Introduction

In the year 1995 the European Union undertook a study whose purpose was to illuminate the field of options for Somali ‘politicians’ and ‘leaders’ (popularly known as ‘war-lords’) in so far as structural solutions to the country’s problems were concerned. They came up with four systems: the confederal; the federal; the unitary; and the consociational(1).  They explained each of them and provided extant examples of countries using it.  But, there were three things I did not like about the study: first, it wrongly assumed that Somalis were unaware of such systems, its approach, therefore, being didactic; secondly, while it explained the virtues of each system it was unbalanced in that it gave no warnings as to its pitfalls; and, finally, there was an underlying but fundamentally wrong assumption that Somalia’s internecine conflict within itself was such that it was amenable to structural solutions.

Nothing could, of course, be farther from the truth. However, given the nature of the hostilities and the depth of rancor there was a clear and growing trend towards federalism, and in the wake of the failure of the Cairo Conference at the end of 1997 Puntland was created in the following year as an autonomous ‘first state’ of a would-be federal Somalia. ‘Somaliland’ had already declared its secession in 1991, barely five months after the collapse of the State.

By the time the Djibouti Conference of the year 2000 was held federalism was widely accepted and indeed adopted in that conference.  At that point, I wrote a paper on it pointing out its multifarious complexities and the challenges they posed.(2) My purpose in writing that paper was two-fold: to kick off a debate that would inform both the faction leaders and the public, especially those participating in reconciliation conferences; and to underscore the fact that even the simplest system would fail, as exemplified by the failure of the unitary system in Somalia, which brought about the demise of democracy to usher in a dictatorial military rule, and ended up with an implosion and the collapse of the State itself.  My position then was, as now, that any system would fail if it is not properly managed.  I do not deny that it is more difficult to manage a more complex system such as federalism, but the point about management as the determinant of success and failure is nevertheless valid.  That point (which most astonishingly continues to escape the attention of many of us writing on systems of government with a view to recommending one or the other as a solution for Somalia’s problems) was seen more than two hundred years ago; and I always quote, in this connection, a relevant and illuminating couplet from Alexander Pope (1688 – 1744):
      
       “For forms of government let fools contest;
        Whatever is best administered, is best”

With the foregoing partly in view, I shall now proceed to discuss a few assertions and recommendations made by some Somali professors and other intellectuals in an effort to guide their compatriots to choose a form of government that would, presumably, ensure political instability.  I shall also point out a general but misguided criticism of the federal system.

1. “HOOGGA SOOMAALIYEED IYO HIIL AQOONYAHAN
   (Somali Catastrophe and Intellectuals’ Succor)”

That is the title of what seems to be a report (for it only says ‘FINAL COPY’, not a report) that came out of the ‘A Conference/ Congress of Somali Intellectuals’ held in Djibouti from 13 to 20 December, 2010.  Although the skeletal report (only 12 pp.), which was published in some Somali websites, was indicated as final, I heard through the grapevine that a full report of about one hundred pages is in the offing. However, sufficient explanation of the group’s recommendations of the unitary, albeit decentralized, system and on how to achieve rescinding the 1991 declaration of secession by what has come to be known as ‘Somaliland’ have been adequately given both in the ‘final’ but short report that has been published as well as radio interviews by Professor Ahmed Ismail Samatar.

When a group of highly educated Somalis meet under the label of ‘Intellectuals’ or the more vainglorious title of ‘Aqoonyahan’ (knowledge expert) to discuss and analyze our country’s grave and long-drawn-out problems we have the right to expect some enlightenment as to the causes, consequences and remedies of these problems.  Like so many of the people I talked to I am deeply disappointed by the shallowness of the report.  First, there is the lack of modesty inherent in arrogating to oneself the title of ‘Aqoonyahan” to which the appropriate reaction should be “Astraqfirullaah” (God forgive).  ‘Aqoonyahan’ is far from being the appropriate Somali word for ‘intellectual’; it is a mistranslation of it and an empty and immodest claim to vast knowledge and learning.   Furthermore, one cannot call oneself ‘an intellectual’ without being presumptuous; it is for others to recognize him or her as such and call him or her ‘an intellectual’. A true intellectual never calls himself or herself an ‘intellectual’ and a truly educated man or woman is always keenly aware of how much he or she does not know – and that gives him or her a sense of modesty.  In court proceedings under the British system an advocate will refer to an opposing advocate as “My learned friend”, but he or she will never call himself or herself as a ‘learned’ person.(3) And to underscore his or her modesty he or she will often say, “I humbly submit that…”. 

