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The Greeks had a name for the likes of Galaal; they declared Because the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) lacks effective institutions and logistical means to reach out for help or solicit advice, the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) has facilitated a simple consultative meeting to assist the Transitional Federal Government cope with its current challenges. Indeed the UN has assembled top ranking military experts, professors, strategic thinkers and operations experts that Somalia ever had. The goal of this gathering was to help the Transitional Federal Government plan how to build its own army, to establish and operationalize security institutions, to secure Mogadishu and its surrounding areas, defeat the new Jihadist and possibly extend this stability gradually and peacefully in collaboration with peaceful regions and the United Nations. Contrary to Galaal’s claims on BBC, the officers didn’t not propose hard and fixed time table or a detailed operational plan. They provided an informed and plausible options, preferable models and credible timelines given all policy aspects are addressed by the UN and TFG. None of which included launching of any military operations outside Mogadishu. The Generals, Colonels and other experts refused to engage in policy making, policy discussions or politics. They defined certain requirements and informed the UN that they would only play an advisory role providing technical and military expertise to the UN and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The officers presented thorough knowledge of Somalia’s security challenges, discipline, mutual respect and no-nonsense attitude to the Somalia problem. They have heard briefings from US officers, UN Officials and Somali delegation from Mogadishu. The willingness of these officers to help their former home can only be described as an altruistic, context based on moral act in which values of their action and possibly virtues of the consequence prevailed over their immediate needs. They buried any selfish needs and respectfully agreed to provide only technical expertise to the weak Somali Government against The Jihadist in the South. Leaving all policy issues for the UN and the TFG. Unlike the other officers, Gen. Galaal was interested in elaborate and immediate tactical plans with fixed dates rather than a model to be implemented by the decision makers at TFG and the UN. He in fact in his first day gave a long lecture on how the country should be dealt with, advocating for a direct role in planning and ostensibly saving Somalia. Perhaps he even wanted to set an agenda of how to rule future Somalia. Gen Galaal’s points of view were listened and discussed during the meeting. But unlike the Clan Militia’s in Mogadishu that Galaal is used to mobilizing, these few old wise men did not easily go along with the rant. These were highly educated decorated officers, some far more educated than Galaal, some senior to him. There were no yes men among these men.! Most of these officers were hardened strategists, technocrats, military experts, professors, planners and operation research experts with no political goals whatsoever. On the other hand, it was clear that Galaal had certain political goals/objectives that he somehow expected would be accepted by all. Moreover he was fighting an old war of honor; An honor he lost after his defeat in 1977 War. But these officers knew well who he is and his role in the Somali civil war no matter whatever false image he projected from day to day; the officers knew Galaal’s Dilemma (The man that never was). Since late 1970s, Galaal carried with him a deep wound of embarrassments of his defeat in Dirirdawe “Dirirdhabe” during the Ogaden war in 1977. Indeed Galaal was the only one in attendance who had been defeated in 1977. On the other hand there were many who commanded divisions and command centers including those who commanded the Somali Army in Godey front and in JigJiga front during the Ogaden in 1977. Another explanation of Galaal’s unease and his negative interview with the BBC may be due to the fact that he was initially unduly promoted and spiraled to the top ranks of the Somali Army not for competitions but as a direct result of his loyalty to Barre’s regime in the 1970s. But soon his dull-witted manners revealed the true character of the man (the man who never was!. ). His defeat in 1977 only helped unmask the man who never was!. The construct that is of what he wanted to portray from time to time. It is also important to mention that, while Galaal was practically removed from the decision making ranks of the Somali Army, he nonetheless, enjoyed a high ranking profile in the then Somali government including ministerial positions and other high profile positions in the ruling party. It is therefore astounding to see him portray himself as an outsider or to even accept his criticism of the former regime that he so loyally served. The question remains however, why did Galaal claim that the meeting’s outcome was a proposal of a military action from Somaliland, through Puntland to Southern Somalia? Doesn’t Galaal know that we live in the the age of electronic records? Could there be Records / documentations available to the media to disprove his claims?. Why did he need to fabricate an imaginary military action that involves Somaliland and Puntland? Is this indicative of ulterior motives?. Don’t wait for answers from the officers, It is understandable that none of these officers will engage with a clan politician like Galaal. They are less ego-centric and more interested in providing expertise than implementing personal goals or engaging in politics. This is what surprised the TFG and the UN alike experts who are impartial and knowledgeable. The knowledge and the discipline of the participants of the conference stunned the US and the UN staff. One of the senior staff members informed me that he has never seen a group like this in Somalia. The current TFG’s Minister of Defense in a radio interview with VOA has stated that this was a unique conference. He stated that it was a non-stop conference that included group consultations, deliberating strategic stances, refining models of operations and structure and almost round the clock support staff that documented and drafted the discussions. The 40 officers constituted members from all the Somali Clans, they however showed a common interest in providing technical advise and they enjoyed themselves and their work. These men showed a moral courage to help Somalia by not engaging in clan politics. Contrary to the wild imaginative claims of Galaal, the conference has proposed a model for stabilizing southern Somalia; they proposed an operational and structural model for a future Somali Army under the TFG. Indeed in their final presentation they left all policy implementation and future political developments for the politicians, TFG and The United Nations. Though not conclusive, the answer as to why Galaal paradoxically condemned the meeting he took part in? Why he gave such a distorted view about this simple consultative meeting may lie in what the Somali officers call “Keligii Is Ku Sarkaal“ “Galaal’s dilemma“, “The Loser’s Dilemma“; The man who never was what he was thought to be. Gen. Galaal after all might still be fighting the 1977 war, carrying the embarrassment of defeat. The dull-witted General who failed 1977 was again unsuccessful to effectively engage with his colleagues. Or may be he is just deceitful egomaniac gone megalomaniac! Abdul Ahmed III; Galaal's Interview We welcome the submission of all articles for possible publication on WardheerNews.com |
