlights the often deplorable political scenarios which emerged out of the political callousness and the social irresponsiveness of the Somali political leadership in all parts of Somalia. The article reminds us not only of the opportunities missed, or forgone, and the challenges that remain as yet unmet, for the nation; but also opportunities missed by some of these politicians, for their own sake, in their efforts to attain power.

The Political Behavior and Power Seeking Methods of the Political elite

The political behavior of the disjointed elite groups has had adverse effects on the conditions of local communities and on the speed, if not the fate, of the national reconciliation process. This has been detrimental to the destiny of the nation in more than one way. Their political orientations vary from democracy in name to despotic government which means a repetition of the political past of Somalia.

Despite their open political rivalry, their shared thinking of solutions to the national crisis is no more, no less, than imposing a central authority without accountability to the general public. Even when arrangement have been forged in foreign capitals, such as those of Arta, Djibouti, and Impagathi, Kenya, the leadership of the ensuing authority sought to sever any relationship  with those of their own (so-called civil society groups and traditional elders) who had the means to participate as clan delegation members. For starters, not many of those selected to man the authority could go back to visit their homesteads, unless, they happen to have been some of the more fortunate, who were already in control of the area as warlords or their cronies.

 The factions and groupings of the political elite have, over the years, manifested a tendency to attach high importance to the same set of mechanisms and methods as sources of political authority, with variation of emphasis—in their quest for political power. These include:

Type 1 Methods: exploiting clan differences by appealing to the honor of the kin in seeking political support or feeding on clan vengeance for military recruitment, in cases where the military method has been preferred.

Type II methods: recruiting clan elite with the prospect of dividing governmental posts between them in processes, which are totally devoid of public participation. The fact that we had very large cabinet in the governments emerging throughout the last decade is telling.

Type III Methods: competing for and seeking international presence, assistance and/or diplomatic links as a symbol of recognition in the expense of their political adversaries, if not as an instrument for discrediting their rivals, since they tend to attach a high value to foreign sponsorship as an important source of political legitimacy. This mechanism explains the role the foreign pseuds play and their usefulness for those who need their services among the elite.

It has been impossible for any nationally (even if remotely) contending groups to come to power, given the elite’s divisive political behavior—resulting in the existing mini-clan geographical division—which they continue to subdivide by their faulty political actions.  Also, given the prevailing global reality after the cold war, foreign sponsorship has been impossible. Compromise between all of them has also proven impossible so far. A military solution has been out of the question, at this stage, since it seems too late for any of these groups to raise the necessary manpower, machinery, resources and organization to force all other forms of authority to submit to them

Given this background, the result has been a protracted situation of stagnation and political stalemate, within which further splits, proliferation of factions and shifting alliances continued. Even when sufficient local and international pressure has been applied as in the case of the Arta Conference, Djibouti, and the Impagathi one in Kenya, the contending political groups failed to compromise to share power, such as was happening for two years before the world helped them to contrive some agreements. Worse even, they continue to breach those agreements after more than a year-and-a-half of the formation of the Transitional Federal Government. They might abort the TFG too with impunity, because they are accountable to no one.

These political misfits have proven time and again that they do not make up the material that raises a nation from the dust. But they are used to getting away with it in such an environment where they have not even been selected, in earnest, let alone elected, to represent the communities they claim to represent. For these gentlemen to be able to form an effective government, the people they claim to represent must first accredit them, which they have not. They are more likely to fail than not. In this case, we will draw on some enlightenment from John Locke's observation on how to approach the reconstitution of government to understand why they might fail:

"And, therefore, when the legislative is broken or dissolved, dissolution and death follow. ... the constitution of the legislative is the first and fundamental act of the society, whereby provision is made for the continuation of their union, under the direction of persons and bonds of laws made by persons authorized thereunto by the consent and appointment of the people, without which no one man or number of men amongst them can have authority of making laws that be binding to the rest." John Locke,(1632-1704)

Not only have the elite failed to re-install government from the top, for their own sake, but they have been very divisive in their jockeying for control at the level of the local community. So in addition to frustrating all possibilities for social and political reconstruction at the national level, they have been recycling hate, which remain the cause of the unabated sectarian violence. For a change to happen in Somalia today, it would imply a total change of attitudes and political behavior on the part of the elite leadership. However, More than just their failure to reach compromise, politically outsmart one another or militarily defeat each other for any group among them to effectively come to power, they may lead to complete disintegration of the country.

