This paper treasures this opportunity to unveil ( kashf ) our Waranle (warrior) and Minghis (Jinn spirit) ethos and to present some facts about Somalis' loyalty to their warlords.   I call them facts of life about Somalis because it has often been asserted as a fact of life that warlordism does exist in Somalia and that cannot be ignored.   Warlordism does not exist only; it is engaging now in mayhem activities that caused many Somalis to live an unspeakable wretched life.

In spite of this, Somalis today are among the most warlord-philiac people in the world.   Many of them consider that following their warlord ( calaqad ) is the prime-requisite of a clan-ethical system and the basis of all kin cohesion.   While their warlord is havocking the environs, they respect him and try to make him happy by emulating his habits.   Even a deceased warlord is regarded as clan/national hero to be admired at social-gatherings – in some cases: there are occasions whereby the deceased's name is certified under a new “Human Rights” chapter.   Somalis who follow a warlord become his foot-soldiers, fundraisers, or writers, etc, before offering their lives to him, as a kin-loyalty.   This gives these Somalis another name – Mujaahidiin .   At social-gatherings, Mujaahidiin elders invoke and recite the “words of wisdom” of the deceased warlord, hoping his spirit will return the “good old days” of kin cohesion.

Instances of clan patronage lent warlords recognition to and entailed a man power and moral boost for their domain and cult personalities.   Without a doubt, warlords in turn generate popular support for their clan elders, through warfare and pillaging other rival clans.   By way of reciprocation, the clan elders, fed with warlord's bililiqo (booty), often cry out for the investiture of their warlord as the “rescuer” of Somalia .   Each time a warlord establishes his rule in a new territory then, he also assumes the prerogative bililiqo to his elder-patrons.   Consequently, we often hear a new obscure local thug or clan faction leader who was thereby elevated to a position in the pantheon of national leadership domain; his religiousity, honest, generosity, and warriorship tales together thus form the nucleus for his new biography, published in the Somali news media.   Each of these portrayals is often authenticated by clan elders and religious men, through appeasements in clan-gathering rituals (including wedding ceremonies and condolence tributes).

A Warlord Fit to Guide!

When a Somali warlord is in the process of so-called government-building (in other words, establishing himself a foothold in the future affairs of Somalia), contemporary praising-accounts from his clan begin to attribute supernatural qualities to his militia's discipline, military feats, and good   governance's capabilities. Thus, clan elders and many religious men, an adjunct in warlord camp, interpret warlord's dream vision of “the saviour-leader of Somalia” to a reality that ends in the capitulation of all other warlords, politicians, intellectuals, and civil society organs in that region.

The second decisive step for a warlord to attain the title of “rescuer of Somalia ” is the captivation of the International Community's imagination.    Unfortunately, to be endorsed and blessed only by his clan elders and militia gives a warlord a mandate to receive the obvious omens – recognition from the International Community as a Somali leader.   His acquisition of that title accords with the concept that a warlord's domain extends down to the future of Somalia , more likely sharing with other rival warlords in the business of statecraft.   Once a warlord has gained that recognition from the International Community, he slowly could rise formally through the ranks of local /regional bully to a Somali leader.   Therefore, recognition from the International Community derives his brute authority to conduct further military campaigns; and clan elders, craved by his bililiqo , perform more of their usual praising rituals, and often unfailing encourage clan-members to commune with the new “rescuer-leader” and follow him.

A variety of local and international sources indicate that nation-states, the UN, IGAD, and numerous NGOs patronize the sovereignty of the warlords.   They let Somali warlords to make trips, as the especially invited guests of Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Kings; and these warlords were received at a time when Somalis were paying dear prices for their lives under Warlords' Isbaaro -brute – as if the International Community was saying “poor warlords should not live by Isbaaro -income alone!”   It seems that the International Community was also telling these warlords that economics aside they should also remain politically at the forefront of the Somali freedom and democracy, culminated by their endorsement of the many transitional governments.   To the front-line States, the sovereignty of warlords is a return, at least in part, of good harvest.   The devolution of Somali sovereignty from a defunct central authority to warlord fiefdoms calls for ritual legitimization of competing warlords who claim to “rescue” Somalia .   It seems that the International Community decided to reserve Somali leadership to the warlords, following Robert Kaplan's doctrine of Warrior Politics :

