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This paper investigates the nature of dynamics, conditions, and forces that prolong civil war duration in Somalia. It suggests, utilizing vast research on this matter, that poverty, a structural feature of Somali society, prolongs civil war duration. As poverty prolongs civil war duration, civil war generates and sustains more poverty; this process, as researchers have noticed, constitutes a cycle that feeds itself to generate poverty and wars. A set of internal and external forces, also, aid this dynamics thereby assuring its capacity to deliver poverty and wars. This first part of the paper, concentrates on the link between poverty and war, and suggests mechanism to weaken the link between them; in subsequent sections, I shall examine other factors that aid war prolongation and its attendant misery (such as external interventions, clans, interest groups and Diaspora communities). Poverty [1], as research shows, prolongs civil war duration [2]. Somalia is a poor country in civil war [3]; poverty, therefore, would prolong civil war duration [4]. One possible mechanism through which poverty prolongs civil war duration is that it limits educational and employment opportunities available to young males: this group constitutes the vast majority of warriors in Somalia and else where [5]. Facing limited alternatives, as shall be shown below, they are cheaper to recruit and retain as soldiers, thereby easing the cost of initiating and sustaining war operations. Employment and educational opportunities, in Somalia, are extremely limited. Reasons as to why this is the case is as follows; education is limited because less than 2% of secondary school aged population go to school; the rest do not [6]. Moreover, unemployment among urban population is 65%, whereas its corresponding figure for the non-urban population is about 40% [7]. This would suggest that rural populations are better off than their urban counterparts, not so, conditions in rural and nomadic areas( here after referred to just as rural areas) are worse for two reasons: First, urban areas house administrations( be it local or regional), businesses, schools, and in some cases aid organizations, while rural areas do no house these entities. Consequently, they lack opportunities offered by these entities; Second, extreme poverty ( a condition under which individuals are incapable of meeting basic needs such as food, clothes and shelter) predominates rural areas: more than half ( 53.4%) of extremely poor in Somalia, live in rural areas, whereas less than 25% of these destitute population live in urban areas( 23.5% to be exact)[8]. Relative lower unemployment in rural areas, therefore, belies the prevalence of extreme poverty. Under such rural and urban conditions, one anticipates the existence of large, extremely poor, unemployed and unschooled young population struggling to survive in harsh environment. If this is the case, war chiefs would have easier time recruiting and retaining these young men as soldiers; Moreover, as long as these economic and social conditions exist, war chiefs would continue to have access to cheap labor provisions that can sustain their operations for an extended period of time. When recruits are killed or injured, for instance, others would be hired to replace them. This is likely not to generate any major complications, because there is always recruits who lack alternatives to earn an income or occupy themselves; the availability of these population, therefore, solves recruitment problems that war chiefs face. The resolution of this problem, partly, makes wars more sustainable processes. And once wars are easier to sustain, they may be initiated and sustained for variety of purposes; they may be initiated and sustained, for instance, to protect or acquire income generating source or even capture or bargain about the nature of post-conflict state (see page 3, paragraph 2 of this paper). Poverty also prolongs civil war duration by making ‘governments' established in neighboring countries (during reconciliation conferences) less sustainable; government being less sustainable survives only in so far as it manages to secure and sustain funds from outside entities, failing to secure or sustain these funds, however, would force the government to cease operations and start collapsing. As the state collapses, war continuation becomes a default condition. In this sense, then, poverty prolongs civil war duration by making formed governments less sustainable. One possible mechanism through which poverty weakens the state and contributes to its collapse is by limiting potential revenues that can be extracted by the state through taxations [9]. Potential revenues is limited, in Somalia, because majority of the people are poor (73% of the them) [10]; Moreover, the country is among the poorest in the world and was getting poorer as the civil war persisted [11]; Suppose, however, that some segment of the population say, relatively richer 30% of the population, would be able to fund core state operations through taxations; under such circumstances, one may anticipate that the state would have access to limited funds that can be used to sustain its operations should the outside funds dry, for whatever reasons. I contend, however, that even this limited fund will not reach its intended destination, rather collection agents and their associates would appropriate these funds as they see proper( they may take the money for themselves, because they are under-funded or perhaps they are simply greedy folks or both) . Reasons for this proposition are as follows: Somalia lacks, at this time, state institutions, be it security, judicial or revenue-collecting institutions; they will, therefore, need time to develop to the point where they are effective in doing their jobs. Since this takes time, they will go through a transitory period in which