



**BRIEFING PAPER**

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# Somalia: February 2017 update

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**Inside:**

1. 'Post-transition' Somalia
2. UK policy on Somalia and Somaliland



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## Summary

Somalia has just completed a long and much-delayed (s)electoral process to create a new parliament and elect a new president. Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (known as Farmajo) was elected the country's president by parliament on 8 February 2017. Although the incumbent, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, was the favourite to win ahead of the vote in the eyes of many commentators, he was decisively defeated by 184 votes to 80.

Power was transferred to the new president on 16 February. His inauguration is scheduled for 22 February. A dual US-Somali citizen, Farmajo was the prime minister of Somalia between 2010 and 2011. During his campaign he promised to renew the fight against corruption and indicated that he would be open to talks with al-Shabaab. He has a reputation for competence that will now be put to the test.

*Africa Confidential* described the process of creating a new parliament as "extremely tortuous and drenched in bribery and violence" and reserved judgement on whether it will be a "stepping stone towards one person, one vote democracy" when the next election season arrives in 2020 (as was originally the hope about the elections that have just finished). Much the same has been alleged of the presidential contest.

As always in Somalia, clan interests and alliances played a major role in deciding the (s)election outcome, as did the involvement of foreign powers. This will remain the case under President Farmajo, who comes from the Darod clan. Most now expect that, in order to ensure balanced clan representation, his prime minister will come from the Hawiye clan. More broadly, the new government will need to be sufficiently "inclusive" of all the larger clans if it is to have credibility.

The credibility of Somalia's new government will depend on its ability to deliver security. Al-Shabaab was unable to prevent the (s)electoral process from taking place. However, *Africa Confidential* claims that many of the Elders involved who came from areas where al-Shabaab is strong have repudiated their involvement on returning home and apologised for participating in it. Their apologies have reportedly been accepted provided they also pay \$300 to al-Shabaab, significantly boosting its coffers. If true, this suggests that President Farmajo's political base remains distinctly fragile.

Al-Shabaab continued to launch regular attacks on the Somali security forces and civilians while the (s)electoral process was taking place. A suicide bombing attack on a Mogadishu hotel in January reportedly killed between 15 and 20 civilians. In January 2017 al-Shabaab attacked a Kenyan military camp and reportedly killed at least 21 soldiers (Kenya claims that nine of its soldiers and dozens of terrorists died). The fact that Kenya has national elections later this year makes their troops a particularly attractive target for al-Shabaab at the moment.

Given the continuing weakness of the Somali National Army, the new president will be keen to see the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),

whose multinational forces have been supporting the Somali Federal Government, play an effective role. The force has also suffered some set-backs over the last year or so. Last year, Ethiopia withdrew its troops from the mission. For now, Kenya remains committed to it.

President Farmajo will also be hoping that a decision by the Kenyan Government to close the Dadaab refugee camp, where 200,000 Somalis currently live, is shelved. Earlier this month, a Kenyan court ruled the decision was illegal. The Kenyan Government has said it intends to appeal against the verdict.

The problems facing AMISOM may open the way for the talks with al-Shabaab that President Farmajo has suggested he would like to see. But talks do not look imminent. It may be that the authorities will start by trying to draw those who are al-Shabaab 'by convenience' into negotiations, rather than target hardliners.

President Farmajo also faces a big challenge in consolidating the country's emerging federal system. His predecessor failed to finish a constitutional review process that might have given it a more resilient underpinning. For now, the division of powers between the centre and the regional states remains opaque.

Perhaps the most urgent challenge facing the new president is the severe drought that is affecting Somalia. In January 2017 the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia said that five million Somalis – about half the population – do not have enough to eat.

In February, the UK Government's Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Sir Nicholas Kay, said that hundreds of thousands of Somalis could die in the next few months unless there is action to address the threat of famine. However, the crisis has not yet officially been declared a famine.