Furthermore, the title of the Report, “Hoogga Soomaliyeed iyo Hiil Aqoonyahan (Somali Catastrophe and Intellectuals’ Succor)” is grotesque,  ‘hoog’ being the most connotatively inappropriate Somali word for describing the continuing tragedy of the Somali people, and ‘succor’ or ‘hiil’ implies that the intellectuals, not being part of them, are only coming to the aid of those affected by the ‘hoog’ or catastrophe. ‘Hiil’ is given to others, not to oneself.  Are the intellectuals who met in Djibouti providing ‘hiil’, or answering the call of duty? In a sense educated Somalis have been part and parcel of the rapid deterioration, collapse and the unending turmoil of their country. Despite their education and long exposure to advanced civilizations by living abroad they think almost exactly like their clannish rabble-rousers back home. Instead of extinguishing the fire back home those in the Diaspora are, tragically, too divided along clan lines, and are generally believed to be adding fuel to the fire. When the educated class itself is like this, one inescapably takes a dim view of the future. I think the educated in the Diaspora can help their country by closing ranks, networking across clan lines and building trust among themselves with a view to leading their country out of the morass and mayhem.

The Choice Between The Unitary System And Federalism

The choice of a system, whether confederal, federal, unitary or consociational, is ultimately a political one.  The discussion thus far has been on the choice between the two well-known systems; namely, the federal and the unitary. In theory, the relative merits and demerits of the two systems are well known, but in practice both have succeeded and failed in different parts of the world.  Whilst we all agree that federalism is more complex and daunting and the unitary approach is apparently, if deceptively, simpler and straightforward we should pause and think why the same system succeeds in one country and fails in another.  Surely, it is the human element that makes the difference between success and failure.

Both the group that assembled in Djibouti and Professor Elmi Afyare(4), now based in Qatar, strongly recommend the unitary system with the proviso that it should be decentralized.  I had said before: “… the causes of successive failures and the final collapse of the Somali State are laid at the doorstep of a unitary system which was highly centralized and despotic.  For the vast majority of Somalis the unitary system evokes the memory of the étatism that was characteristic of the ancient régime: we should not underestimate the psychological urge to break with a troubled past and to introduce a system which represents a total departure from the previous arrangement.”(5) 

The decision to opt for federalism has been irrevocably made, already, as a political compromise between the clans and after a long journey beginning with the clamor of Hisbia Digle Mirifle (later Hizbia Dastur Mustaquil Soomaliyeed , HDMS) in the late fifties for a federal arrangement.  The inalterable reality, which is still current, is that neither Puntland nor what used to be Upper Juba region (the stronghold of the erstwhile HDMS) will settle for the unitary stem.  Nor can the secessionist Administration based in Hargeisa be lured back to national unity with anything less than a federalism that unequivocally and genuinely guarantees them to be masters in their own home.  Other units of the federal state have been in the making and are also preparing themselves for their own home rule as well.

While I sympathize with Afyare and the Djibouti group there is a strong resistance to ‘going back to Mogadishu’ because of what it has been (the capital city where all the repressive powers were concentrated and emanated from), and what it has become (the city of darkness and death).  A lot of cleaning (not clan cleansing) is required such as safety and security, restitution of property to rightful owners, and the Somalization of the city for it to serve truly as the Nation’s capital – a cosmopolitan metropolis mirroring all varied interests and economic pursuits.  I know that, like federalism, it has already been agreed, equally irrevocably, that it should be the seat of the federal government.  But, as with federalism, there are people who are still opposed to the redesignation of Mogadishu as the national capital.

It is a sad and bitter reality that the clans have not au fond reconciled as yet which is the reason why there are still deep-seated mistrusts between them - the Hawiye and Darod, for example.  This is precisely the reason why Puntland never trusted Sheikh Sharief, and why he never ventured to visit Puntland although as President it is incumbent upon him to do so in order to build trust.  In the Diaspora itself, hypocrisy and niceties apart, the Darod are on one side and the Hawiye on the opposite side – and, tragically, education has not made any difference.  The Isaq in the far north have neither forgotten nor forgiven the other Somalis, particularly southerners, for the atrocities they suffered under the Siad Barre regime. Time has not been the great physician in this instance, for their rancor still lingers twenty full years after the collapse of the regime and the liberation of their homeland.  Neither Professor Ahmed Samatar, nor Professor Afyare Elmi can placate them by offering an empty talk, however sweetened, and a return to the unitary system, which in their eyes was a convenient vehicle for unfettered despotism.  There are, truly, veritable barriers, albeit psychological, to the reintroduction of the unitary system.  Furthermore, there are minority clans and groups in the South (Mogadishu, Merca, Barava and the surrounding areas) who were treated savagely in the post-Barre period because they were unable to defend themselves: their men were gratuitously killed, their women raped right before their eyes, their property looted and their land spoliated.  They too are very bitter and need to be part of a genuine reconciliation.

