Editor’s Note: Great essays are timeless and are often being exonerated by time. This essay is one of such a case. A Feature Article by the Ethiopian Review, April 1996, this piece gives a good read to our readers . Some of the events that Mr. Roble has addressed in this article have a far-reaching impact on the Somali National State in Ethiopia. Almost 10 years have passed since the publication, yet the problems highlighted here are still with us. Of particular interest is that a number of the recommendations that Mr. Roble had advanced then had just been implemented. The conferences that he had called for had taken place recently in London and Jigjiga, and the establishment of a regional Gurti to foster cooperation and reconciliation among Somali clans as well as enhance participation is underway. Meles Zenzwi is proposing to establish a house of Gurti that is parallel to the house of the regional Parliament.    

Gone are the days when Somalis viewed the EPRDF government as a friendly government.  At its victory over the Derg, the Tigrean-dominated Transitional Government of Ethiopia was welcomed by all Somalis for two reasons: first, the Tigreans led to believe that Somalis would be granted an unconditional independence; secondly, they implied that the enemies of the Somalis existed (only) in the Amhara dominated governments of Haile Selassie and Mengistu Haile Mariam. Now, after four years of Tigrean rule, Somalis are debating how much of this is true.   

When I arrived in Jijiga, the wounds caused by the killing of many Muslims during the Al-Anwar mosque fiasco were still fresh.  Shocked by what EPRDF troops could do, the city's residents mourned not only for the dead but for the death that may befalling upon the living.  As one elder put it, "they," meaning EPRDF government, "would probably use tanks against demonstrating students in a school yard if they had used AK-47 guns against Ulimas whose crime was only to disagree with one another on who runs the affairs of their mosque."

The killing of religious figures (Ulima) in the house of God became a point of reference for the residents of this largely Muslim city to evaluate the level of government tolerance or the absence of it.  Most people I talked to regarding this issue believe that the government is less tolerant to those who dissent.

In the midst of chronic unemployment/underemployment, one observes a nascent militarization of the community in progress.  Unlike two years ago, when I last visited the region, I have noticed this time that, while some individuals who tout EPRDF's political line are supplied with guns, other officials considered to be unfriendly to the government are not. This is consistent with an interview that Ato Meles Zenawi gave in 1991 to Jane Parlez of The New York Times. He emphasized that his government will remove weapons from the hands of unfriendly forces.   Some of my own friends are the [un] fortunate ones to be armed.  And these guns are openly displayed at public and private gathering. One of them even showed me how to open soft drink bottles with the butt of a Russian made revolver.

I was not threatened by the presence of guns in my own circles.  However, I was dismayed by such an inadvertent militarization of our public space. Why the mayor of Jijiga or the governor of the region would need guns to protect themselves (from what?) is incomprehensible.  In the past, guns mainly stayed in the hands of the region's notorious police and armed forces. When Jijiga was under Somali officials (i.e., Mohammed Sheikh Hassan Wacdi and Abdulahi Bade, both under previous regimes), they never carried guns. Nor did their residences looked like fortresses, as are those of present day officials. 

The present militarization of the region is the latest stage of a three-pronged process of invading the community's public space first was the Derg's policy of distributing guns to MEISON cadres; then it was the 1978 Ethio-Somali war during which time millions of guns had fallen into civilian hands. If those who carry weapons today in the streets of the region emulate the trigger-happy, ever-wondering EPRDF soldiers, who refuse to learn not to shoot at public gatherings, the invasion of the community's public space would be irreversible.

While arms are unnecessarily pouring into the region, several scarce machines earmarked for project development have been removed since 1991. One such machine is a power generator that was located at a place called "El-baxay," five miles to the north of Jijiga. It was a generator that peasants in the region utilized for drinking water and for agricultural irrigation. Initially donated by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the generator has been allegedly removed from Jijiga by the order of the then Prime Minister (now Defense Minister) Tamrat Lyne. I was convinced about the authenticity of this mater only after an officer in charge of the region's water and natural resources read to me the memo of removal, which Mr. Tamrat had reportedly signed.  Toward the end of my stay in Jijiga, I was also able to learn that the UNDP's regional representative disapproved such action without first commissioning an impact evaluation study.

