By Faisal Roble
On the eve of June 27, 2014, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, seemingly jubilant, albeit unsuspecting, rhymed “nabad ku afura,” or “break your fast with peace” to impart on the residents of Mogadishu his Ramadan greetings. It was a positive but gullible message of peace to the terror-weary residents of this city of 2 million. By July 8, that message became “naar ku afur,” or “break your fast with hell.”
Little did he know; the month of Ramadan came down to be a deadly month. Here, the maxim “the road to hell is paved with good intentions” aptly applies. The unending, incessant attacks mounted by Al-shabab have taken new heights, reaching crescendo inside Villa Somalia, where both the President and his Prime Minster reside.
According to a solidarity message released by IGAD, the Prime Minister and the chairman of the feeble parliament were in Villa Somalia during the attack; both escaped unscathed. Suffice to say fatal attacks on members of the parliament, district commissioners inside Mogadishu, and other key sites that house SFG institutions are heart wrenching.
One day after the attack, President Hassan, wearing his ersatz face of normalcy, sat on an outsized chair glazed with artificial gold-like metal plates, and he tried to console the nation. His misplaced audacious speech was frail and incoherent, consisting entirely of declarative bravados bereft of any public policy contents. In short, he did not say much on how he is going to deal with the ever-daring terror cells in his own backyard.
Neither did his unwarranted swagger of “I am not scared of you” help; rather it sent a message of a broken leader swearing over a turf war as opposed to a President trying to win back his nation that is at risk of disappearing. This could have been a moment to capitalize for a delivery of more inspiring speech to rally the nation to an actionable program. Alas, he came across a whinny President with “good intentions,” but less substance.
Most Somalis were shaken by the brazen act of obliterating Villa Somalia. The President’s well-intentioned peace message in this month of reflection and relaxation was completely undermined by a resilient home-grown terror group. Al-shabab denied the City’s residents the simple commodity of peace in their own neighborhoods. Nearly a quarter of a century of terror and torment is too long to bear. Thus, Mogadishu, a city that came to the end of the wire, can’t avoid but to ask what does Al-shabab want?
What Al-shabab Wants
Al-shabab has publicly vowed to achieve three objectives: military, political, and social. First, it promised to assassinate anybody who holds high offices for the government, including the President, members of the cabinet, and the fledgling legislative body. Second, it wants to belittle national symbols such as Villa Somalia to break the will of the nation. By attacking Villa Somalia twice in a period of six months, Al-shabab seems to have successfully undermined whatever governmental authority President Hassan Sheikh had claimed. Third, it wants to win over the hearts of the neglected youth and the downtrodden in Mogadishu.[i]
With its latest action, Alshabab militarily ambushed Villa Somalia with the help of a young man, and almost assassinated the Prime Minister. The terror group is singing: “the emperor has no clothes” in front of the gates of Villa Somalia.
No one is immune to the terror of Al-shabab. The stern attack in February 24, 2014, for example, gravely struck a dagger in the hearts of Diaspora community. The unforgettable eulogy Somali Canadians organized for the late chief of staff in the Prime Minister’s office (Ottawa), and the unresolved murder of Faisal Ali (from Toronto), a member of the parliament from Puntland, evoke painful memories of the horrific nature of terror in Mogadishu. Such losses make our collective conscience of what is wrong with Mogadishu.
In an op-ed piece, I acknowledged both the devastation this particular attack caused and the need for radical change in how Mogadishu does business:
“The attack on Villa Somalia (Presidential compound) in Mogadishu by Alshabab militia on Friday 21, 2014 is without a doubt devastating both to President Sheikh Mohamed and to the families of the victims. Without a radical departure from the status quo, Security will not improve in Mogadishu.”
The Enemy within
This time around, the SFG had indeed rolled some heads following Al-shabab’s attack on Villa Somalia on July 8. Unconfirmed reports say that the Prime Minster single handedly fired those who neglected their duties. He hired a new team so within hours of the attack, despite some of the new officials have shady human rights record. The police commissioner, Abdihakim Saacid, had been replaced by Mohamed Sheikh Ismail; Bashir Mohamed Jama, security czar, was also replaced by Mohamed Abdullahi Hassan. Additionally, Khalif Ahmed Ereg, a former national security official is named Security Minister, replacing Defense Minister Mohamed Sheikh Hassan who has been an acting minister.
The overhaul at the top echelon of the security personnel isn’t by any means a precedent. For example, on April 17, 2013, the BBC Africa Monitoring wrote this: “Following the election of Professor Hasan Shaykh Mahmud as the president of the federal government of Somalia, guards at the presidential palace, Villa Somalia, have been quietly replaced. Members of the presidential guard unit, known as VIP Security, received training in Egypt, Sudan, and Uganda.” Yet, Villa Somalia is repeatedly attacked by Al-shabab.
It is because of the inability of the government in Mogadishu to arrest the Al-shabab that led to more Somalis and foreigners alike to doubt the President’s willingness to fight terrorism effectively. According to the January 29, 2014 US Intelligence Community, authored by James R. Clapper the superstructure to defeat al-shabab isn’t there
“In Somalia, al-shabab is conducting asymmetric attacks against government facilities and Western targets in and around Mogadishu. The credibility and effectiveness of the young Somali government will be further threatened by persistent political infighting, weak leadership from President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, ill-equipped government institutions, and pervasive technical, political and administrative shortfalls.”[ii]
President Hassan vehemently disagreed with the report; nonetheless, persistent perceptions, like the one expressed by this report, are hard to change, and may have already eroded public confidence. As of writing this piece, reports coming from Mugadishu say that the Turkish government has evacuated 200 of its citizens, key technical staff helping the country, because of deteriorating security conditions.
