By Isaac Muhammad
Following incessant terrorist episodes into Kenyan soil by the notorious terror group Al-Shabab in 2011, Kenya advanced the argument of the ‘Right to Self-defense’ as embodied in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which explicitly recognizes ‘the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in the wake of an armed attack against a member of the UN.’ Kenya maintained that Al-Shabab’s frequent violence, kidnappings, and killings of tourists in its coastal and Northeastern regions had become a threat to trade and tourism, both of which are vital sectors of Kenya’s economy. Therefore, ‘Kenya launched “Operation Linda Nchi” (Operation Defend the Country in October 2011.’ Through this operation, Kenya hoped to counter the direct threat of Al-Shabab militias who have long controlled the Jubbaland area—southern regions of Somalia bordering Kenya, infiltrated Kenya, and terrorized its citizens.
However, defeating Al-Shabab militarily alone without political stabilization seemed meaningless for Somalia as well for Kenya—because Al-Shabab could regroup and maintain operations in the area. Therefore, the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) in consultation with Jubbaland clan representatives and intellectuals, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Kenya, and other frontline states put an elaborative plan in place. A plan that would create the ‘Jubbaland State’, consisting of the Gedo, Middle Juba, and Lower Juba regions in Southern Somalia, bordering Northeastern Kenya. The establishment of the Jubbaland State meant a step towards Federation and stabilization for Somalia. Correspondingly, for Kenya, it meant the birth of a strong and a friendly state that could safeguard it from adverse effects spawned by the lawlessness in the neighboring regions of Somalia.
Both the TFG and Kenya fully supported Somalia’s former defense Minister Professor Gandi, to lead Jubbaland to drive Al-Shabab away from the area and to secure the longer border between Somalia and Kenya— stabilizing the region and ending violence spilling over into Kenya (Berhane, 2011). Despite Professor Gandi’s initial success to gain support from the TFG, the civil society, and the Kenya government, he failed to become viable after it became clear groups such as the Raskiamboni Militia, which had a presence in the target area and other elements in the region, would neither support nor recognize the administration under the auspices of Professor Gandi. This deterred the TFG and Kenya from further pursuing the professor and ‘Azania’, which he was the chief architect, but rather turned their support to Mr. Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Ahmed Madobe), to lead the soon to be formed state of ‘Jubbaland.’ Mr. Madobe had no previous political or executive experience nor had he any advanced education to qualify him for the post—but he was the leader of the Raskiamboni Armed Militia and was at the time based in Dobley, the border city of Somalia.
In their pursuit to liberating the Jubbaland area, the local Somali intelligence and the Somali Army aided by the tactical support of the Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) killed hundreds of Al-Shabab militants and captured strategic towns formerly held by the Al-Shabab group. The KDF have trained and positioned Somali forces in liberated areas, and Al-Shabab became drained, confused, and was on the run. In capturing ‘Kismayo,’ the Somali Army and the KDF seized an economic, infrastructural, and technical center of Al-Shabab. Besides destroying the militants training and bomb assembly facilities in Kismayo, the city was regarded as the militants’ last stronghold in the Jubbaland. Further, cutting Al- Shabab off from the port city meant a fatal blow to the group as it was the bastion, which financed activities of the Al-Shabab not only in Jubbaland but also in other regions of Somalia.
However, since the capture of the Kismayo city, the Al-Shabab’s terrorization power has grown; on the contrary, the Jubbaland administration and Kenya’s counterterrorism policies have been counterproductive, and generally, the counterinsurgency efforts by the African Union Mission (AMISOM) in Jubbaland have at best deteriorated (The Brookings Institution, 2016). The AMISOM and the Jubbaland Forces vacated strategic border towns and stationed themselves in the heavily guarded city of Kismayo. Since 2012, the AMISOM and the Jubbaland forces failed to make any tangible progress towards Al-Shabab and liberate additional territories. To the contrary, Al-Shabab reoccupied areas vacated by the KDF and the Jubbaland Forces (Muhammad, 2016). Most of Somalia’s long border with Kenya is now unguarded. Moreover, the Al-Shabab often controls many of Somalia’s border towns guaranteeing quick and easy access to transport weaponry and jihadi elements, which usually carry out deadly attacks in Kenya.
