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Fifteen years ago in May of 1991, representatives of communities from all regions of Northern Somalia (former British Somali Protectorate) gathered in the town of Burco for talks on ending hostilities among them, and share ideas on social, economic and political issues facing the country and the region in particular. The meeting followed an announcement by the leadership of SNM and its supporters to end all hostilities against other communities in the region, and start a new chapter of peaceful coexistence in which discourse and deliberation would be the center of addressing socioeconomic and political issues in the region. Despite of active hostilities perpetrated by some of SNM forces in Sool and Sanaag regions, and an all out assault on Addle region few months earlier, many people outside the SNM community felt that the meeting presented an opportunity for peace and decided to attend with caution. With that the Burca summit convened, in May of 1991, in the spirit it had been conceived. What happened next and events that transpired from it over the last 15 years is at the root cause of why people in that region hold extremely opposing views on what Somaliland is or is not. First, let me present a brief background on the state of SNM politics in the run up to the Burco summit. As the preparation for the meeting was underway, there was a lot of political maneuvering among SNM leaders and throughout its constituency in and outside the country. The question at the heart of the political posturing was clear to everyone . How should SNM transition itself from a tribal rebel movement to a political body that can appeal to a constituency far beyond the current one? The SNM leaders find themselves in two camps. On one hand, there were those who believed in a gradual process of transformation into a national political body capable of building a coalition worthy of filling the political leadership vacuum in Somalia. This group included most of SNM's prominent political leaders who had amble experience in public service and politics. They are better known as political face of SNM. This group's strategy for the meeting in Burco was to end all hostilities towards other communities in the region immediately, and put major focus on securing peace and stability among them. They also realized that it would take time for communities to start dialogue with each other and heal the wounds of the conflict. Only then, would it be possible to have a united people of the former British Somaliland, a condition necessary to negotiate some formation of a federal government with former southern Somalia. That was their goal, renegotiate the 1960 union of Somalia. On the other hand, a group of leaders from the military wing of SNM, supported by a number of inexperienced, radical and emotionally charged civilians, were determined not to settle for anything short of a quick declaration of an independent state. Their attitude was famously reflected in their slogan “Kaadi baan u soo cabbay” which loosely translates into “I had to drink my own urine to persevere the hardship of the struggle, so don't question me”. This camp could not understand why the other group would waste so much time to get the consensus of communities who, in their view, should have no say on the issues at hand. Few days after the meeting convened in Burco, as the audience was inundated with a series of marathon reports on SNM's achievements and sacrifices, a group of heavily armed militia loyal to the leadership of SNM's military wing surrounded the building where the meeting was in session. From that day on, the peace meeting went into a panic mode. Fearful delegates resorted to frantic discussions in secluded private gatherings sometimes under the watchful eyes of private armed security. Not a single topic on the original agenda made it to the forum. Few days later Somaliland was declared. Enough with background, and let move on to what went wrong. The armed militia was brought in to intimidate members of SNM's political wing and their associates, but it also had the desired effect of muting from non-SNM delegates, who at the end went back home and became subjects of humiliation and ridicule. The political leaders of SNM succumbed to the intimidation tactics of their opponents. As result, they failed not only on personal level, but their actions that day set the stage for the failure of Somaliland itself. What is even sadder is that they repeated their mistakes again and again. Here are few examples of their failures: 1) They lacked the courage and leadership to stand up for their convictions and views when it counted the most. They decided to leave the fate of the cause they championed for over a decade in the hands of radical, inexperienced and emotional individuals. If what they wanted all along was to have an independent state for their own, why did they chose to name their organization Somali National Movement instead of Somaliland National Movement? 2) After failing to deliver leadership in Burco, SNM leaders jumped on the Somaliland bandwagon and eagerly assumed leadership role. In this capacity, they reinvented themselves and redefined their cause as the legitimization of Somaliland by the formation of an exemplary democratic society. In other ways, they decided to retrofit an unlawful and ill-conceived entity, created against their wishes in the first place, with symbols of democratic values such as holding referendum on a constitution and organizing local and presidential elections. They now claim that “people” overwhelmingly supported the constitution and the election. They don't mention that one tribe had cast all votes and is the sole beneficiary of the process. 3) Fourteen years went by and as of May of 2005, none of what they promised materialized. International recognition and legitimacy had never been more elusive. Mr. Riyaale and his administration in Hargaysa were frustrated by economic down turn due to excessive taxation on businesses and internal political squabbling. He and his associates decided that a diversionary tactic would turn around things in their favor. They launched an attack on Sool region in the name of securing the nation's borders. 4) Once again, former SNM political leaders failed to speak up against the tyranny of few individuals. Again they jumped on the bandwagon. However, things were a little different this time. Some people learned from the lessons of Burco in 1991, and they were determined to stand up for what they believe and value and defend it against any form of aggression. Now it is May of 2005. There is still tension in the region and possibility of new violence between Puntland, a new and serious player in the region's politics, and Somaliland forces most of which are often conscripted militia from Awdal and Hargaysa regions. However, there is a glimpse of hope in Hargeysa. For the first, a prominent politician broke the taboo of avoiding debate and discourse on the issue of unity and went on live television to speak passionately about his beliefs and convictions about the region's affairs. It is must that Hargaysa is put on the path of de-radicalization in the overall interest of everyone in the region. Omar Mohamed Abdi
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