Moreover, several important development projects and three annual budgets have been returned to Addis Abeba because of alleged inability of the region to use them in a timely fashion. Also the "Biyada Dam," located in the vicinity of Jijiga and perhaps the most important public project within Jijiga area, has been broken since Col. Mengistu was ousted. And, after four seasons of what could have been a good harvest, the Dam remained broken, looted of its parts and has steadfastly deteriorated. The government did not, for the last four years, even bother to take inventoriy of what was lost so that whatever is left may be rescued for future repair work. The story of the "Biyada Dam" epitomizes the worst-case euthanasia in the region's development. (However, a visiting government official informed me recently that the Dam has resumed its work.   Not quite so.)

On the positive column, the government has authorized the funding of several projects: for example, a road construction connecting Babile to fiiq, or possibly to Imay (southwest of Harer), at an estimated cost of $10 million (70 million birr), has been proposed.  This proposed project, perhaps the largest public works project in the region since EPRDF took power, predictably went to a thirty-some-years-old Tigrean individual whose knowledge of public works construction and the region is sketchy.  The proposed road construction, which would connect Harer to Jijiga, plus direct telephone hookups to Jijiga, is positive developments. However, in evaluating the trickle down economic benefits of these projects to the region's residents, one must look at who gets the contracts, and the role, if any, local officials play in the decision making of contract awards. So far, the Meles government in Addis Ababa decides everything.

Any observation of the Somali region would be incomplete without commenting on the most dehumanizing public space - customs.  It is here where the old and the sage are treated like boys; where reservedly shy and proper-mannered Somali women loose their privacy to young custom employees. Often women, indeed poor women, are victims of custom searches, some times loosing all that they own which may amount to as little as 10 packs of cigarettes.  The soldiers are entirely non-Somalis. If the region is autonomous, why are non-Somalis the only ones who work at the region's customs?  This was a question I tried to ask several local officials, who were irritated more at my "naiveté" regarding the issue of autonomy than at the absence of it.

There is another story to the issue of customs and why only EPRDF troops manage them. It is the story of Trucks hauling heavy loads of construction materials whose points of origin are either the port city of Barbara or the border town of Harta Sheikh. These trucks, constantly passing through the custom of Jijiga, are not inspected. Entirely all these trucks are operated by Tigrean speaking individuals and have the destination of either Addis Ababa or beyond. The day I was leaving Jijiga, for example, I counted 15 such trucks within a short distance of 20 miles (from Hadow to Dakhato). Somalis, including friends of EPRDF, believe that these trucks carry mainly construction materials and other consumer goods, and there is not much that they can do about this matter. No Somali, except the porters (Hamal) at the point of origin, ever goes close to these trucks.

Ethiopia is perhaps going through an era of ethnic strive whose main characteristic is the transfer of development projects and/or opportunities from less represented regions to well represented ones. What had constituted a transfer of surplus capital in the infamous core and periphery relationship at a world scale in the past (Emanuel Wallerstine) may be in motion in Ethiopia in the form of transfer of (scarce) development essentials from weaker regions (like the Somali region) to stronger ones.

By far, Ethiopia's Somali region is on the loosing end, while Tigray region is the most beneficiary (see current national investment allocation by regions released by the Ethiopian Investment Office). 

If the loss of development essentials and/or opportunities in the Somali region in favor of northern regions is not a full-blown colonial relationship ala that one which existed between Africa and Europe, it may evolve itself to qualify for an uneven relationship in the tradition of England versus Ireland. The budgets that the Somali region lost, plus the transfer of development essentials from Jijiga and the partial transfer of Alamaya Agricultural College's components to the north constitute such a relationship. What Africa has experienced in the hands of European colonialism in wealth exploitation, Somalis are experiencing under EPRDF-ruled Ethiopia.

Political Manipulation of the Somali Clan

Clan is an important social organization in the Somali social structure.  It impacts politics, economics and social status.  The beneficiaries of clan politics are, more often than not, opportunistic individuals, while the entire members of the clan suffer the consequences.  That is the lesson we have learned in Somalia's bitter civil war, where innocent civilians have paid dear for the crimes committed by a few elites of one or two clans. 

