As I have mentioned in a previous article, there is very little difference among the Isaaq secessionists between the man in the street and those presumably educated ones when it comes to articulating their grievances and their justifications for their secession. More often than not, they tend to over-dramatize and exaggerate their suffering under the regime of Siyad Barre, and to hurl gratuitous insults and emotional tirades against all and sundry.

A good example are recent articles in Awdalnews by Yussuf Dirir Ali ( A band-aid for bleeding hearts ) and an earlier one by Abdulkadir Idan ( Game is over for Somaliland's enemies ). Perhaps annoyed by recent unfavourable articles in AwdalNews and WardheerNews websites, possibly including some of mine, these writers inveigh against what they call the “Faqash”- the derogatory sobriquet for the rest of the people in Somalia- who are collectively considered as collaborators of the former Siyad Barre regime. While their strong feelings concerning the crimes committed by the former military regime against the Isaaqs are understandable, it is another thing to vent their bitterness in an abusive manner on the rest of the Somali people, who themselves had suffered under that regime in one way or another.

No one is disputing the fact that the former military regime has committed heinous crimes against the Isaaq clan as it also did, to varying degrees, against other clans, individuals and groups. But when it comes to roughly how many Isaaqs were killed by the regime, it is any body's guess. .The writers in Awdalnews claim that the atrocities committed against them are comparable to the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda (close to one million killed) or the Jewish Holocaust during the Nazi era (nearly 6 million killed). This is simply going over the top, given the paucity of facts and figures. To indulge in such ridiculous comparisons for propaganda purposes is to merely shoot yourself on the foot. It is self defeating since it is bound to discredit their version of the history of the excesses of the former military regime.

How come that during all the 14 years of so-called independence of Somaliland, it has not been deemed necessary by the self-styled government to solicit help from the international community so that through professional investigation could be carried out as was the case in other war-torn countries such as Cambodian, Rwanda and the Balkans?. That this has not been undertaken can only be the result of a deliberate policy at the highest level that prefers to make capital out of the alleged genocide rather than digging up the facts once and for all. The longer this is not done, the stronger the doubts about the scale of the alleged genocide and the greater the suspicion that this tragedy has been cynically exploited to further the secessionist propaganda for independence.

The next question is why do the secessionists needlessly alienate the rest of the Somali people and negate all the groundswell of good will generated by the atrocities of the former regime? I have argued in my previous article ( Somaliland recognition: why it won't happen ) that the Isaaq antipathy towards others, in particular Southerners, has political roots. Their disenchantment with the union was not prompted solely by the excesses of the Siyad Barre regime but rather goes back to the early days soon after independence when increasing numbers of the Isaaq clan began agitating covertly or overtly for secession, culminating in the 1962 military insurrection in the North. The period between 1960 and 1969 was a time when Somalia had democratic governments and indeed Mr. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, the last Prime Minister overthrown in 1969 by Siyad Barre, was their own man. Undoubtedly, one contributing factor to the Isaaq grievances right from the start was the highly centralized nature of the government where most administrative matters were handled in Mogadishu with all its admittedly irritating inconveniences. But this was not unique to the North. All other regions faced the same problems. The overriding reason for the secessionist sentiments, then as now, is that the Isaaqs realised soon after union that they were only one clan among equals in Somalia and no longer the dominant clan they used to be in the by-gone days of former British Somaliland . It is a craving for this glorious past that is driving their secessionist crusade to return to their former status as a separate independent country where Hargeisa is once again the capital and the Isaaqs are once more the dominant clan. All the economic, social and political advantages they would enjoy under a federal, democratic Somalia , in which they have their own regional assemblies, has no appeal for them. It is Somaliland where they are the top dog or nothing else. The suffering under Siyad Barre has merely reinforced these long simmering secessionist sentiments.