# 1. 'Post-transition' Somalia

## 1.1 Somalia under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud

Somalia's post-civil war 'transition' officially came to an end in August 2012 when the mandate of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) expired. The following month, [Hassan Sheikh Mohamud](#) was elected president by a new parliament. However, within a couple of years, the president was declaring that Somalia was once again in a "[political crisis](#)".

### His performance in office

President Mohamud was president between 2012 and February 2017. His tenure was marked by continuing allegations of large-scale official corruption. The country remained in a condition of almost permanent humanitarian crisis. While progress was made in combating the Islamist terrorist group al-Shabaab, it continued to be a significant security threat. Al-Shabaab increased its attacks in neighbouring Kenya, which sent troops into southern Somalia in 2011.<sup>1</sup> There was a spike in large-scale attacks in Kenya by the group during 2014 and 2015. The African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) force experienced successes but also setbacks. At the end of President Mohamud's term of office, it was short of morale and funds. Ethiopia had withdrawn from participation and Burundi had indicated that it might do so too. Despite donor efforts to strengthen it, the Somali National Army often remained ineffective.

### Creating regional states

Under President Mohamud, the Federal Government also made some progress towards establishing district and regional administrations in areas under its control, with a number of interim regional states created. Critics argued that the foundations of some of the interim states were often distinctly shaky, with a number of them reflecting the interests of Somalia's neighbours more than those of its people (for example, Ethiopia and Kenya's strong influence over Jubaland in the far south of the country).<sup>2</sup>

The process of regional state formation inevitably created losers as well as winners. In some cases, this led to violence on the ground. One flashpoint was between Puntland, formed in 1998 and therefore by far the longest-established regional state in Somalia, and a still-emerging Galmudug regional state in central Somalia over north Mudug, to which both make claim.<sup>3</sup> In December 2015 a peace deal was signed.<sup>4</sup> But clashes continued.<sup>5</sup> There were also tensions over the regional state

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<sup>1</sup> "How KDF's Entry Into Somalia Changed Security Situation in Northern Kenya", *Garissa News*, 6 July 2016

<sup>2</sup> "More states, less unity", *Africa Confidential*, 11 July 2014

<sup>3</sup> J. Mosley, "Somalia's federal future: layered agendas, risks and opportunities", Chatham House Research Paper, August 2015, pp13-14

<sup>4</sup> "The peace deal made today in Gaalkacyo demonstrates the maturity of our politicians, political process and people towards promoting peace and development", *Raxanreeb Online*, 3 December 2015

<sup>5</sup> Somalia, *Crisis Watch Database*, 1 July 2016

formation process in the middle Shabelle and Hiraa regions of central Somalia.<sup>6</sup> During 2015 there were also clashes between the Somali National Army (SNA) and supposedly pro-federal government private militias linked to regional state structures.<sup>7</sup> These tensions sometimes played into the hands of al-Shabaab (see below).

### Somalia-Somaliland-Puntland relations

There were several rounds of high-level talks in Djibouti and Turkey between the Federal Government and its Somaliland counterpart during President Mohamud's tenure, but there was no meaningful progress towards bringing Somaliland back into the federal fold.

Somaliland and Puntland were unable to resolve a long-standing territorial dispute in the Sool, Sanaag and Ceyn areas which has led to military clashes in the past. However, Somaliland and Puntland had a shared hostility towards another, more recently announced, 'state' in these areas called Khatumo. This state draws on territory that straddles both polities. Somaliland forces have clashed with Khatumo forces on several occasions.<sup>8</sup>

## 1.2 The (s)electoral system for the 2016 elections

Hopes that the 2016 elections would be held on a 'one-person-one-vote' basis proved unrealistic. However, President Mohamud promised that they would more "legitimacy" than they did in 2012.<sup>9</sup> To this end, there were negotiations aimed at increasing the number of people involved in the electoral process as compared with the 2012 elections, when parliamentarians in the lower house were selected by a Council of 135 Elders based on a power-sharing formula between Somalia's main clans. The parliament then elected the president.