Academics are prone to defining their terms.  But neither Professor Afyare Elmi nor Professor Ahmed Samatar told us what they mean by ‘Somaliland’ -  or the ‘North’ for that matter.  I know from personal experience that the two terms mean different things to different people.  The other myth which the professors and many others, especially foreigners, make is that there are two solid blocks one of which is ‘Somalia’ - or the ‘South’- and the other is ‘Somaliland’ - or the ‘North’.  In reality, these blocks do not exist on the ground.  Unfortunately, Somalis are divided along clan lines, not on the basis of geography or colonial heritage. In a way this is good, for every dark cloud has a silver lining, and the silver lining here is that secession is prevented by the lack of coincidence between regional and clan divisions.  That is precisely why the secession of one clan in what was once called ‘Somaliland Protectorate’ cannot succeed.  But, if the terms of the Union between the two territories that merged in 1960 are to be renegotiated each of them must first and foremost reconfigure itself in order to coalesce around a solid goal and then negotiate with the other side. Incidentally, if I may correct Professor Afyare Elmi, there was no regional or provincial administration in British Somaliland.  The entire territory was divided into six districts during the colonial administration.  It was the Somali government that bifurcated the area in 1961by creating two regions – one based in Hargeisa (‘Northwestern Region’) and the other based in Burao (‘Northeastern Region’).

Professor Afyare Elmi argues that the federal system gives the greatest possible scope to separatism.  That point is integral to the case of the anti-federalists.  However, the paradox of federalism is that while it encourages parochialism it is also an effective antidote to fissiparous tendencies.  It is excessive centralization (which is possible in both the unitary and federal systems, but more so in the former than in the latter) that provides the breeding ground for separatism.  The struggle for the liberation of Eritrea, which lasted a whole generation, was caused by Haile Selassie’s abrogation in 1961 of the federal arrangement that had been agreed upon with the United Nations following the end of WWII as part of the disposal of the former Italian possessions.

On The Writing of A Constitution

I have seen the draft constitution and the accompanying “Summary & Questions Guide of the Consultation Draft Constitution”.  They are well written and well argued. But they have been subject of controversy even before the ink dried on them.  Fully aware that they should be thoroughly studied before anyone can venture to comment on them, I must admit that I have only browsed through them.  I shall therefore reserve my comments for another day.

However, the assumption being made in writing a constitution is that it will be observed as the supreme law of the land.  Almost all countries have written constitutions, the only notable exception being the UK, but few give them the force and majesty of the law.  Many will be surprised to learn that Somalia had a constitution even under the regime of Siad Barre.  But, of course, it was no more than a window dressing. 

A constitution is no more than ink on paper if there is no constitutionalism, and the fact is that we live in a world replete with written constitutions but so glaringly lack constitutionalism.  It is not the document that is important: it is the actions that may follow from it.  The UK does not have a constitution; yet, it does. You may read about the ‘British Constitution’ in articles and books but these are merely explanations and treatises on how the political system, or the system of governance, if you like, has evolved in the UK in a thousand years. The British constitution is not really unlike the Somali Xeer which also was unwritten, but none the less induced conformity, except it did not evolve into a modern political system.

I am sure Somalia will need a new constitution though, in all probability, it will not be followed.  It will need it because it is one of the paraphernalia of a modern state. I have discussed in my book(6) a major conflict between a provision in the constitution of 1960 and the Public Order Law which upheld the administration of the Xeer.  I have also discussed in my book how President Aden Abdulle Osman, the first president, was the first to violate the spirit of the constitution.  Moreover, one of the shortcomings of the 1960 constitution was that it did not require the central government to decentralize and Professor Afyare Elmi is wrong in saying that “…the 1960 constitution provides mechanisms that mandate decentralization”(7) In fact, the relevant provision of that constitution left it to the discretion of the central government to provide ‘administrative decentralization’.  Again, I have criticized this provision and explained in my book how confused the writers of the constitution were about the nature of ‘decentralization’.

All this apart, the important question is whether the current circumstances are propitious for the writing of a constitution.  The overarching goal of helping Somalia should be the restoration of peace and security, the restoration of national unity through genuine reconciliation, and, finally, the revival of the state on agreed foundations.  Then, and only then, should a constitutional commission be established and go around the country in order to sound out a greater number of people in all the constituent states of the federation. 

I know that the international community is fatigued and want to wash off their hands from Somalia and its problems once and for all.  But, the Somalis are also tired with some of their blatant interferences, which are at times counterproductive, and with the huge amounts of money the international community spend in their name.  I think they should not push the draft constitution too much.  They should, instead, put it in a state of suspended animation until the country is stabilized, the State is restored and there is a government that controls the entire country.  By then Somalis will have the ease of mind to decide what is good for them and should figure in the constitution.  At present mistrusts abound and there is no general agreement on the draft constitution.  The president, Sheikh Sharief, and his political allies are opposed to it; Puntland is opposed to it; ‘Somaliland’ is unconcerned, and the Shabab that control much of the South consider it a conspiracy by ‘infidels’, the majority of the Somali people who are struggling to eke out some kind of living from harsh and inhospitable conditions are not aware of it, and the Parliament has no legitimacy emanating from the people they claim to represent. Clearly, the objective reality is that the circumstances are not at all favorable for the consideration of a draft constitution. Why, the, waste time and resources on a futile exercise?