Kaplan's above quoted aphorism obviously requires some alteration in the ‘Somali context' that is under investigation. Here, we have warlords who claim to be Muslims but willing to govern through Minghis ethos and the International Community appear to endorse it, seeing the interest of the warlords as pragmatic in the Somali political discourse. Or do we say that our sedentary neighbours simply borrowed the ancient Chinese (sedentary) tactics that aimed to subdue their fierce nomadic neigbour, the Mongols, in which historian David Morgan implies this Chinese medieval deceit as ‘divide and rule tactics' when he states:

Thus, I personally doubt the sincerity of the front-line states and if their efforts are genuine ansār (helpers) endeavor.   I would rather think that they have found warlords, as useful façade behind which to seize political opportunity; and anyone who has read extensively in the writings of many Somali writers will have been struck by the political and moral pessimism of ansār undertakings.   One will wonder whether the all-pervading convictions that the front-line States are constructing will be broken in the near future or more shattering upheavals will arise from it, prolonging this era of shameful and inexorable decline.

In many other instances, some members of the International Community emphasized the virtual impossibility for the warlords to fit to guide Somalia; even some who have been so far endorsed as a Somali leader simply retreated back to their clan's fiefdoms, stashing away millions of aid money without doing a bit.   In addition, a warlord sponsored by the neighboring countries is typically consecrated to pawn destiny.   Like the warlord himself, Patrons of the sovereignty of such warlord would actually have to supplicate for peace and prosperity to those who hold the strings.

Our memory yield further insight into the nature of the relationship between warlords and International Community, already unveiled by the many transitional governments erected, and no genuine reconciliation achievements yet materialized.   This relationship may contain an international ritual intention: weak governments that set out wasteful occasions and led by pawn destiny leaders who serve a purpose similar to that of the front line states.

Our Minghis Ethos

Although Somalis are overwhelmingly Muslims, they still have to come to terms with pagan (Minghis) ethos derived from ancient practices.   Some of these ancient practices are still prevalent among Muslim Somalis, often as healing practices.   Here, Minghis carries a larger load of meanings however; it means all activities devoid of Islam, the religion of the majority of Somalis.   It also refers to ‘the function or status of anarchy'. The title “ our Minghis ethos ” may therefore imply: the role and functions of Minghis practices in our war culture.   If we translate Minghis in this perspective, the warlord is similar to Calaqad (a designated individual who perform priestly functions in Minghis ceremony), in terms of leading and guarding the ecstasy of anarchy.   Like Calaqad , a warlord is dependent on his ecstasy found only in the irrational environment of anarchism; therefore, anarchy is absolutely necessary for warlordism.

The Eternity of Changes

Many people are by nature optimists; and many Somalis are optimists who more or less share Leibnizian optimism: “this is the best of all possible worlds.”   They appeal for optimism against the pessimistic attitude fortified by the current tragic situation.   They say that no matter how finely the mills of the International Community and Somali warlords may grind, the future is sure to be different from the present.   Somali optimists trust that tomorrow will not only be different but better; they believe in the improvement of mankind.   In Somalia, not all the changes of the last two decades have been encouraging; yet, optimists are treating this period as an awkward, brief interlude between tyranny and bright future, in which none of the current numerous Somali warlords that have claimed leadership roles in their communities could qualify as incumbent of a popular mandate to rule Somalia.   Somali optimists are the most determined, relentless single group that the warlords have to face, although they also unreservedly disregard the logics of the international role in the affairs of Somalia .