THE DISINTEGRATION SCENARIO:

Although many may not wish to agree, the chaotic situation observed in Somalia since the collapse of government, in January 1991, symbolizes no more and no less than a dissolution of the civil society in Somalia—that civil society of 1960. Let us draw once again on a description of such a situation as the "dissolution of government" by John Locke (ibid) which could be sobering for those who doubt this simple fact.

"He that will in any clearness speak of the dissolution of government ought, in the first place, to distinguish between the dissolution of the society and dissolution of government. That which makes the community and brings men out of the loose state of nature into one politic society, is the agreement which everyone has with the rest to incorporate and act as one body, and so be one distinct commonwealth. ... Whereby this union is dissolved ... in that case (not being able to maintain and support themselves as one entire and independent body) the union belonging to that body which consisted therein must necessarily cease, and so everyone returns to the state he was in before, with a liberty to shift for himself and provide for his own safety as he thinks fit or in some other society. Whenever the society is dissolved, it becomes certain the government cannot remain."

The crisis has, therefore, involved more than just the collapse of government as some might believe—the "warlords" and their allies and supporters, who generally believe that all is well except for the imposition of government from the top. Therefore, the state may disintegrate into its traditional, natural, clannish-cum-geographic denominations. In fact a  mere fragmentation into clan territories might, in the interim, be considered a blessing in disguise, by some, because that can be interpreted as freedom from the grip of the elite, in which case the restoration of state would only involve a reconfiguration of the political and administrative map.  But the situation is more complex than that.    

In fact, unless the political elite venture out to become sober by emerging out of their power seeking stupor, or, that some new breed of politicians comes to replace them, the situation in Somalia may remain as somber as ever and the state may eventually disintegrate the way the Drysdales and the Lewises of this World want it. In that regard, there have been arguments and counterarguments as to whether the State of Somalia has or has not disintegrated and the nature and denominations of the disintegration. In the end, all sides of the political spectrum of Somalia meekly admit to some sort of disintegration. Not that anybody is open about it, except perhaps those, not surprisingly, staunch supporters of “Somaliland” and their international well wishers. There have been three main camps in terms of holding to the different views and assumptions about the nature of the disintegration process.

Type I Assumptions: This view holds to the argument that the state has disintegrated with a prospect that the country might territorially (territorial disintegration) break up into two or more parts. Of course the supporters of the secession of “Somaliland” promote this view (agenda) foremost and use the above quoted observation of John Locke as a justification for their cause. What they fail to realize is that if any region of that old state can secede, it will also fall apart before it happens, because it still remains patched up of a bunch of clans, run by the same punch of political demagogues.

Type II Assumptions: The second view is based on the premise that the nation has broken into its component clan constituencies (social disintegration) and that a sense of restored nationhood can best be hoped for in a federal, if not a confederate, form of statehood. The bottom-line for the adherents to this view is that nothing has changed in the country; there only has been a requirement to impose a government from the top as the only solution—hence the recurrent so-called Reconciliation Conferences. For these, the answer lies in patching up something, as long as it can be installed from the top and they become part of it. Remember the 4.5-formula? Some even call for a strong unitary government. But then, the catch has remained in the snare pit with the trap attached to it, since they could not quickly reinstall government from the top. Alas! It took them 15 years so far.

Type III Assumptions: A third view suggests that neither the national sense of semblance nor the territorial integrity of the state is at stake, and that the dissolution relates to that post-colonial political edifice—political culture, structures and agents of the previous systems of government—including the colonial, the civilian post-colonial of the sixties, and the military dictatorship (Administrative and political disintegration). In the case of this last assumption, optimists might even, already, stretch their aspirations to interpret the meaning of it all as a second chance for statehood—a rebirth of the nation; even better, a second wave of independence; if you like! This type of assumptions argues that the people of Somalia do not wish to dismember their country or do away with their state. They want to do away with the old forms of postcolonial government. They do not, however, wish to throw away the baby with the bath water. But assumptions based on this third view require more than just politicians. It requires two other types of people in addition. The first type comprises the thinkers—the theorists—the intellectual leaders, as Ismail A. Ismail would have it in his article “the intellectual paralysis of the educated Somalis”. The second group comprises politicians of the statesmen type. Even a few of those would do.