After a period of negotiation and consultation, it was eventually agreed that, for the lower house (275 seats), the Council of 135 Traditional Elders would not select parliamentarians this time around. Instead they would nominate 50 members for each of 275 'Electoral Colleges' – that is, one College for each parliamentary seat. This College would then elect the MP. Nominations to the Colleges would reflect the principle of 'power-sharing' between the main clans. This arrangement in effect created an 'electorate' of 13,750 people.<sup>10</sup>

For the upper house (54 seats), regional presidents would nominate two candidates for each seat, from which regional assemblies would elect one.<sup>11</sup> Here again, the principle of power-sharing would apply. As they did in 2012, parliamentarians would subsequently elect the president.

<sup>6</sup> "President Hassan arrives in Beled Weyne to resolve southeastern Somalia impasse", *BBC Monitoring Africa*, 25 March 2016

<sup>7</sup> "A federal farrago", *Africa Confidential*, 10 July 2015

<sup>8</sup> "Somaliland Accused of Fueling Deadly Clan Fighting", *Shabelle Media Network*, 30 June 2016

<sup>9</sup> "Division all round", *Africa Confidential*, 8 January 2015

<sup>10</sup> "The National Leaders Forum Communique", 12 April 2016

<sup>11</sup> "Somalia's Federal Future: Layered Agendas, Risks and Opportunities", *Chatham House*, 2 September 2015

There were concerns that the electoral process would escalate the already fraught relations between some regional polities and Mogadishu. Somaliland did not send representatives to talks concerning the new electoral model. Puntland eventually agreed to participate in the Electoral College system after initially rejecting the proposal, on condition that the 2020 elections would take place on a one-man-one-vote basis.<sup>12</sup>

To reassure those who were disappointed by the electoral process agreed for the forthcoming elections, President Mohamud said that the goal would be to have one-person-one-vote elections in 2020.<sup>13</sup> But some worried that even this might be prove to be over-optimistic.

### 1.3 February 2017: a new president is (s)elected

The complex (s)electoral process to create a new parliament and president experienced several delays and ultimately took over six months to complete. It finally ended with the election on 8 February 2017 of Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (known as Farmajo) as Somalia's new president. Although the incumbent, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, was the favourite to win ahead of the vote in the eyes of many commentators, he was decisively defeated by 184 votes to 80.

Power was transferred to the new president on 16 February. His inauguration is scheduled for 22 February. A dual US-Somali citizen, he was the prime minister of Somalia between 2010 and 2011. During his campaign he promised to renew the fight against corruption and indicated that he would be open to talks with [al-Shabaab](#).<sup>14</sup> He has a reputation for competence that will now be put to the test.

The federal parliament was inaugurated on 27 December 2016. *Africa Confidential* described the process of creating a new parliament as "extremely tortuous and drenched in bribery and violence", reserving judgement on whether it will be a "stepping stone towards one person, one vote democracy" when the next elections come round in 2020.<sup>15</sup> Much the same has been alleged of the presidential contest. A host of outstanding disputes and grievances arising from the 2016-17 process, which the UN Special Representative for Somalia, Michael Keating, called a "[political process with electoral features](#)", remain to be resolved.

Western donors heavily backed the process, including with funds. The international community has welcomed the successful conclusion of the (s)electoral process and warmly congratulated the winner. But they will be aware that Somalia will continue to face enormous challenges under the new president.