they are weaker, weaker in the sense of being under-funded, in addition to being in their earliest stage of development. Under such circumstances, judicial and security institutions, like any other institutions of the state, would also be weaker; thereby lacking capacities to investigate and punish those who appropriate collected funds; if this is the case, collected revenues, are less likely to reach their intended destination; in this scenario, the state will not only lack potential resources to tax but would also lack means to acquire them. Somali state facing these funding problems has traditionally relied on foreign support to sustain its operations; it is likely that the state had collapsed, when it was unable to secure these funds from its traditional patrons [12]; Consequently, the state might have been unable to pay its employees, thereby, encouraging them to cease operations and leave. It is likely, also, with a benefit of hindsight, that rebels, in 1990s, had easier time defeating the state owing to the bankruptcy of the state, thereby assuring themselves reasons to celebrate; but their celebrations did not last long. They faced the same problems that previous governments had faced: limited funding or lack of means to extract revenues or both; failing, just lack their predecessors, to secure outside sources of funds, they followed suit. Many ‘governments' that were further established in reconciliations conferences that took place in neighboring countries (during 1990-2002), followed similar path: the path to collapse and irrelevance. It remains to be seen whether the current government will succeed in resolving these funding problems. As poverty continues to favor wars, through weakening the state and easing the cost of initiating and sustaining armed conflicts; wars, in return reciprocate [13]: wars generate more poverty by displacing populations and capital, destroying infrastructures, and by increasing insecurity [14]. Some evidence is available indicating that poverty-war dynamics is at work in some parts of Somalia; A socioeconomic survey carried in 2002, suggests a general link between peace and better levels of income in Somalia [15]. Conditions under which poverty and wars predominate, wars would be easier to initiate and sustain for variety of purposes; they may be initiated and sustained for idiosyncratic reasons such as personal vengeance and family feuds [16]; Or for attaining or protecting an income generating-source, such as ports, airports, road blocks, or plantations [17]; (3) They may also be initiated and prolonged for bargaining about or even capturing post-conflict state [18]. All these purposes, and many others, will be pursued so long as they are profitable, and they are profitable in so far as the cost of war is low relative to the profits that can be attained as result of initiating and sustaining armed conflict[19]. As more wars are waged for variety of reasons, as more society becomes poorer, and as more society becomes poorer, as more society becomes vulnerable to more and more wars in the future; under such scenario, society appears to be trapped. Trapped, in part, by two powerful forces feeding one another: war and poverty. Societies lacking means to escape from this trap, continue to experience violent episodes and abject poverty for extended period of time. Recommendations 1- One way to make wars less sustainable is to build more schools; doing so, would decrease the number of potential recruits available for armed mobilizations and would also increase the cost of recruiting them; research further links education to a lower risk of civil war [20] This is probably because, as Paul Collier and his team suggest, schools either occupy young people or change their attitudes towards life [21]; in either case, education would make wars less sustainable. 2- How do you build schools?; one way to build them is to mobilize funds from Diaspora populations, local populations( people in villages, districts, and towns in Somalia) and from international well-wishers, so that they can be used to establish more sustainable and more affordable public schools. 3- Do not wait peace to build schools, the phenomenon of war and poverty is likely to be cyclical; that is to say, poverty and war feed one another. Hence, they can survive for extended period of time. Building more schools in conflict zones disrupts the vicious cycle of war and poverty, by making wars costly to initiate and sustain. Moreover, less sustainability of war is likely to incline war chiefs and their affiliates to appreciate peace. 4- This paper recognizes that more schools are, at best, insufficient to terminate war, precisely, for this reason; I shall discuss other factors that sustain armed conflicts and make pertinent recommendations. Samatalis Haille
Reference: 1- Poverty is, sometimes, measured by low Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita; GDP per capita is “the value of all goods and services produced in the economy divided by the population” wellspring.isinj.com/sample/econ/macro/glossg.htm>, (Accessed 28, 8, 2005). 2- Paul Collier., et al, “The Duration of Conflict in the Literature on Civil War” On the Duration of Civil war, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 41, No. 3, 253-273 (2004). See also Nick Donovan. “Poverty is Strongly Associated with Civil Wars,” Countries at Risk of instability: Risk Factors and Dynamics of Instability, February, 2003, PP 27. 3- Reputed organizations that rank countries on the basis of income alone or income and other factors such as life expectancy and literacy, place Somalia, consistently, at or close to the bottom of the world; See ;The World Fact Book, Central Intelligence Agency, 2004, Central Intelligence