THE TELLTALES OF TERRITORIAL DISINTEGRATION

Fatun Mohamed Hassan, the former charge d’affaires of the Somali Mission to the United Nations, frustrated (in 1992) with the slow pace of the United Nations to embark on efforts to start the reconciliation process and with its misguided approach to the Somali question, once wrote the following to the President of the Security Council of the United Nations:

“First, hostage of its old perceptions, the world continues focused on a nostalgic Somalia that has changed and may never come back the same. In passing , all must keep an open mind about the notion of a future Somali state. Any realistic revival of the Somali Unity and statehood may involve a renegotiation of all its present symbols including capital, flag and terms of union, to say the least”

Indeed, Fatun’s fears of those days could not have been put more mildly, even if diplomatically. A negotiation of the symbols of the state, such as we witness or expect to witness in the near future, involves the dissolution of civil society—in other words the fabric of which the state is made. We should all see it crystal clear today that all the symbols of the state are, politically speaking, in question. The mere call for dismemberment of a large junk of the country—although there is no consensus on the secession within “Somaliland” itself—and the fact that there has been not even an iota worth of efforts to address the issue over the last decade, in itself confirms the worse of Fatun’s fears. The fact the the issues will come to the table as soon as talks start on the question of “Somaliland” is disturbing. Not to mention the fact that the status of the capital is already in discussion for other stupid political reasons. In essence, this questions all the Symbols of state, as we knew it—the flag, the boundaries, the capital and certainly the terms of union. If the symbols of the state are in question, one way or another, one must agree that there has been a calamity lurking forward on Somalia, only delayed by the Grace of God over the last 15 years.

The Sub-lands Revisited —another telltale of disintegration

The formation of sub-states (i.e. Puntland and Somaliland) along clan lines has represented another development in the ongoing process of disintegration of the old state. There have been other sub-lands in the making—i.e. Juba-land, Hiiran-land, and Central-land but which have not yet materialized. “Puntland”, it seems, had followed the footsteps of  “Somaliland” before it, as far as structure and source of legitimacy go, and has represented the manifestation of the failure of the international approach towards reconciliation.  As well as being a means for political survival on the part of the elite as they waited for that government which they would nationally impose from the top—Boos-celis for some, to use a familiar Somali phrase—the sub-lands have, at best, and in essence, been a corruption of terms such as the “bottom-up approach”, “governance at grass roots level” and “decentralization”—I should add. These sub-states are fashioned after the parent SomaliRepublic of the past by the same clan-conscious elite of the failed Republic. More recently these have been wrongly proposed as sub-denominations of a FederalState.

These sub-states have been designed in the form of rogue mini-states by the same agents of old to reproduce the same past structures and political culture of that failed State. Far from meaning self-governance or a bottom-up approach to nation building, as is claimed by their advocates, the phenomenon implies government imposed from the top at the regional levels. The same military and political elite of the former despotic forms of Somali governments, who have failed to reconstitute government top-down fashion at the national level, seem to have imposed government on their respective clan denominations to demarcate their claimed boundaries of jurisdiction within the State. The proliferation of these sub-states—the sub-lands or sub-national entities, as a phenomenon—will not only prolong the stagnation and political stalemate experienced through-out, but will also deepen the extent of division and conflict between and within communities at local levels beyond easy repair.

“Somaliland” and “Puntland” already have fundamental differences and are built on diametrically opposing orientations in terms of assumptions, theoretically speaking. Their boundaries have also been overlapping and their dispute over a large portion of territory may have been a blessing in disguise for the territorial integrity of Somalia, so far. “Somaliland” is built on the Type I assumptions above, and “Puntland” is built on Type II assumptions, for that matter. A resolution of the territorial dispute would substantiate one or the other assumption about the nature of disintegration, in terms of the types of assumptions mentioned above. For the time being though, and by the same token, the case for the sub-lands remains pending the process of disintegration taking its toll one way or the other. The irony is that the diametrically opposing presumptions on which the two sub-lands are founded make a mockery of their existence and, in the meantime, check the possibility of early disintegration either way

CHANGE—a Must in the Way Forward

In his article, “The Intellectual Paralysis of the Educated Somalis”, on the question of post-independence Somali leadership, Ismail A. Ismail correctly observes the fact that:

’”…at Independence, their were no experienced technocrats nor were there adequately educated politicians. In this regard, he writes: “Somalia has been led since independence by persons, the vast majority of whom had either a modicum of formal education or none at all. The first few university graduates who just returned at Independence were young and too inexperienced for the high posts they were destined to encumber and were inevitably occupied with the day-to-day administration of the country, albeit with the help of expatriate experts. They hardly had any time for reflection or policy planning and they lacked the necessary institutional infrastructure and educated political leaders who knew where they were going.”