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<sup>12</sup> "Seeking stability in Somalia's election season", *The Africa Report*, 9 June 2016

<sup>13</sup> "National Leadership Forum agree on implementation of key instruments to fast track Somalia's electoral process", *AMISOM*, 26 June 2016

<sup>14</sup> "Farmaajo begins 'era of unity' as Somali president", *East African*, 8 February 2017

<sup>15</sup> "Surviving elections and jihad", 6 January 2017

## 1.4 Challenges facing the new president

As always in Somalia, clan interests and alliances played a major role in deciding the (s)election outcome, as did the involvement of foreign powers. This will remain the case under President Farmajo, who comes from the Darod clan. Most now expect that, in order to ensure balanced clan representation, his prime minister will come from the Hawiye clan. More broadly, the new government will need to be sufficiently “inclusive” of all the larger clans if it is to have credibility.<sup>16</sup>

As stated earlier, Somaliland played no part in Somalia’s 2016-17 (s)electoral process. Diplomatic efforts to draw it in were unsuccessful. It has recently [postponed](#) its own (already once delayed) presidential election from March to October 2017 – officially due to the severe drought. The international community has criticised this decision. A dramatic breakthrough in relations under the new president of Somalia looks unlikely.

The credibility of Somalia’s new government will depend on its ability to deliver security. Al-Shabaab was unable to prevent the (s)electoral process from taking place. However, *Africa Confidential* claims that many of the Elders involved who came from areas where al-Shabaab is strong have repudiated their involvement on returning home and apologised for participating in it. Their apologies have reportedly been accepted provided they also pay \$300 to al-Shabaab, significantly boosting its coffers. If true, this suggests that President Farmajo’s political base remains distinctly fragile.<sup>17</sup>

Al-Shabaab continued to launch regular attacks on the Somali security forces and civilians while the (s)electoral process was taking place. At least 50 people died at its hands in December 2016. A suicide bombing attack on a Mogadishu hotel in January reportedly killed between 15 and 20 civilians. Several towns and villages have fallen into the hands of militants in recent months but more often than not they have been re-taken by the authorities fairly quickly. A smaller pro-Islamic State faction based in Puntland has also been conducting some attacks.

In January 2017 al-Shabaab attacked a Kenyan military camp and reportedly killed at least 21 soldiers (Kenya claims that nine of its soldiers and dozens of terrorists died). The fact that Kenya has national elections later this year makes their troops a particularly attractive target for Al-Shabaab at the moment. For now, Kenya says it remains committed to AMISOM.

The new president will be keen to see AMISOM’s fortunes revive during 2017. He will also be hoping that a decision by the Kenyan Government to close the Dadaab refugee camp, where 200,000 Somali refugees currently reside, is shelved. Earlier this month, a Kenyan court ruled the

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
<sup>16</sup> “UN chief urges Somalia’s new president to form inclusive government”, *Belfast Telegraph*, 10 February 2017

<sup>17</sup> “The endless election”, *Africa Confidential*, 3 February 2017

decision illegal. The Kenyan Government has said it plans to appeal against the verdict.<sup>18</sup>

The problems facing AMISOM may open the way for the talks with al-Shabaab that President Farmajo has hinted at. But these do not seem imminent. The authorities face the challenge of identifying credible and acceptable interlocutors on the al-Shabaab side. It may be that their preference will be to try and draw those who are al-Shabaab 'by convenience' into negotiations, rather than the hardliners.<sup>19</sup>

Below is a BBC [map](#) setting out who controlled what territory in Somalia in November 2016:



President Farmajo also faces a big challenge in consolidating the country's emerging federal system. His predecessor failed to see through a constitutional review process that might have given it a more durable legal and administrative underpinning. For now, the division of powers between the centre and the regional states remains opaque.<sup>20</sup>

Perhaps the most urgent challenge facing the new president is the severe drought that is affecting Somalia. In January 2017 the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia said that five million Somalis – about half the population – do not have enough to eat.<sup>21</sup> In February, the UK Government's Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Sir Nicholas Kay, said that hundreds of thousands of Somalis could die in the next few months unless there is action to address the threat of famine.<sup>22</sup> However, the crisis has not yet officially been declared a famine.