Somalis are divided into several clans, the largest of which are Daarood, Isaq, Hawiya, Dir, etc.  But there are a host of other clans such as Akisho, Gaboya, and Jarso. In the case of the Somali Ethiopian region, however, none of the latter clans are small, that is, if one is talking only about the Somali Ethiopian region. On the other hand, Issaq or Hawiya may not be as large here in the Ethiopian Somali region as they may be in "Somaliland," or in southern Somalia, respectively. Or the aggregate name of Daarood, which is the single largest corporate entity, may not be as cohesive in Ethiopia as it is in Somalia.

While clan refers to the social organization, clanism is the politicization of the clan structure by elites for personal and devious gains. Because of clanism and a run-away manipulation of it by EPRDF, serious crisis is in the offing in the Somali region. Instead of arresting the possible precipitation of clan animosity among Somalis, the larger ones in particular, the government of Ethiopia appears to have chosen politics of manipulation. 

This strain of politics: 1) weakens the collective bargaining position of the Somalis; 2) helps EPRDF continue ruling divided Somalis from Addis Abeba, hence undermining any meaningful autonomy of the region. One is reminded of how the EPRDF leadership has sacked three Somali regional governments in three years without consulting Somalis. And that is why Somalis widely speculate that the central government, using any one of the clauses in the newly adopted "constitution," may declare at any time in the near future an emergency rule that will authorize the prime minister to designate a governor. Dire Dawa has already fallen under this rule and the city is currently governed by an EPRDF nominee, but not by a locally elected official. If so, what is there to prohibit the central government from imposing similar authority on the entire Somali region?  As to the constitution's ability to protect regional governments, it has not so far protected Dire Dawa; and it may not protect the Somali region.

The Shaping of the Somali Crisis

The crisis in the Somali region can be traced back to 1991, when the Tigrean led EPRDF troops took power in Addis Abeba. The now defunct Charter, which EPRDF prepared, was soon adopted as the guiding interim principle. This Charter was sold to the Somalis as the legal instrument to be employed to achieve independence. The Somali community was made to believe that TPLF stood for secession.  Particularly, pro-EPRDF forces were not and are not still honest enough to tell Somalis that secession was not and is not in the cards. On the contrary, they continue telling the public that secession is within their reach. Is this a realistic expectation on the part of pro-government forces? If so, how are they different from other pro-independence groups?

Veterans of the 1964 Somali uprising (Mr. Majeerteen and Sheikh Abdul-Nasir) have earlier praised the Charter. Now, both leaders have severed their relationship with the Meles government. In their place, however, new leaders, who are more akin to the vision of the EPRDF leadership, have emerged to negotiate on behalf of Somalis. Under pressure from his kinsmen, one of the new leaders, Dr. Abdi Aden Dollal, former vice minister of health, who belongs to an important Ogadeni family, has already defected to Canada. Muse Jomo, first counselor at the Ethiopian Embassy in London, has defected too. Moreover, a significant number of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) members are either in jail, left the country mainly to Mogadishu or have decided to stay inside the country and fight back government troops.

How did EPRDF and Somalis come to this point?  In the summer of 1993, when some thirteen Somali clan-based parties and organizations convened in the city of Harer, clan animosity among Somalis seemed minimal. Meles Zenawi was the keynote speaker. His massage hinged on the importance of Somali unity, the role of colonial powers in the division of the Somali people (Ethiopia was here referred to as a colonial power), and the role of the Somali region in a new "democratically united Ethiopia." With respect to Somalis seeking a separate state, Ato Meles outlined the constitutional procedures that need to be satisfied.

During this convention, names like the late Hussein Gire and many other heroes were remembered.  All clans seemed to have mended their relations. Individuals who earlier angered one another were now hugging each other as fellow delegates.  At the same time, the mood seemed relaxed enough and the delegates offered to one another the Islamic forgiveness of "saamahnaakum" (each is forgiven). As common to peacetime Somali conventions, the hallways exploded with hundreds of mainly men voices merging into a single stream of melancholy of "Soomaaliyey Toos oo! Toosoo isku Tiirsada," (“O Somalis! Wake up and lean on each other”), the national anthem of Somalis since the 1940s.  Unbeknown to Meles Zenawi, Somalis had earlier on formed a consensus on a single request for "freedom now." With this, they presented to Meles a plea for an internationally supervised referendum, ala that of Eritrea.