Why Nothing Will Work

The Djibouti group believed to be spearheaded by Professor Ahmed Ismail Samatar has misdiagnosed the chronic disease that tears apart the very fabric of Somali society and has seriously degraded the moral character of the individual; and so has Professor Afyare Elmi.  The root-cause of Somalia’s ever worsening malaise has been and still is acute moral deprivation. One can correct honest mistakes, but one cannot correct a ‘mistake’ that was not honestly made. Institutions and systems are mere tools in the hands of human beings.  People can receive all the education and training in the world and they may perfect their trade and skills as a result, but if they are not imbued with the right values to make them conscientious there will be nothing to stop them from engaging in improprieties of all sorts, particularly when the laws are not enforced and there is a culture of impunity. 

Education, technical advance, economic development and mindless materialism can only produce a soul-less civilization with disastrous consequences.  Nazi Germany is often quoted as an obvious example.  Professionals may get some ethical values and standards from their training. But, as the saying goes “You can lead a horse to a well, but you cannot force it to drink”. So many professionals set aside their ethical standards, especially in a country such as Somalia where there are no professional societies.  The result of this is depicted in the expressive Egyptian phrase, “Xaamiihaa Xaraamiiha” (‘The guardian is the thief’ or ‘The protector is the violator’).

It has been argued that Somalia deteriorated over the years and finally plunged into chaos because of poor and even willful leadership.  Whilst this is true I also know that leaders do not drop from heaven: they are the product of their societies and there is therefore some truth in the saying that “ Every nation gets the government it deserves”.  If leaders are bad, one after the other, (and education and training do not stop them from being bad) we should look into the source that produces them: their society.

I have expressed my sense of moral outrage in my article, “2011: A Miracle Year for Somalia or More of the Same?” which is still posted on Wardheernews.com.  Since that article is still there I will not bother my readers with reiterating every thing I had said in it.  But I want them to reflect on the question of whether any thing will work as it should, if: the successful presidential candidate had bought the election and all he is doing is to make huge and quick profits on his investment; others are similarly diverting public funds to private accounts, openly and without the slightest pricking of conscience; preventive rules, regulations and procedures as well as punitive laws are set aside by the law enforcers; the Parliament is so corrupt that its leaders and members consider their votes as a commercial commodity to be sold to the highest bidder; ‘honesty’ is a bad word and therefore a rare commodity; and, finally, the public themselves encourage the improprieties by holding those who commit them in very high esteem, instead of applying social sanctions against them.

The situation may seem hopeless, but giving in to pessimism and despair is not an option.  It is much easier to deal with material or palpable things like writing a constitution, choosing a form or system of governance, constituting the legislature, appointing civil servants, forming an army and police, forming the judiciary, and so on.  But, what if all these things exist only in name? Surely, it is not the structures per se that are important, but their substance or content as well, including a sense of moral direction to guide them to where the Nation wants to be.  As I often say, ‘Good governance needs good people” – and that includes the governed on whose shoulders ultimate responsibility must rest.

(1) EC Somalia Unit, A Study of Decentralized Political Structures for Somalia, August, 1995

(2) "A federalStructure for Somalia: An Upas Tree or a Panacea?", Horn of Africa Journal,  Vol. XVIII, 2000, pp. 70-80

(3) For my views on these matters, see Ismail Ali Ismail, "The Intellectual Paralysis of the Educated Somali", Wardheernews.com, August 29, 2005

(4) Afyare Elmi,"Nidaamka Federaalka Xal uma aha Dhibaatada Somalida", Wardheernews.com, January  17, 2011; and "In Search of a Somali consitution" in Aljazeera, January 25, 2011 also reprinted in Hiiraan .com at the same time.

(5)  Isnail Ali Ismail, op. cit.p.72

(6) "GOVERNANCE: The Scourge And Hope of Somalia", Trafford Publisher, 2010

(7) Afyare Elmi,"In search of a Somali  constitution, Aljazeera, January 25, 2011, p.2

Related Articles:

- Federalism: The Past and The Present   By Abdlkadir Abow
- Nidaamka Federaalku Xal uma ahan Dhibaatada Soomaalida Wq. Afyare Abdi Elmi

_____________________________________________________________________

We welcome the submission of all articles for possible publication on WardheerNews.com
So please email your article today Opinions expressed in this article are those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the views of WardheerNews
Maqaalkani wuxuu ka turjumayaa aragtida Qoraaga loomana fasiran karo tan WardheerNews 

Copyright © 2011 WardheerNews.com