<sup>18</sup> "Closure of Dadaab refugee camp ruled illegal by Kenyan court", *Irish Times*, 10 February 2017

<sup>19</sup> "Talks with Shabaab to end conflict not unlikely – experts", *Sunday Nation*, 5 February 2017

<sup>20</sup> "Security tops list of problems for Somalia's new president", *Financial Times*, 11 February 2017

<sup>21</sup> "Somalia: president appeals for assistance as drought worsens", *Africa News*, 20 January 2017

<sup>22</sup> "Famine could kill hundreds of thousands in Somalia, UN is warned", *Belfast Telegraph*, 16 February 2017

## 2. UK policy on Somalia and Somaliland

The UK Government was a strong supporter of President Mohamud, although it shared much of the frustration of other donors with his performance, not least on corruption.<sup>23</sup>

On 8 February 2017, UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson [congratulated](#) President Farmajo on his victory.

For all of its problems over the last year or so, the UK Government remains a strong supporter of AMISOM.

The UK Government is sympathetic to the idea of a federal Somalia. This would include Somaliland, with which the UK Government has a positive relationship, co-operating on development, counter-terrorism and piracy issues, but which it does not (and will not) recognise as an independent state. The UK Government has encouraged direct talks between the Somali Federal Government and its Somaliland counterpart in recent years.

General UK policy is not to support secessionism within internationally recognised states. This policy is long-established and reflects the UN's position since its creation after World War II. However, there have been a small number of exceptions to this rule.

- There have been exceptions where secession has been mutually accepted by leading parties within a state, usually in the context of a peace process and/or peace agreement (South Sudan and Eritrea emerged in this way).
- There have been exceptions where secession has taken place from a state which has lost its legitimacy in the eyes of much of the international community, including the UK (a number of new states emerged out of former Yugoslavia in this way).

For the UK to assist Somaliland to gain international recognition, a policy decision would need first to be taken that Somalia – or the idea of Somalia as a state – has lost its legitimacy. The UK would be highly unlikely to act alone, which means that this would have to become the view of the UK's international allies and partners too. To take that position now would be to break ranks with the current US and collective EU positions on Somalia.

There are many in the international community who sympathise with Somaliland's wish for independence, but they appear to be waiting for an African Union (AU) member state to take the lead.

In September 2015, the then Prime Minister, David Cameron, announced that the UK would be sending military personnel to Somalia as part of UN support to AMISOM. The first personnel arrived in Mogadishu in May 2016. According to a Ministry of Defence press release:

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<sup>23</sup> "An offering to Obama", *Africa Confidential*, 21 July 2015

UK Armed Forces personnel have arrived in Somalia to support a United Nations-backed mission in Africa, the Defence Secretary has announced.

Following a recce to assess options, this is the first UK team to travel to Somalia as part of United Nations (UN) support for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) that is working to build stability in the country and tackle the threat posed by extremist group Al-Shabaab.

UK military personnel, drawn from Force Troop Command, 1 Div and Field Army training will provide medical, logistical and engineering support as part of a wider UK commitment. Following the arrival of these initial troops, up to 70 UK personnel will deploy to Somalia this year.<sup>24</sup>

The UK has been an active player in EU anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. It is home to the headquarters of the EU's [Operation Atalanta](#). The UK has also provided assistance to local efforts to prosecute pirates. Somali officials have been warning of a [return to piracy](#) unless more is done to create alternative livelihoods and tackle illegal fishing in Somalia's territorial waters by ships from other countries.<sup>25</sup>

UN Security Council Resolution 2142 (2014) continued the embargo on the supply of arms and related material to Somalia. However, the embargo no longer applies to military equipment "intended solely for the development of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, providing the UN Sanctions Committee is notified in advance". For example, between July and September 2016, the UK [approved](#) military licences worth £84,500 for body armour and helmets.

Somalia was designated a 'human rights priority country' in the UK Government's [2015 Human Rights and Democracy report](#). Here is a link to the latest official report on the country situation: [Somalia - Human Rights Priority Country](#) (last updated 8 February 2017).

