The Somali Transitional Federal Institutions formed at Mbagathi, Kenya have already completed their first year of existence; however, only to note the gruesome reality that these institutions have just about two month back commenced their long-procrastinated return to Somalia. But this relocation has sparked a major rift over where the beleaguered institutions should be based. The President, the Premier and their supporters have relocated to Jowhar, 90 km north of Mogadishu, because they consider the capital city too risky. The Speaker of the Parliament and his supporters in the Parliament and in the Cabinet, on the other hand, argue that the Transitional Federal Institutions must be based in the capital city and insist that failure to do so would be tantamount to a violation of the Transitional Charter.

An attempt by the Government of Yemen to mediate between the President and the Speaker over the issue of relocation and other contentious issues that have split the Transitional Federal Institutions has ostensibly failed. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Somalia is currently holding consultations with Egyptian and Ethiopian authorities and with Heads of the African Union and the Arab League in a bid to end the stalemate over the relocation of the Government.

The formation of the new Transitional Federal Institutions of Somalia represents another bid by the Somali people, IGAD, and the International Community to reconstitute the Somali State and restore a semblance of law and order. The outcome of Mbagathi Peace Process is viewed by many as being the best chance yet for ending the protracted crisis because it has been able to embrace warlords, and also mollify all the neighbouring states including Ethiopia, which was previously not pleased with the outcome of Arta Peace Process.

There are those who argue though that Mbagathi Peace Process has failed to generate the all-inclusive and broad-based government that the Somali people were craving for. The focus on warlords at Mbagathi and the benign neglect shown with regard to the civil society, particularly women's organizations, business and religious leaders, has provoked mix feelings about the outcome of this pivotal event. These sources assert that Arta Peace Process, in retrospect, was unquestionably more participatory because it was able to assemble over 3000 delegates from all over Somalia representing a wide array of political and tribal groups. But notwithstanding this contention and despite some of the scurrilous attacks mounted against the new leadership of the Transitional Federal Institutions, the outcome of Mbagathi Peace Process is seen as being the sole hope left for the people of Somalia.

However, the rift that is deepening between the supporters of the President and those of the Speaker of the Parliament will, I am afraid, speed up the demise of the fragile Transitional Federal Institutions, and further weaken the fading hopes of the Somali people inside the country and in the diaspora.   Moreover, this wrangling between the two camps and their zero-sum games will only produce a confluence of circumstances propitious to the strategies of the internal and external spoilers of the Somali peace process.

As the fledgling Transitional Institutions are further menaced to crumble if the rift between the two camps continues unabated, the need for a serious effort to mediate between the two intransigent camps is now more compelling. The Somali people, both inside the country and in the diaspora with the help of the international community must do everything they can to ensure that both parties remain committed to negotiations and dialogue and share responsibility with other legitimate actors to counter the impending demise of the Transitional Federal Institutions. It is imperative that both camps understand the consequences of another failure that results from sheer intransigence and stern positional attitudes.

I should perhaps reiterate some of the ideas that have already been articulated in the hope they would also contribute to salvaging the fledgling Transitional Federal Institutions:

The leadership:

The President and the Prime Minister need to recover from the perception that their election to head to newly established institutions has been leading to further domination of the Ethiopian-backed “SRRC” and engendering marginalization of those who oppose them.

The President and the Prime Minister must refrain from the politics of “winner-take-all arrangement”; they must spearhead a programme of healing the wounds, reach out to all the political groups and individuals who oppose them, and adopt the strategy of compromise and deep political inclusion.

When President Museveni took over in 1986 and inherited the chaos brought about by the prolonged civil war in Uganda, his overriding priority guided by his political pragmatism was to heal wounds, and broaden his political base by co-opting the political groups that opposed him in order to reduce political polarization and consolidate a post-conflict government of national unity.