It is speculated that this convention had convinced Meles Zenawi the need to employ the policy of "divide and rule."  Shortly after, the then president of the regional government, Mohammed Jire, was sacked.  Under the weight of trumpeted charges of corruption, a good portion of his administration (including himself) was all sent to prison. Eventually, the Ogaden clan was labeled as the "enemy of the government," followed by the 1994 uprising in Kebridahar and Warder, where over 25 civilians including Mohammed Tube of Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) were killed. Since then, a bloody conflict has become a commonplace in the region.

Publicly, Meles tried to strike a balance between the imperatives of the "new Ethiopia” which many Somalis believe to be the same as the "old Ethiopia” and the "democratic rights" of the Somalis. In private, however, he reportedly scolded his host and convention organizers for not preparing him what exactly to expect. For example, he did not expect to argue with the 80-year-old Garad Makhtal Dahir, whose revolt in 1963 against Haile Selassie prompted the emperor to demand of Makhtal "dead or alive."  During the debate, Garad Makhtal had earnestly compared his impressive freedom fighter's résumé to that of Meles.

The Harer convention represented to Meles a moral duplicity and a serious political dilemma: for example, how would he be able to hold together the Ethiopia that he called a colonial power?  Or why is it that Eritrians were granted a separate state and not to Somalis, who have much less affinity with the Ethiopian nation-state than do the former? Understanding that TPLF has decidedly mutated its original objective of seeking a separate state for Tigray (as Tecola Hagos argues), how is the head of state going to explain the political imperatives of the "new Ethiopia," without discrediting his previous position? 

In other words, Meles has the difficult job to reconcile his earlier position as a proponent of secession with his current one as an advocate of Ethiopian territorial integrity, and still remain credible to all groups. With Somali, Oromo, Afar questions on the hanging, notwithstanding the impending conflict with the Islamic state of Sudan and Mogadishu emerging as the "new center" for several Islamic groups such as the "Afgan Arabs," (Indian Ocean Newsletter, January 1996), Meles has a lot to sort out.

Elections: A Vehicle to Consolidate Power

One year before the 1995 elections, individuals akin to EPRDF policy gathered at a small town called Hurso near Dire Dawa, where Ethiopian Somali Democratic League (ESDL), was unveiled. The objective of ESDL is to counterbalance ONLF in the affairs of the region. While ESDL showed at birth complacency in the technical and material support it receives from EPRDF, ONLF takes pride in not being accountable to a government steadfastly loosing credit among Somalis. But, where ESDL prides itself for its easy access to the office of the Prime Minister and for attempting to create a pan-Somali organization, albeit within a united Ethiopia, ONLF agonizes itself over its narrow clan orientation which hinders its crusade for Somali independence. One wonders whether it is pan-Somali inside the womb of Ethiopia (which ESDL subscribes to) or Somali separatism (led by ONLF) that endangers the traditional concept of the territorial integrity of Ethiopia.

Although the political cost of alienating the most persistent, and peripherally located pro-independence clan (Ogaden) has yet to be assessed, Meles hopes that ESDL would dominate the region's politics through "elections," as did Oromia's Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO). And that is what the results of the elections for regional and national assembly reflected. This is predictably the outcome of the Ogadens boycotting the elections, and ESDL running in the non-Ogaden inhabited districts unchallenged. 

Basked in the election's victory, ESDL's 9-member executive body single-handedly elected zonal governors and president of the region. Many Ogadens, Daarood members and large sections of other Somalis, loudly complain about the person to whom the region's presidency went - a member of the Isaq clan. In today's sensitive climate of clan relations in the Somali society, the rationale for such a nomination is questionable. Even though one may consider this surprise move of installing an Issaqi president in a sea of Darood country as one way to radically defy all the rigid limitations of clan politics, such a nomination is, at best, insensitive to clan relationship; rather, it ignores the majority feeling and re-enforces politics of arrogance, the kind of politics widely practiced in Kenya under Arap Moi and in pre-civil war Somalia under Said Barre.