## 2.1 UK support to Somalia

The current UK Government has been heavily engaged on Somalia since it convened the London Conference on Somalia in February 2012. There was a follow-up conference in London in September 2013. Another conference there is being organised by the UK Government for May 2017.<sup>26</sup>

The UK backs the September 2013 '[New Deal Somali Compact](#)', which is the current framework for donor support to Somalia. The UK pledged Euro 407 million towards the implementation of the Compact between 2013 and 2016.

DFID's bilateral programme for Somalia operates in south-central Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland. Its [top priorities](#) are:

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<sup>24</sup> "[UK troops support mission in Somalia](#)", Ministry of Defence, 2 May 2016

<sup>25</sup> In May 2015, the previous UK Government published a policy paper entitled "[2010 to 2015 government policy: piracy off the coast of Somalia](#)"

<sup>26</sup> "Famine could kill hundreds of thousands in Somalia, UN is warned", *Belfast Telegraph*, 16 February 2017

- investing in strengthening political settlements, accountable governance, security and local reconciliation
- addressing immediate social development needs among the most vulnerable populations
- expanding work on growth and growth transmission

The total project budget for 2016/17 is just over £140 million. Upwards of 40% of spend is going on disaster relief. The project budget for Somalia is scheduled to decline to just over £58 million in 2018/19.

In December 2016, DFID [announced](#) that it would be providing £1.5 million of support to help establish a new fund to deliver key infrastructure projects in Somalia:

The support, delivered through the African Development Bank's (AfDB) multi partner "Somalia Infrastructure Fund", will make a vital contribution to Somalia's stability by focusing on infrastructure rehabilitation and development, with specific investments in the energy, water and sanitation and transport sectors.

The funds will also help strengthen government capabilities in infrastructure development and management, and provide skills training for young people.

For more information on UK aid to Somalia, see the relevant [country page](#) on the government website 'Development Tracker'.

Here is a [link](#) to a list of the projects that DFID is currently funding.

On 2 February 2017, the Secretary of State for International Development, Priti Patel, [announced](#) an additional package of humanitarian support for Somalia during a visit to Mogadishu. It involves:

- food for 60,000 people;
- urgent nutrition support for 240,000 children and pregnant women;
- safe water for 180,000 people;
- access to health service for 75,000 people; and
- vaccinations for 3 million animals.

## State-building support

The UK has been offering capacity-building for the Somali National Army and to the police, as well as training and financial support (largely via the EU) to AMISOM.

In a 6 June 2016 written statement about UK personnel in Somalia, Earl Howe [said](#):

The UK currently has 27 military personnel deployed in Somalia. Of those, 25 personnel are supporting the UN and EU Missions, providing training, mentoring, and logistical support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and developing the Somali National Army. The purpose of those Missions is to counter the terrorist threat from Al Shabaab and to help strengthen security and stability within Somalia and the wider East Africa region. The 25 includes the first eight personnel committed by the Prime Minister to the UN in Somalia at the UN General Assembly

session in September 2015. The total current UK deployment of 27 military personnel is completed by a Defence Attaché and Assistant Defence Attaché at the British Embassy in Mogadishu.

In a 21 July 2016 written statement about activities being undertaken through the Conflict, Security and Stability Fund (CSSF), Ben Gummer [said](#):

In Africa we are helping to tackle terrorist groups, including training the Africa Union peacekeepers in Somalia and capacity-building for the Somali military. We have also ensured women's participation in building Somalia's future through its state-building processes.

Details of a number of relevant projects are on the government's 'Development Tracker' website. The following six projects are running until 2019/20:

[Somalia Stability Fund II \[GB-1-205068\]](#)

Budget: **£34,999,999** Status: **Implementation** Reporting Org: **Department for International Development**

The purpose of this project is to promote stability across Somalia. This is a flexible adaptable instrument that will develop a portfolio of projects aimed at strengthening local governance and reducing conflict in Somalia.