The Isaaq secessionist strategy rests on a number of planks: Firstly, it is to drive as big a wedge as possible between them and the South and render the N.W and the rest of Somalia as two separate unrelated countries for all practical purposes. Even if no country has recognized them, they have at least the initial satisfaction that they had managed to force UNDP Somalia, and other UN and aid agencies based in Hargeisa, to treat them as de facto independent country to the extent that Hargeisa can veto any relief or development assistance to regions in the North-West that refuse to subscribe to the secession such as Sool, Eastern Sanaag and Cayn. As part of this de-linking from Somalia , Southerners are considered as foreigners and are liable to deportation if they set foot in Hargeisa. This deliberate hostility towards other Somalis is not as random and disconnected as it might appear. Indeed, they are part of the strategy to make themselves so unpopular with the South that the later will in the end throw the towel and succumb to the dictates of the secessionists:

The second blank is to miss no opportunity to indirectly fan the flames of the mayhem and disorder in Mogadishu . The daily diatribe against President Abdullahi Yussuf is aimed at stoking up the old distrust between Hawiya and Darood. This comes as a big propaganda boost to the warlords who are further motivated to derail the nascent government formed in Nairobi and to thwart the emergence of any other government any time in the foreseeable future. The longer the South is in turmoil, the longer the warlords can prevail and hence the less likely a government will emerge. This is all in line with the wishes of the secessionists. There is thus a convergence of interest between the warlords and the secessionists. Neither side wants peace and stability in the South or the emergence of a government. If that situation were to persist and the international community were to give up on Somalia in the end, and say enough is enough, the recognition of Somaliland cannot be completely ruled out provided it is in full control of the N.W and that it has the support of all the clans and regions of former British –an impossible condition to fulfil as I will argue below

Speaking as one from the N.W, admittedly non-Isaaq, how do we fit into the Isaaq designs? Their attitude towards the rest of us in the N.W is at best volatile and can change like traffic lights. When they are at their most ebullient mood, you have the green light and can expect on such occasions to be embraced comradely as a fellow Somalilander and be reminded, lest you forget at your peril, of the unshakable bonds between the people of Somaliland . This is when they are politically motivated since the Isaaqs need other clans to join them if they have to convince the outside world that it is not only them, the Isaaqs, but the whole population and clans of former British Somaliland who had together opted for secession. When, on the other hand, they are in a bad mood or doubts arise about the loyalties of non-Isaaqs to the secessionist, you are reminded in no uncertain terms of who you are after all – a despised Faqash!!!

The ability of the non-Isaaq clans to resist the unwelcome embraces of the secessionists differs, depending on their geographical location. The Gadabuursi and Issa clans are in a more vulnerable situation and had little choice but to succumb to the SNM occupation- at least for now. Lest they forget, they are constantly reminded of their past sins as collaborators of Siyad Barre, a crime for which they have to atone by showing unwavering loyalty to the secession. No one is more subject to these accusations as the president who is originally from Borama. A Damocles sword is constantly hanging over his head, as his Isaaq tormenters endlessly accuse him of contrived war crimes when he was an official of the regime of Siyad Barre- as did the above-mentioned writers.

The Eastern Regions of Sool, Eastern Sanaag and Cayn are in a better geographical position as they are contiguous with the rest of Somalia . They had managed to ward off the secessionists and remain part and parcel of Somalia . It has not been lost upon the secessionists of the importance of being seen by the outside world to be in full control of the whole N.W. This need was the rationale for their desperate attempt last year to capture Lascanod, the capital of the Sool region. Fortunately they were repulsed, thanks to the defending Puntland forces. But even if they were to overrun Lasanod, and that is a big if, that is not tantamount to controlling the region and having the support of the people everywhere. The chances of capturing these Harti regions in the N.W will get slimmer as the new government of Somalia extends its writ to the region and to everywhere else in Somalia . As long as the defiance of the Harti areas in the N.W persists- and there is no reason why it should falter or change- the chances of Somaliland 's recognition are almost nil.

As a patriotic Somalian, nothing offends more than to be called a Somalilander. Call me Faqash anytime!!!

By Mohsin Mahad

Email: Mohsinmahad@yahoo.co.uk

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