Moreover, the Interim President of Somalia must be careful not to follow the slippery road to authoritarianism. He must abandon the “Big Man Syndrome” where most decision-making power is vested in one individual or leader. Abdiqassim Salad Hassan's fatal decision to usurp the constitutional power of the executive branch of the Transitional National Government was, in retrospect, a factor that has contributed to the fragmentation of Arta's Transitional Institutions.

The President and his Prime Minister must endeavor to identify the interests, concerns, and the power of the major players in the Somali political landscape. The understanding of the underlying interests and concerns of all of these parties and their inclusion in the decision-making processes would facilitate the consensus building process and replace the “win-lose” image with “win-win” situation. Alienating the political leaders in Mogadishu and the adoption of confrontational attitudes with them will only weaken reconciliation and tarnish the image of the President and the Prime Minister.

Mogadishu Vs Jowhar:

The President and the Prime Minister's decision not to relocate the government to the capital city unless militias and their warlords are disarmed can only be construed as being an underestimation of   the monumental task of the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).  

DDR is a complex process that requires the participation of all the forces that shape the Transitional Federal Institutions, as well as the local and international non-governmental actors involved in the Somali post-conflict peacebuilding efforts.

The longevity of the Somali conflict and the ensuing destruction of national socio-economic infrastructures have engendered enormous challenges for the DDR. For instance, resources and other logistical means required for undertaking DDR in Mogadishu and its surrounding areas are severely scanty. The abject poverty that is so widespread now because of the protracted civil war has generated a favourable environment for the recruitment of young Somalis to become members of the militias of the different political, religious or business groups in the capital city. I argue that the freelance militias in the capital city and in other parts of Somalia have no strong allegiance or commitment to their clans or sub-clans. Their motivation for carrying weapons is mainly, if not solely, economic. Poverty and lack of employment opportunities have become a disincentive to lay down arms. Guns are a means for securing a livelihood in Mogadishu and in other parts of Somalia. They possess economic and security value, and as certain peacebuilding scholars assert, failure to understand the socio-cultural context of the weapons has in the past been the reason for the failure of   disarmament efforts in Somalia.

Moreover, the deep mistrust and the open hostility that has persisted among the different Mogadishu sub-clans, on one hand, and between the various business and religious groups on the other, have all along rendered the process of militia disarmament and demobilization very difficult. To pool all of these different political, business and religious groups in Mogadishu into a monolithic entity is an outright mythology. It appears that the leadership of the TFG is enhancing this mythology by treating the said groups as a monolith. It is very important to recognize the fact that the political, business and religious groups in Mogadishu exhibit an inordinate amount of diversity in terms of their political as well as economic interests and strategies, which obviously transcend clan loyalties.  

In light of the complexity of the issue of armed groups in Mogadishu, I argue that the process of DDR in the beleaguered capital city requires a concerted effort of all the parties that make up the Transitional Federal Institutions. Though the MPs assembled in Mogadishu together with their Speaker have been commended for the efforts they have exerted with regard to the removal of the roadblocks (sbarros); it is, however, fair also to state that the removal of such barricades, and the subsequent encampment of the militias, could have, in my view, gained more momentum if the initiative had been tackled collectively by all the forces of the Transitional Federal Institutions within the framework of an effective Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Strategy.

In conclusion, the President, the Speaker, and the Prime Minister must drop the idea of using coercive approaches to disarm militias in the capital city and elsewhere. It has previously failed in Somalia, and it is bound to succumb to another disaster if the Transitional Federal Institutions insist on it. In Somaliland, an indigenously worked out peace and stability still prevails. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the militias was successfully planned and executed through dialogue and negotiations. No frontline states or any other states were involved in restoring law and order. This part of Somalia, after emerging from a lengthy civil war, has demonstrated a genuine commitment to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction. I believe the southern parts of the country could   do the same with a little of bit of wisdom, a political maturity and pragmatism, and a sense of nationalism from its people and leaders.

Burci M. Xamsa

Toronto, Canada

buri.hamza@gmail.com

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