In a larger scheme of their romantics, the fact of the collapse of the Somali State stands out as a catalyst of a deep social transformation that marks the transition to modern, religiously faithful Somalis.   Optimists insist that Somali religious traditions and customs previously depreciated as backwardness and disruptions of the modern notion of nation-state, will assume in the near future as a more positive significance in the Somali society.   After all, change is always in the air; and the eternity of changes grants the increase of knowledge – the fruit of endless hope and freedom.

On the other hand, we can sense optimists' oversimplification, at forcing the most remote wish and facts into their ideal scheme.   It is conceded in Somalia that optimism's progress is excruciatingly slow; while warlordism is advancing.   Warlords can and have gone to International conferences; have proposed “designs” to the future of Somalia ; but what about optimists?   “ Bright future will come ” doesn't really answer the simple question as to why optimists cannot interpret and find solutions to the warlord-philiac reality.   Warlords have been able to recruit Somalis and at the same time annihilate the environment.   They are also doing quite well, in terms of financial rewards; while optimists publish their “wisdom”, hoping that one day it will become “ I told you so ” prophetic literature and then seek acknowledgment within their own little Diaspora Somali Community – probably in the Western World.   What optimists should discuss is why all their previous optimism has been a “no-way-out”, on warlordism issue – without censuring anyone's Islamic faith.   Warlords do better job when it comes of convincing ordinary Somalis to comprehend their ambitions and designs of the future of Somalia .   What an optimist has an answer for when asked to compare the warlords' current interference with the Somali future affairs to that of optimists in the Diaspora, since even children in Dugsi Qur'an now have a fairly good idea of the warlord-philiac Somalia they inhabit.

There is no apologist quite as simple as an optimist when it comes in understanding and solving Somali crises.   Concerned Somalis can sense the soaring grandeur in optimist's ideas and wishful prospects in his spirit.   Many Somalis feel that optimists give no adequate answer to the question of how in reality will the saga of warlordism end, that the suffering underlining it will be solved?   We thus must give a chance to hear a pessimist's point of view for dealing with and preparing for the future.   A pessimist often put forth works devoid of imaginations and the work of Allah , works that merely record civil war experiences and leave to his audience to construct or predict for themselves, through pessimists' hints and indications, the dreadful picture of the future.   Somalis are in the midst of civil wars and are experiencing changes in their outlook mentality to the future; thus, a pessimist is aware of the fact that Somalis want to know the real cause of the war.   To know the reality of warlord-philiac ethos is important, for only from that knowledge could an answer probably be found to the question: what is warlordism and whither will its ethos drive Somalis?   A pessimist's approach to this question is thus “universal”: no part of our experience is left unveiled and discussed, however little painful it may be.

Still, there has been no unanimous answer to that question.   The painful fire of warlordism in Somalia is still flaming, too early to be ignored as a “no-factor” to the future.   Warlord-philiac is still in us and around us so that it stands in front of us and prevents the eye of imagination and discovery from seeing a fruitful future. Furthermore, recognition of warlords is clearly a very sophisticated, misleading, and often misunderstood phrase.   Recognition does not imply that the International Community approves the forms or policies of the recognized warlords.   When the front-line States in particular endorse or recognize Somali political actors, they first and foremost consider and carefully evaluate all the tangible and intangible factors involved in their ambitions.

C/fataax S. Faamo
Roobdoon Forum

  E-Mail: roobdoon2000@yahoo.ca

Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: an Introduction to History , translated by Franz Rosenthal, abridged and edited by N. J. Dawood (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967B), p.119.  

Minghis is also known as Saar Xabashi, which according to I. M. Lewis is “the most serious sprite affliction”: see I. M. Lewis, Saints and Somalis: Popular Islam in a Clan-based Society (Lawrenceville, NJ: the Red Sea Press, 1998), p. 122.  

It is often during this stage when the term warlord is dropped and regarded as a derogatory; and terms such as Somali/faction leader are preferred.

Robert D. Kaplan, Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos ( New York : Random House, 2002), 51.

David Morgan, The Mongols (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1986), p. 35.

Catherine Wilson, “Leibniz and Whitehead,” The Journal of philosophy , Vol. 80, No. 11 (Nov., 1983), p. 765.

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