I.M. LEWIS: PLEA FOR RECOGNITION, OR A PROMOTION OF AN INFANTILE DISORDER?

By Faisal A Roble

“Intellectuals …are to promote the redeeming, transcending Truth, the establishment of which they see their mission on behalf of humanity, they have not much patience with the mundane, everyday truths represented by objective facts which get in the way of their arguments. This awkward, minor truth get brushed aside, doctored, reversed or are even deliberately suppressed.

Paul Johnson: “Intellectuals”

I stumbled across I. M Lewis's recent article on Hiiraan Online, and his plea for the recognition of Somaliland's independence. I read the article with much interest, but was dismayed in the end. Professor Lewis had a colorful yet controversial presence in the intellectual landscape of Somalia. He is one of the founding fathers of Somali Studies. Yet, he was on the pay roll of the late dictator Mohamed Siad Barre (Mr. Gure makes a new accusation that professor Lewis is on the payroll of Somaliland's Administration).

In company with Richard Greenfield, Mr. Drysdale and Graham Hancock, Lewis belongs to what Dr. Neguse Ayale, a noted Ethiopian political scientist, once called “intellectual mercenaries.” These trio and Lewis constitute a small circle of western-born scholars who made fortunes by availing their intellectual power to unpopular regimes in the Horn of Africa. Given his larger-than-life presence in Somali politics and his ever- growing pool of disappointed critics, Lewis has aged in to what Paul Johnson calls intellectuals with “troubled conscience.” We argue here that Lewis's reasoning and historical foundations for his arguments on the recognition for Somaliland's secession is patronizing, contradictory to his earlier works and shows total disregard for the “aspirations of ordinary Somalis” and for a sustainable peace and stability in the horn of Africa region.

Lewis argues that England would have established a colonial administration akin to a “parental” relationship with Somaliland protectorate. The story about L. Prendergast Walsh and how he broke up fights in Berbara depicts Somalis as child-like. Recognizing that proponents of secession are one-issue constituency, professor Lewis throws out this relationship tactfully and stuffs it in to the readers' throats as a relationship worthy of utmost appreciation! It is here that professor Lewis becomes indistinguishable from his predecessors such as Winthrop Jordan, who in his [in] famous book, the “White Man's Burden” characterized Black Americans as infant-like, and Rudyard Kipling, who un-apologetically referred to Black Africans as child-like people.

Professor Lewis makes an arrogant reference to how Britain's role and its intentions to modernize Somaliland would have been as benign as a "Cinderella of Empire" or, like the fairy tale of a household drudge/servant who eventually marries a prince. He argues that Britain's good intentions were undermined by the “terrible aberration” of the movement of the late Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan.

He deliberately distorts the epistemology surrounding the Dervish movement and brushes aside all the objective contributions, only to create an alibi for Britain's abysmal accomplishments. The purpose here is to malign the history of Somalia and them justify secession of the north. Professor Lewis comes out here as a typical intellectual where objective facts are “doctored, reversed or even deliberately suppressed” to justify secession. While we understand that Britain viewed Somaliland as an exotic place inhabited by noble nomadic clans that needed to be “converted and civilized,” Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan correctly fought back to protect his people, culture, history and religion (Islam) that need no mercy from her Majesty

Professor Lewis's argument and his accounts about Somaliland are not sustainable. For example, between the times the British East Indian Company hit the shores of Somalia's Red Sea around the year 1839 and the time its rule unceremoniously ended in 1960, Britain had established only two high schools with limited enrolment capacity. Those schools were established way after the Second World War ended, a war that claimed the lives of many sons of the former protectorate in defense of the queen's honor.

By 1960, there was only one provincial warden (not a complete hospital) in Hargeisa. Moreover, there was no significant infrastructure in the whole protectorate worthy of mention. Let alone paying for the huge casualties inflicted on Somalis during the colonial rule (“Isma oga agoon iyo ninkii aabaheed dilaye; Isma oga Ismiidh iyo nikii ayro foofsadaye…is reminiscent of Britain's brutal rule), the two schools and the warden are not even a fraction to compensate for all those who died to fight in a war that they were not consulted on. In passing, Britain's record of accomplishments is dwarfed when compared to the record of both the civilian governments and that of the late dictator.

It is comforting that many of Somaliland's leaders consider the war of Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan in the history of Somaliland as a positive factor. It provides immense consolation to learn that the late Mohammed Haji Ibrahim Egal proudly owned the legacy of Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan and publicly respected and cherished the Dervish movement. This is in total contrast to sectarian and extremist groups who unwittingly echoed Lewis's negative views of Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan. It is the views of the later group within the proponents for secession that prompts one to call the whole secession enterprise an infantile disorder. Such an infantile disorder is more pronounced by the comments of an uninitiated extremist political party leader in Hargeisa who openly attributes more affinity between children born in Hargeisa and Addis Ababa versus between those born in Hargeisa and Mogadishu!