Was Kenya’s strategy flawed? Understanding the underlying causes and the roots of those fundamental factors require a proper analysis. To answer those key points, one must examine strategic and critical glitches. By doing so, one must ask the core reasons preventing the AMISOM and the Jubbaland Forces from further advancing into other Al- Shabab held areas. After all, distancing Al- Shabab would have denied them the access to the border, subsequently limiting their access to Kenya. If nothing else, what stopped the Jubbaland Administration from deploying its troops to crucial border entry points, therefore, restricting Jihadi element’s access to Kenya? Put it in another way, why is Al- Shabab still in control of most of the Somali-Kenya border towns, giving them easy access to Kenya? These questions highlight the critical underachievement of the current Jubbaland Administration and Kenya’s policy.
Indications are that Kenya and Jubbalanders are suffering from a ‘Set-up-to-Fail Syndrome.’ If the Pygmalion effect describes the dynamic in which individual lives up to great expectations, the set-up-to-fail syndrome explains the opposite. It describes a dynamic in which one that is perceived to be exceptional performer lives down to expectations people have for them. The result is that they often end up leaving—either of their volitions or not. In any case, the syndrome is set in motion when one side begins to worry that the other side’s performance is not up to par. Measuring the effectiveness of leadership should always be done together with the context of the leadership era. The context outlays the type of leadership that is more appropriate to it. We must remember that measures are always very evolving and fluid. Therefore, what was an effective leadership style in one context might be disastrous in another circumstance. In other words, one could be a great guerrilla-war leader but a dreadful political leader.
The current Jubbaland leadership had proven to be ineffective when it failed to formulate a solid strategy to defeat Al-Shabab. Kenya and the Jubbaland population seem to be struggling with this notion and continue to suffer. The president of Jubbaland and his administration have disappointed many by not coming up with a plan to defeat Al-Shabab, revitalize economic prospects, create employment opportunities, and secure the Jubbaland interest and protect its borders. By drafting such plan and implementing it, the current leadership would have diminished new Al-Shabab recruits. Mr. Madobe failed time after time to surround himself, with qualified and capable individuals who could have constructively scrutinize his policies and leadership style so to articulate fruitful policies, draft strategies, stimulate creativity, and support developments, but instead opted for a loyalty.
It is imperative to realize that just because someone is in a leadership position, does not necessarily mean they should be. Put it another way; not all leaders are created equal! The problem many suffer from is a recognition problem—they cannot seem to recognize good leaders from bad ones. It doesn’t matter how intelligent, affable, persuasive, or savvy a person is, if they are prone to rationalizing strategic behavior based on current or future needs they will eventually fall prey to their undoing. Furthermore, if a leader does not understand the concept of “Service above Self” they will engender the trust, confidence, and loyalty of those they lead. Any leader is only as good as his society’s desire to be led by them! An overabundance of ego, pride and arrogance, are not positive leadership traits. Such traits are the core qualities present in the Jubbaland State House.
One must wonder if Ahmed Madobe is a steward of the friendship bestowed, the resources provided to him, and more importantly, one must critically evaluate whether Ahmed Madobe is a reliable political ally to those who invested in him and his administration! Kenya has been striking Al-Shabab, but it has never crashed them. To end Al- Shabab, Kenya must hit them at the head with a mallet. Jubbalanders are feeling the pain and they are indeed fed-up with the current administration’s predicaments. They feel unfulfilled and let down by the current leadership, which, they were so proud to support and expected more. They see the skyrocketing unemployment, lack of education and basic needs, which forces Jubbaland youth to risk their lives to take the most dangerous and deadliest journey to Europe, while many others in the areas still controlled by the Al-Shabaab group are left no other option but to join the extremist Al Shaba. Additionally, they see their families still housed in Kenya refugee camps and are unable to return home.
However, they also see a ‘HOPE’ at the end of the tunnel. Hence, they are determined to bring about a solution focused on a transformation that will not only deliver for the people of the Jubbaland State but will also see through the end of Al-Shabab. A change that will protect Jubbaland and its borders to ensure no terrorist elements cross over to its neighboring countries—and finally, a change that will work with the Federal government of Somalia hand in hand. Jubbaland is a place filled with potential triumph and promise of hope. A place with a rich river, fertile soils, the beautiful Indian Ocean, and livestock. Jubbaland is known for its diverse cultures and hospitality. It has the potential to be one of Somalia’s most exceptional, productive, stable, and prosperous states, and Jubbalanders are hopeful that it will soon realize its possibilities. Is it time to revisit supporting the current Jubbaland administration and its unproductive policies? If momentous indications mean anything, all signs should point to that direction.
Isaac Muhammad
Email: [email protected]
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Isaac Muhammad is a writer based in the USA.
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