Both Faisal Roble and Ismail have—each in his way—been trying to explain why Somalia has failed as a state. Like many others, they came to the conclusion that the lack of adequate political and intellectual leadership is a root cause. While Faisal’s (ibid) is intimating for improved political elitism, as a likely avenue for resuscitating the nation from its current doom, Ismail’s laments the educated Somalis for having self-abrogated their leadership role, perhaps by misrepresenting their intellectual role. “In short”, he writes, “they have been critical of everything that has gone wrong but shied away from coming forward to fill the apparent intellectual void”. Ismail takes the educated Somalis to task by identifying issues such as decolonization, federalism and human rights in which this group of the society can play a leadership role.

But then, we have intellectuals in Somalia! We always had them, if that is what we miss, and Ismail has recognized this fact somewhat. The fact is that we ceased to pay attention to our intellectuals. We do not recognize them, perhaps because of the language they use—our own—the Somali language! Those of you who had the opportunity to study Hadrawi’s works of the seventies and the eighties, will find not only a criticism of the political system of the day, but that he foretells a lot of the political problems we have in the arena today, if we were to avoid them. Take Zahid Qaman who, for example, speaks to the subjects of diplomacy and democratic decision making within the Somali clan context during the 19^th century. Take Qassim who had been bombarding the elite with his political verse during 60s and the 70 in a nationalistic trance of unequalled passion. Take Adan Arab , who had registered his disenchantment with the political elite of the day, in the 1960s, in the following verses, alluding to miss-conferred trust and underscoring the misconceived priorities—roughly translated—the poet says:

Visit AminCaamir.com which represents another art form, which an intellectual uses to criticize the political establishment of Somalia through the use of caricatures and cartoons. Therefore, If intellect means the power of the mind to reason, then we have enough of those, including the above mentioned artists, but we have not been heeding, nor have we taking them seriously, because, perhaps, we long ago disavowed intellect produced in our tongue. The respect for our own—one thinks—has long vanished with the advent of colonization, as we warmed up to foreign languages and ways. It may therefore, be more of a disconnect between the educated Somalis and their cultural past, more than it is the lack of the intellectual material itself, that we are suffering from.

CONCLUSION

Whatever we call them intellectuals (as Ismail would call them) or a new breed of politicians, as I do, there is a dire need for a change in the political leadership of the country—leadership that can bring about a new, nationwide political movement, as Faisal Roble would correctly conclude (ibid)—and I emphasize—which has nationalistic, democratic and peaceful features. Whether the current elite can bring about this movement, as Faisal Roble (ibid) would argue, is a matter for debate, unless the current political elite can change their political goals, methods and motivations.  In that regard, the old guards will need to change their assumptions about what exists in Somalia and their general view of the world. In other words, they will have abandoned their Type I and Type II assumptions, above, and let the systems of the past wither away. That may become too much to ask of them—politically speaking. In the mean time, the TFG must move on to bring about some semblance of law and order and a modicum of basic structure and organization. The challenges carried in this paper remain a natural predicament for it, because the proposition requires the change of the stuff of which the TFG is made of or, at least, its processes and products. But there is no alternative to its existence in the mean time. Worse even, it has only about three and half years of its mandate left to bring about change or die like the others before it.

On a slightly more optimistic note, Mohamed Mukhtar , in his article of June 03, 2005, wonders,”…why so many extremely beneficial writings that examine Somali ills at length and offer a range of positive panaceas end at computer storages devices or dusted shelves at best, if not in rubbish bins.” He further asks;’…why the conflict in Somalia still lingers on when there are literally heaps of writing from resourced people that sketch many hypotheses which can succeed in turning around the predicament that Somalia is in”. Mukhtar’s questions are legitimate. But, even then reading articles is not enough. Analyzing, internalizing, testing and applying ideas require intellectual skill, which, if you accept Ismail’s argument, is already in short supply. But this does not render Mukhtar’s observation and questions any less relevant.

In the mean time, the question remains, can the current Transitional Federal Government stand on its feet? Can it avert the lurking tragedy? Can Somalia politically reorganize to bring about a new capable leadership to bring about freedom and justice? Can the country survive the current decade without becoming a thing of the past? Can we all avert further national tragedy by changing our national assumptions from Type I and Type II to Type III, above?

By: Abdalla A. Hirad
E-Mail :MHirad@aol.com

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