Creating a faustian pact with proponents of secession, professor Lewis tries to tactfully frighten and entice front line states, mainly Ethiopia and Kenya, in to extending recognition to Somaliland for their own national interests. He implies that recognizing Somaliland's independence is one way of stopping and pacifying Islamic fundamentalism. Offering this kind of political incentive to Ethiopia and Kenya, two Christian dominated front line countries, who have had recent conflicts with Somalia, appears, as Lewis calculates, attractive and a lucrative political investment. It is not! Rather, it is a more costly proposition to everyone and has an unmitigated long-term impact for the entire Horn of Africa region.

On moral basis, and, yes, Africa has moral values, as much as Europe has, both Ethiopia and Kenya should not take advantage of the current abysmal conditions in Somalia. To do so, particularly by Ethiopia, given all the cultural, historical and political conflicts that date back to the 15th Century, as observed by Samuel P. Huntington, in his "Clashes of Civilizations," is tantamount to furthering cultural conflict and strengthens nihilistic view in the region. At best, his proposal undermines the good will that has been lately cultivated between Ethiopians and Somalis to arrest past conflicts and instead seek a culture of understanding and cooperation.

Furthermore, Ethiopia should not be in the business of promoting politics of secession. A homegrown existentialist pan-Ethiopian philosophy, which Ethiopia's intellectuals have lately promoted, underscores the values of unity and views secession as a nihilistic solution to normal historical, social and political problems. Still reeling from the trauma of Eritrea's secession, the conflict on land between Oromos and northern Ethiopians, for example, argue this philosophy, should not be the basis for secession or the factor to dismantle the country. If so, how could Ethiopia(ns), on the one hand, preach to Oromos, Sidamos, Afars, Somalis and many others the gospel of unity, and on the other hand, curse Somalia to disunity by taking advantage of the present day quagmire? Ethiopia had in the past its share of traumatic years, in which central governance and normal social contract almost disappeared due to civil wars. Ethiopian unity was spared. Likewise, Somalia hopes nothing less than this from all involved.

Still there are more persuasive reasons why Ethiopia should not help dismantle Somalia. Despite recent decentralization, Ethiopia houses many ethnic groups with unresolved historical grudges against the central government in Addis. Factional leaders within these ethnic groups have not totally given up their dreams to achieve their own states based on self-determination. What, then, forbids a future Somalia, whatever its size may be, from helping groups that may one day seek to secede from Addis Ababa? If Ethiopia plays with Somalia a game of “ maku curad tiray ma ku caano tiray, ” (I kill your eldest and deprive you of your Milk) and decides to undermine Somalia's unity, then Somalia may also warn Ethiopia by saying “Booran hadimo haqodin ku dhicidoontaane mooyee.” (Do not set up a malicious noose for some one else for you may be the one to fell in to it) Unlike professor Lewis's nihilistic proposal, a more progressive vision for both Ethiopia and Kenya would be to stay the course and help Somalia preserve its unity, unless Somalis themselves decide otherwise.

With its 70 million people and a new direction to democratize/modernize its ancient regime, Ethiopia is better served if it behaves like a big brother on the block and not as a small guy nurturing yesteryears' grudges. Unlike professor Lewis's assertions, which obviously are based on the philosophy of realpolitik or “survival of the fittest” that can potentially destabilize the region, helping Somalia go through its current trying times is good for the interest of peace and stability in the entire region.

One can't help but agree with professor Lewis's obvious frustration with the slow pace of reconciliation in the vast and more complex half of Somalia's south. He is also agreeable when he offers words of praise for the cautious moves of both Somaliland and Puntland administrations on the conflict lurking over Buuhoodle, Sool and Sanaag regions.

His arguments for the recognition of Somaliland's secession, however, sounds simplistic, especially when he makes the crisis in the south as the rationale for the recognition for the north's unilateral secession. He becomes a mere annoyance and arrogant when he suggests that Somalis have already accustomed to “political dismemberment” (into Djibouti, Ethiopian Somalis and Kenyan Somalis) and more of it may not be any more damaging! The unity and territorial integrity of the Somali Democratic Republic is protected by the Geneva Convention, which calls for the self-determination and territorial integrity of all nations.

