| |
|
The past 15 years saw Somalia weather horrendous upheaval marked by internecine wars and resultant man-made disasters set in motion by the collapse of the National Government towards the end of 1990. During much of this period, Somalis faced heaps of dreadful conditions at home and abroad due, in large measure, to statelessness and its corollary—anarchy. Meanwhile, in the era of hyper-nationalism, rich nations were getting exacerbated with poor, self-mutilating nations’ perennial cries to be saved from the consequence of their own irrational policies. Yet, when displaced Somalis made enquiries to international institutions for assistance in restoring a sense of normalcy in their lives, the response was almost always the same: “put your house in order first and the international community will help your society to pick up the pieces”. Somalis must have taken that encouragement to heart. For they once again defied the odds by unexpectedly putting their collective shoulders to the wheel, stayed the course during two years of difficult negotiations, and at the end of the day, elected, by wide margins, a Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Suddenly, the cheer-leading on the part of several international agencies, save the regional governments, came to a screeching halt. These previously supportive international agencies (which are also known as the International Community) began to express doubts about the very process they professed to champion few short months before an historic, all-faction-election conference resulted in the formation of the TFG in October 2004. Thus, a strange new atmosphere was taking shape and it had the eerie look and feel that key international actors and the TFG were ships passing in the night! So, what went wrong with the promised international support to help get Somalis stand on their own feet, once they took concrete steps towards peace and reconciliation? And, how does this international community supposed to work anyway? Was there a universally accepted system or does the IC operates on the basis of contradictory impulses? Not surprisingly, the term “International Community” is defined differently by different people: 1) ‘All the lands represented by the United Nations’, 2) ‘The people of the lands all over the world’, and 3) ‘A term of convenience’ coined for super power purposes, etc. Whatever the case may be, it is regulated by international law and its principles are applicable to international security. To its credit, the TFG has conscientiously sought to observe the extant rules of the road of the international community. However, they have been less than sure-footed in making their case convincingly against admittedly determined foes. Hence, most of their formal requests seem to have all but fell into deaf ears. To take stock of the situation, this much is clear regarding obstacles that the TFG needs to overcome soon: the consortium of nations that populate world institutions such as the UN, EU, AU, Arab League, etc, and their member states are by no means equal in terms of power and influence. They belong to different tiers of definite pecking order in terms of relative authority that must be understood in the all-important arena of public diplomacy. In this pecking order, the United States is far and away the top dog. What US government says carries much more weight than, say, the AU and the Arab League combined. The EU is a close second rung in this order but its power does not constitute a viable alternative to America’s reach and influence. To date, about a year since Somalia’s TFG has been inaugurated in Nairobi, Kenya, and six months after it moved into Somalia, the United States has been cool to the new Somali national government headed by President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Ghedi. Somali Analysts cite many different reasons for this unmistakable detachment. They point to the aftereffects of the 1993 skirmish in Mogadishu between US forces assigned to the UN and the militia of the late warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed in which 18 American servicemen were killed; the efforts of a small but energetic band of half a dozen or so boosters of the secessionist cause that is being waged by politicians seeking to make Northwestern Somalia a country called the “Republic of Somaliland”; and, finally, the TFG’s seeming slowness in making the case for their vision for Somalia. The Analysts posit that the cumulative effect of these factors plus the instability of Mogadishu under warlords, and their religious allies, have conspired to influence US policy to withhold crucial endorsement from the TFG. Taken together, these factors could pose formidable challenge to overcome, however, as separate issues, a reasonable remediation can be brought to bear to each one of them. For example, while Aideed is dead and gone, splinter groups from his faction are now wreaking havoc on parts of Mogadishu and nearby regions, including organizing piracy operations on important sea lanes, with deadly results. Clearly, the TFG needs outside help to be able to stop their multi-faceted banditry once and for all. With regard to the small, eclectic band of self-styled champions of the cause of secessionism in Northwestern Somalia, it is important to note that they are not a monolithic group. They include two well-placed true believers, a.k.a. the “in-laws” who will do and say anything in furtherance of secessionism. The TFG should have no problem in organizing a successful challenge to this group by simply telling the truth at every turn. Then there are a couple of academics who are enamored with the form, if not the substance, of staged “voting” events in parts of northern Somalia—events which the opposition there calls sham, every time; they too can benefit from a concerted effort by the government aimed at setting the record straight. The secessionists also seek assistance from registered lobbyists, who take clients from all over the world, for a fee. The TFG would be well advised to consult with them (or others in that profession) to counter the misinformation being disseminated by the first group. Lastly, there is the recently emancipated South African middleman, who is not acquainted with either Somalia or the truth, for that matter. His case illustrates Napoleon’s dictum: “In politics, stupidity is not a handicap”. Back to the international community, US support is vital in international relations. The AU, and its East African subset, IGAD, though well-meaning, lack the socio-economic and political wherewithal to back their regional policy goals and are therefore a little more than paper tigers. The EU has, over the past few years, shown some interest in assisting the new Somali government but its member-states are loathe to getting involved in nation-building type of ventures that are not fully sanctioned by the United States. The same goes for Japan. The oil-rich Arab states too take their cues from the US. (Wherever they see a green light, they go head over heels, including unzipping their fat wallets in a New York minute!) This is not a bad system as the world needs more order, not less; for its part, the TFG needs to become not only a quick study of the politics of pragmatism but to model it without delay. Behind the scenes, there is high-stakes geopolitical struggle for Africa (of a different sort) and China is deeply involved in that looming tussle. Needless to say, they have already telegraphed their interest in Somalia (particularly in oil and gas exploration). At the moment, China appears to be practicing Zen-like patience by waiting in wings. Their expectation may be that Somalia will soon lurch in their direction after that country’s overtures are rebuffed, albeit gently, by the leading western powers. All in all, the retail, nickel and dime diplomacy that the TFG has been conducting up to this point is proving to be a total waste of time and that nothing good is likely to come out of it. So, the Somali Government needs to start engaging in high-level diplomacy beginning with senior US Officials. Recommendations:
In conclusion, it appears that the TFG has bought into a ruse early on its tenure. According to knowledgeable people, they were told by highly placed international agencies—while still in Nairobi—that, to qualify for assistance from the international community, the TFG should: A) establish a working government in Somalia, B) pacify the heedless warlords and their allied, armed religious groups in Mogadishu, through peaceful means. The TFG successfully accomplished the first task, but the second one requires a great deal of resources, which the TFG does not have. The problem is compounded by the fact that the government is dealing with warlord foes that are armed to the teeth and are not shy about using such weapons. They routinely conduct high profile killings of individuals with institutional memory of the workings of the Somali nation-state, maritime piracy, kidnappings, extortion, drug running and the like. They have brazenly tried to assassinate the Premier twice in the past six months, while he was on official visits to his home town of Mogadishu. For the TFG to find its sea legs, therefore, in such a hostile environment, the support of the international community is indispensable; it is not the other way around. Furthermore, the success of the TFG should not be viewed solely in terms of assisting in the stabilization of Somalia or as participating in the dreaded activity of “nation-building a failed state”. Such support has far more implications for the peace and security of the world as a whole. For one thing, it will help deny terror groups lurking in the shadows from establishing a foothold in the strategic Horn of Africa region. From this perspective alone, US-led international support for the TFG would be a win-win for all parties concerned (except of course the bad guys). The TFG, for its part, has to find a credible way to state as emphatically as possible its vision for leading a prosperous Somalia that is at peace with itself and with its neighbors. Ali A. Fatah
Copyright © 2005 Wardheernews.com |