Agency, http://www.so.undp.org/PDF-2001/Chapter5.pdf > (Accessed June, 2005). Again See Somalia's position in relation to the world, “Relevance of Human development in Somalia Context”, National Human Development Report 98-Somalia, 1998, PP 21, < http://www.so.undp.org/HDR98/cpt1.pdf > (Accessed September 2005). See also Somalia' poverty in relation to its neighboring countries, “Trends in Human Development” Human Development Report 2001-Somalia, 2001, pp 46, < http://www.so.undp.org/PDF- 2001/Chapter1.pdf>( Accessed June, 2005). 4- Researchers estimate that average civil wars (which persist by about seven years) tend to slow down the growth of the economy by about 2.2 percent. [Paul Collier et al,. Breaking Conflict Trap (Washington: Oxford University Press and World Bank, 2003), 84.] In so doing they make per capita income much lower (by about 15%) than what it would have been had the civil war not been sustained [Collier, 84.]. And as per capita income becomes lower than what it would have been, it tends to increase the duration of the conflict( by about 6%) and also increases the risk of another armed conflict in the future( by about 17%)[ Collier, 84]. I think Somalia is not like average civil wars, it is worse for two reasons; first, Somali civil war was going on for twice the average of civil wars (about 15 years); Second, the impact of the civil war on the economy was quite substantial [see this document; Mark Bradbury, Ken Menkhause and Ronald Marchal, “Human Development Indicators” Human Development Report 2001-Somalia, 2001, pp 194-222.] < http://www.so.undp.org/PDF-2001/Chapter5.pdf > (accessed September, 2005). If so, the impact of the civil war on the economy, and vice versa, is higher than the impact of average civil wars on economy. This would suggest, on the basis of the research cited above, that the Somali civil war would be prolonged and the risk of another one starting is higher should the current one terminate. 5- Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, October 21st, 2001, pp 12-16. < http://wdsbeta.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2004 6- Mark Bradbury, Ken Menkhause and Ronald Marchal, “Human Development Indicators” Human Development Report 2001-Somalia, 2001, PP 203, <http://www.so.undp.org/PDF-2001/Chapter5.pdf > (Accessed June, 2005). 7- World Bank/UNDP, “Employment and Income” Socio-Economic Survey 2002, 2002, PP 20, < http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOMALIAEXTN/Resources/chpt2.pdf > (Accessed July, 2005). 8- World Bank/UNDP, “Employment and Income” Socio-Economic Survey 2002, 2002, PP 28, < http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOMALIAEXTN/Resources/chpt2.pdf > (Accessed July, 2005). 9- Ken Menkhaus and John Prendergast, “The Nature of the Collapse of the Central State -- the Politics of Centrifuge” Political Economy of Post-Intervention Somalia, Somalia Task Force Issue Paper #3, April 1995. < http://www.netnomad.com/menkhaus.html > (Accessed May, 2005). See also Jamil Mubarak, From Bad Policy to Chaos in Somalia (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996), 75. 10- World Bank/UNDP, “Employment and Income” Socio-Economic Survey 2002, 2002, PP 25, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOMALIAEXTN/Resources/chpt2.pdf > (Accessed July, 2005). 11- World Bank/UNDP, “Employment and Income” Socio-Economic Survey 2002, 2002, PP 25, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOMALIAEXTN/Resources/chpt2.pdf > ( Accessed July, 2005).See, also, this document for the impact of war on poverty [Mark Bradbury, Ken Menkhause and Ronald Marchal, “Human Development Indicators” Human Development Report 2001-Somalia, 2001, pp 194-222.] ;Mark Bradbury, Ken Menkhause and Ronald Marchal “Trends in Human development” National Human Development Report - Somalia, 2001, PP 46-48 < http://www.so.undp.org/PDF-2001/Chapter1.pdf > ( Accessed June, 2005). 12- AllRefer, “Foreign Military Assistance” Country Study & Guide < http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/somalia/somalia122.html > (Accessed September 5) 2005. See also William Reno, “Patronage Politics, Foreign Aid, and Start of State Collapse” Somalia and Survival in the Shadow of global Economy February 2003. PP 14-17. <http://www2.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/qehwp/qehwps100.pdf > (Accessed April, 2005). 13- Paul Collier et al,. Breaking Conflict Trap (Washington: Oxford: University Press and World Bank, 2003), 1.<http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2003/06/30/000094946 _0306190405396/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf >. (Accessed July, 2005). 14- Ibrahim A. Elbadawi, “Introduction” Civil wars and Poverty: The Role of External Interventions, Political Rights, and Economic Growth February, 1999, PP 1, < http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/civilwars_and_poverty.pdf > (Accessed June, 2005). 15- World Bank/UNDP, “Employment and Income” Socio-Economic Survey 2002, 2002, PP 23, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOMALIAEXTN/Resources/chpt2.pdf > (Accessed July, 2005). 16- Stathis N Kalyvas, “Theory of Civil War” The Logic of Violence in Civil War March, 2000, Pp, 7-11. < http://www.duke.edu/web/licep/1/kalyvas/kalyvaspaper.pdf > (Accessed, March, 2005). 17- Paul Collier “Who gains During Conflict” Doing Well out of War April 10, 1999, PP 8-11. http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2004/03/ 18- Collier, On the duration of Conflict, 254. 19- Collier, On the Duration of the Conflict, 256. 20- Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler : “Interpretation and Conclusion” Greed and Grievance in Civil War October 2001, pp 16. <http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/greedgrievance_23oct.pdf > Accessed September, 2005). 21- Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler “Interpretation and Conclusion” Greed and Grievance in Civil War march, 2002, pp 34. <http://econwpa.wustl.edu/eps/dev/papers/0409/0409007.pdf > ( Accessed, March 3005).
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