More than 50 years ago, professor Lewis has analyzed the kinship structure of family in the Buuhoodle region. There, he mapped out a clan-based sociology used since then by most scholars and professionals to evaluate all types of socio-political arrangements in the Somali society. Given his current position to promote Somaliland's secession, one wonders where Lewis would like us to place, although sheepishly implied in his article, the political loyalty of the people in Buuhoodle, Sool and Sanaag? Would he advice us, as he has done in the past, that kinship is stronger than neighborliness? Echoing Mr. Gure's report that each clan in the region had signed their own separate treaty with England (one did not sign any), without any substantive and inclusive discourse about secession, why should anyone clan bow down to the whims of Hargeisa, which, in Lewis' terms, is more of a trophy for “clan interest.” Worse, why would any one even give a modicum of honor to Hargeisa when power is in the hands of Barre's henchmen (See critical articles on current administration by Ahmed Hassan and Rakiya Omar in Hiiraan Online.)

In Paul Johnson's tradition, it is clear here that professor Lewis had conveniently suppressed the scholarship, which he has pursued for more than 50 years only to justify what he considers to be a “redeeming transcending Truth.” This is a typical case of an intellectual's troubled conscience at its best!

It is not easy, though, to hide Lewis's paper trail. In his most recent book, “Blood and Bone,” Lewis writes: “The evocative power of kinship as the axiomatic “natural” basis for all forms of social co-operation and as the ultimate guarantee of personal and collective security is deeply and pervasively rooted in Somali culture.” He further notes: “our kinsmen, right or wrong, is the basic motto of Somali social life.” Therefore, he asserts, that Isaaqs collectively owned the clan-dominated front of the Somali National Movement (SNM). One, therefore, wonders whether Lewis would apply the same logic to justify the refusal of the inhabitants in Buuhoodle, Sool and Sanaag to join Somaliland's unilateral secession as opposed to joining their kinsmen in Puntland.

Lest he missed his earlier records, Lewis has already addressed the role of kinship in a response to the SNM group's decision in 1977 to broaden its base in the following:

The group subsequently decided to widen its membership and tried to recruit from the Dhulbahante clan (Darood)… Prominent Dulbahate men who were approached included Ahmed Mohamed “Abdille Sakhran” and the clan leader Garad Ali Jama. In the end, through no fault of their own, it transpired that they could not carry their clansmen with them.

As far as the clans mentioned here are concerned, facts on the ground show that things have not changed much since the above mentioned aborted “recruitment” took place. Things have in fact been more complicated with the establishment of the Puntlnad regional administration. As can be judged from news reports, Puntland has more presence in Buuhoodle, Sool and Sanaag region than does Somaliland.

In his pursuit to justify the secession of Somaliland, professor Lewis suppressed his own theory of Somali kinship, which otherwise portrays Somaliland as a one clan project. For example, this is how he characterized the political movement of the SNM: ” The SNM was thus, from the beginning, a typical reactive Somali clan-based organization responding to hostile external pressures and seeking to protect and forward clan interest .”(Emphasis added here) Brushing aside the Trojan horse installed in Hargeisa (represented by Rayale, Qaybe, Ismeal Faqash), one must conclude here that the establishment of Somaliland, therefore, represents a trophy for “clan interest.”

Unlike Lewis's thesis, the basis for the secession of the north is not based on the inability of the south to put its house in order. It has always been argued that the pain inflicted on the clan (represented by the SNM front in northern Somalia) by the Barre regime, including the clans that supported him, as the overriding reason for secession (see “Isaaq Oppression” in Somaliland Forum and “Blood and Bone, by Lewis.) It is how the past was constructed that is haunting secession to have broader appeal today.

Lewis' s Blood and Bone narrates well the clan inspiration that the SNM used to mobilize angry clansmen against Barre's regime. It is littered with accounts on how the National Security Service (NSS) harassed the multitude of Hargeisa, Borao and Berbera. What makes the whole secession enterprise an infantile disorder now is that the very same henchmen who supposedly maimed and harassed the residents of Hargeisa are now their supreme rulers. If the case for secession anchored on the moral argument of “Isaaq Oppression” in the hands of the late dictator and his tribesmen, it has lost moral grounds when Said Barre's henchmen are recruited to occupy the state house in Hargeisa. Indeed, this condition alone makes the secession project more of an infantile disorder than a new horizon for the people of the region to long for. If secession breaths life back to those who committed serious human rights abuses (just consider the present day rulers in Hargeisa) while at the same time promoting inter-clan and intra-clan conflicts, ala the conflicts orchestrated in Buuhoodle, Sool and Saanag , then secession is a morally bankrupt infantile disorder, from which Hadrawi correctly distanced himself.

Faisal Roble
City Planner, Los Angeles (USA)
E-mail: fabroble@aol.com

Copyright © 2005 Wardheernews.com