It is perhaps this insensitivity that is the immediate cause of the region's conflict. The deteriorating security in the Fiq region and the virtual paralysis of EPRDF troops in the Ogaden-inhabited districts are part of the short-term outcome of the conflict. Its long-term outcome may be a wide spread clan animosity among Somalis and this would eventually render EPRDF rule in the region irrelevant. If clan civil war, similar to that of Somalia, erupts in the region, developments may prove a nightmare to both ESDL and EPRDF leaders.

The regional elections have exhibited a dual characteristic: one undemocratic and another democratic.  The undemocratic aspect, a subject widely discussed by others, can be summarized as follows: the use of government resources including free aircraft by only one side, while others had to raise funds at grassroots; the gerrymandering of districts to favor pro-EPRDF forces, despite that the election commission has adopted a policy of temporarily keeping districts' configuration intact until a national census is conducted. There are also stories where individuals who had no known constituents were mysteriously declared winners. Moreover, stories where districts unfriendly to EPRDF did not receive their election cards and ballot boxes plagued the creditability of the process.

As a result, prior to the commencement of the election, the results were obviously predictable to a point of precision. It was known to the residents of Jijiga, for example, that ESDL would win all the seats.   But there was a modicum of democratic exercise that I have observed.

Following are two cases that interested me, although none had any consequences to how EPRDF rules the region or the country: In the first case, the Gari and Jarso, two clans with common geography and recent conflicts, had six seats to collectively contest for. Leaders of both sides (consisting of elders and politicians) met, deliberated and decided to divide the six seats into two halves. Then, each side was asked to identify its best three individuals. Once the six most able Gari-Jarso alliance were identified, they run on one single ticket (as ESDL affiliates).  Accordingly, members of the two clans were asked to vote for these candidates. (Each citizen can elect six candidates, one for the federal parliament and 5 for the regional.)  Dissension was allowed, but not endorsed.  (There is an incident where a father, Ali Gudal of Jijiga, refused to endorse his own son who ran as an independent candidate.)  During the campaign, a council of elders, representing both sides, visited all villages and towns within the election district (Jijiga 1) and distributed the pictures and election ensign of candidates sanctioned by the alliance. I observed that these deliberations at this level were free from anyone's manipulation and the clans have placed all their trust (“amana”) on these six candidates all of whom predictably won.

But in the case of my maternal clan, the Bartire, divisions were officially sown early in the process.  And this was the work of devious individuals (clan "Afminsharo"), who averted consensus-based decision-making process. Nonetheless, Abdi Deg Heban, whose application for party membership was rejected by ESDL local officials for no apparent reason, ended up running a strong independent campaign. He defeated ESDL's candidate and impressively won a seat in the regional assembly. He run on a platform of uniting his subclan (the Hirsi Garad clan, the largest of the Bartire), the Goboye, with whom his clan shares settlement, the Shekhash, Akisho, Yaberi, and Geri residents in Jijiga 2 district. This was by far the most broad-based coalition campaign in Jijiga.  Mr. Heban, who unsuccessfully run in the last elections of the country under Emperor Haile Selassie and was more recently an effective regional official during the Derg, showed that odds can be overcome with wit and will. He is the only independent parliamentarian out of a total of 18 in the Jijiga and Kabribayah area. What effect he or other similar independent candidates can have on public policy in such a parliament is, of course, limited.

Why the process is half democratic and half undemocratic is a subject of interest to social scientists and Ethiopianists. Is the question of, say, availing government resources to pro-EPRDF groups versus independent or opposition candidates a matter of corruption?  Or is it part of a bigger effort by the government to ensure that opposition groups stay ineffective? How much of these illegal acts can international observers and donor countries alleviate? Does the current political order in Ethiopia have more in common with Ugandan President Mussevieni's "single partyism," and his rebuke of "multi-partyism" in Africa as a European imposition? In Mussevieni's view, Africa needs a "single party system" political order where only individuals carry different view points, but not different membership cards.  In Ethiopia, at least in the Somali region, there is more of Mussevieni's "one-partyism" than a Jeffersonian "multi-partyism."