[Somalia Security and Justice Programme \[GB-1-205069\]](#)

Budget: **£30,000,000** Status: **Implementation** Reporting Org: **Department for International Development**

To strengthen security and justice institutions by providing basic training to police and equipping police and justice agencies with basic infrastructure and skill sets; improving management systems; and developing legal institutions including the district courts in the new federal member states and the ministries of justice at the Federal and member state level.

[Accountability Programme - To support interventions that strengthen government accountability in Somalia \[GB-1-203383\]](#)

Budget: **£22,999,995** Status: **Implementation** Reporting Org: **Department for International Development**

To improve government accountability from the local level up by building the capacity of citizens to better understand, articulate, and call for their needs to be met. It will also provide support to government bodies in order to respond to this demand.

[Public Resource Management in Somalia \[GB-1-205065\]](#)

Budget: **£18,359,076** Status: **Implementation** Reporting Org: **Department for International Development**

To build the capacity of Somalia's new federal system of government by establishing and improving systems for tax, spend and civil service management at all levels including Public finance management, Public administration and work on decentralisation / federalism.

[Conflict Stability and Security Fund - Support to Elections, State Formation and Rule of Law Programmes in Somalia. \[GB-1-205091\]](#)

Budget: **£13,253,229** Status: **Implementation** Reporting  
Org: **Department for International Development**

To support physical infrastructure critical to the operational effectiveness and human rights compliance of the justice system by building a regional police headquarters in Beledweyne and reducing overcrowding in Mogadishu prison; and support capacity of key actors in the state formation process; incl. support to inclusive and credible federal electoral process in 2016 with focus on women and marginalised groups. This will result in tangible improvements in security provision and access to justice for Somali citizens and strengthen the foundation for stronger state institutions.

[SNaP: Increasing Women's Participation in Decision-Making and Challenging Harmful Social Norms in Somalia \[GB-1-205110\]](#)

Budget: **£10,000,000** Status: **Implementation** Reporting  
Org: **Department for International Development**

Ensure that women have voice, choice and control over decisions that affect them by promoting women's voice in official processes including transitional justice and local decision making, support women civil society, challenge discriminatory social norms and end harmful traditional practices.

Last year, the [Scottish Government](#) made £700,000 available to development agencies for humanitarian relief work in East Africa.

## 2.2 UK support to Somaliland

In 2013, the UK created, with Norway and Denmark a '[Somaliland Development Fund](#)', whose objective is "improved and better resourced core state functions for the people of Somaliland".

In January 2014, Lord Chidgey received the following answer to a question about UK support to Somaliland (HL Deb 30 January 2014 cWA261-2):

To ask Her Majesty's Government what steps they are taking to increase the United Kingdom's engagement with Somaliland.[HL4825]

**The Senior Minister of State, Department for Communities and Local Government & Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Warsi) (Con):**

The UK has a close relationship with the Somaliland Administration, including regular meetings at official and Ministerial level. The UK formally opened an office in Hargeisa in September 2012, strengthening our engagement with Somaliland.

The UK worked closely with the Somaliland Administration in the run-up to the second Somalia Conference in London, and the EU-Somalia Conference in Brussels in September last year. In Brussels we announced further support to the Somaliland Development Fund (SDF) of £5 million, taking our total support to the SDF to £25 million for infrastructure and improved service delivery. Overall, the UK has pledged to up to £95 million in aid for Somaliland up to 2015. We continue to engage with Somaliland in a wide range of areas including support to elections and democracy, institutional reform, security cooperation including counter-piracy and justice sector reform. The Parliamentary Under-

## 15 Somalia: February 2017 update

Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Boston and Skegness (Mr Simmonds), discussed the UK's Somali policy with members of the Somaliland Diaspora community during a visit to Cardiff in April 2013.

There is information about current DFID-funded projects for Somalia that focus on or include Somaliland on its ['Development Indicators'](#) website.

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