A Shift of Policy

The current conflict in the Somali region, whose underlying cause resembles previous conflicts, is characterized by EPRDF's readiness to destroy its opponents and Somalis' unwavering insurgency attitude.  While EPRDF believes that its victory over the Derg army could be replicated in all other conflict areas in the country, Somalis point out to their long history of resistance against foreign incursions into their public space.

To ameliorate conditions in the EPRDF/ONLF conflict, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi appears to have moved toward politics of accommodation. For example, the elevation of two Ogadens, Abdi Dulane to the post of vice minister and Said Bakri to the deputy chair of the house of nationalities are indications of such a move. While the former belongs to an important Ogadeni family, whose father was exiled to Gojam by the late emperor Haile Selassie, for his role in the 1963 Somali uprisings, Mr. Bakri is the son-in-law of late Makhtal Dahir, the godfather of the 1963 Somali resistance. Makhtal himself has decidedly settled in a government-provided house in Addis Abeba.

It is arguable that, like other groups, Amhara, Oromos, Afars Somalis are of two groups: While one groups is susceptible to the politics of accommodation, others have to pursue total victory towards their goals. If so, can Meles reach out more of the Ogadens? Or can Ogaden accommodations use their influence to cause Meles reverse his government's lack of sensitivity toward clan related issues? Would ESDL and ONLF agree to design a system of regional government, where both clan and individual merits are addressed? So far, none has been done since 1991, when the first regional government was established.

Notwithstanding the democratic content of the question of ethnicity in Ethiopia and the need for equitable clan representation, from Addis Abeba to Jijiga, the central government and local administrations ritually employ ethnicity and/or clan as effective political resources. In the Oromia region, the OPDO is poised to elbow out the OLF from the political process; in the Somali case, it is ESDL versus ONLF and so is true in the Afar, Gambela and other regions. In their instructive book, "Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant," Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Roseburg of UC Berkeley have argued that factors like ethnicity or clan are, among others, resources that authoritarian rulers have at their disposal. Their specific examples of how the late dictator Said Barre used the clan factor to effectively rule Somalis impressively mirrors the case of EPRDF manipulation of clan structures to rule Somalis. It is a case where rule by manipulation prevails over rule by consent.

But the authors of “Personal Rule in Black Africa” did not address the extent to which excessive manipulations of the clan institution for devious goals can a) undermine the one valuable commodity trust that is needed between the ruled and the ruler in a nation-state; b) erode the social cohesion of the society, which ultimately destroys institutions (example, inter- and intra-clan committees, or "Guurti") that are vital to the survival of Somali civil society.  Now, we know that it was a combination of extreme manipulation of the clan factor and unhindered insensitivity to local feelings that precipitated the Somalia civil war of 1990, a war that consumed the most cohesive nation-state in sub-Sahara Africa. Occurrences of excessive clan manipulations and insensitivity to local feeling are the rule, not the exception, in the region. If unchecked, the Somalia civil war could be re-enacted in the Ethiopian Somali region.

To arrest these problems in the Somali region, a reconciliation conference must be organized with the following agenda:

1. The nature and scope of the Ethiopian-Somali agenda.

2. The need to identify short- and long-term measures to ameliorate impending clan animosity in the      region.

3. The use of the "Gurti" or elders' institution in resolving some of the clan-based conflicts and grievances.

4. Ways to curb clan manipulation and the perpetual interference of the central government in the affairs of the region.

5. Ways to achieve equitable representations to satisfy clan balance without sacrificing individual merit.

6. Identifying steps to stabilize the region so that reconciliation, development and reconstruction move at an acceptable pace.

The idea of having such a conference is widely circulated among the Somali-Ethiopian community in the Diaspora. If not inside the country, it may take place in a number of cities abroad. Such a conference is intended to humble the present leadership and/or encourage the emergence of an alternative one. As the (humbled) Somali Chief, Garad Hirsi Wiilwaal, said, "rag waday oo waday oo walaal wax uu ku dhaamo waayey," (of all the methods I have employed to tame my fellow men, read: "human beings," the best way to tame at the same time earn their respect is a brotherly reconciliation). The question is whether present- day leaders can be humbled before time humbles them as it did to Garad Hirsi Wiilwal, or for that matter to Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam.

Faisal Roble is a city planner for the City of Los Angeles.
fabroble@aol.com

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