A life interview given by the young man (Mohamed Muhiyadin) who orchestrated the July 8th attack on Villa Somalia is all the more disturbing. He is a former employee of Villa Somalia, and he revealed that his brother in-law, Abdi Razak Sheikh Ibrahim, a known member of Al-shabab leadership, hired him for $200 to transport weapons and terrorists to Villa Somalia, with the intent to kill the Prime Minister.
Sitting on a government-provided luxury sofa, still wearing his Argentina-soccer jacket, and appearing nonchalant towards the entire affair, Mr. Mohamed details how weak security is at Villa Somalia. From the generous treatment afforded to him, one gets the perception that Mogadishu has grown tolerant to terrorists. Otherwise, this criminal should have been in a mug shot.
Theory and Practice against Terror
Villa Somalia sorely needs a coherent theory to fight terrorism within. What is the government’s approach to fight terrorism in Mogadishu? Does the government know who the architects and members/sympathizers of sleeper cells are? If yes, what is it doing about it?
Mogadishu’s terror network is admittedly complex. First, Al-shabab is one variant of the many religious groups who are entrenched inside Mogadishu. Second, it is a close cousin of Dem-aljadid, the latter being President Hassan’s ideological wing.
In addition, there are complex sociopolitical structures that enable Al-shabab, a homegrown terror group that is part and parcel of the social fabric of the city, easily survive in Mogadishu. The City’s intricate clan system, chronic unemployment or/and lack of access to education and entertainment outlets, such as sport activities for the youth, a thriving Islamic radicalism, and government officials who sympathize with Al-shabab, all nurture the culture of terror.[iii]
The June 2014 International Crisis Group’s (ICG) report makes credible observations about the intricate political and clan superstructures that help Al-shabab stay resilient in South Central Somalia. It concludes that defeating Al-shabab requires more than military hardware; least of all AMISOM troops.
Nor can it be defeated with a lukewarm, a lackluster President at the helm. It requires a national vision anchored on a united purpose agreeable to both regional and federal governments. A renewed national cohesion, with a unified and professionally organized national army, is what it takes to defeat Al-shabab for good.
The inescapable conclusion is that Villa Somalia must formulate an integrated, sound anti-terror theory with legal instruments to wipe out terrorism in Mogadishu. Such a theory must have at minimum the following components:
- A comprehensive national reconciliation program (CNRP), dealing with past conflicts, and a redefinition of relationships among different regions of the country, is paramount. There must be a united front between federal, regional and local entities of the country to win the war.
- Developing a social theory, founded on credible new data, to explain the overly that exists between clan membership and terrorist networks inside Mogadishu is imperative. The SFG must come up with a system to unpack the murky relationship between certain clan/clan chiefs and the architectural network that sustains Al-shabab in the capital. It is only then that the legal system developed to fight terrorism can bear results.
- A coherent and comprehensive mass education, societal mobilization, and gang reduction programs at neighborhood and block level must be implemented in Mogadishu. Central to this program is approaching al-shabab as no more than gangs, not as a political force. This shall be accompanied by a robust human capital element for the youth population. This approach has been successfully implemented in major cities such as Los Angeles, Toronto, etc. Some Central American countries that have been battling drug lords (El-Salvador, Colombia) have successfully copied lessons learned from these practices.[iv]
- Prioritization of anti-terror programs in Mogadishu, accompanied by substantial budget allocation, specialized training, and equipment, including information gathering and social media technologies, must be instituted.
Endnotes
[i] Revolutions or counter revolutions normally succeed or die based on the role the youth plays. It is imperative that SFG win back the youth if it were to defeat Al-shabab. It has to develop a theoretical foundation, more than rhetoric, to win the hearts of the youth. Currently, Somalis of all stripes are dismayed by the presence of unfriendly foreign troops around their national symbols, around mosques and whatever is left of Somali symbols. This war is not winnable as long as foreign troops hoard Somali citizens, no matter whether they are criminals or not. The sooner foreign troops leave Somalis the faster the war is winnable, that is only if the government in Mogadishu has a theory of winning the war against gangs.
[ii] http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/140129/clapper.pdf , US Intelligence Community World Assessment, Worldwide Threat Assessment, January 29, 201.
[iii] Despite his dictatorial tendencies to promote extra-judicial treatment of alleged members of Al-shabab, such as his call for “killing them on the spot”, the former Mayor of Mogadishu, Mohamed Nur (Tarzan), argued that Al-shabab survives in Mogadishu because there are forces that support it.
[iv] These theories (urban gang reduction theories) heavily relay on neighborhood mobilization, community policing, and services delivery programs. One such program was proposed to USAID in 2012, for funding by the Minnesota- based American Refugee Council. If funded, this project would have transferred anti-terror knowledge from Los Angeles city to Mogadishu. In the last inquiry, the proposal is tabled although it was welcomed by both the State Department and the LA mayor’s Gang Reduction and Youth Development. The former Mayor of Los Angeles, Mayor Villaraigosa endorsed the program in concept. I am proud to say I facilitated the connection between the Mayor’s Deputy and members of Minnesota-based American Refugee Council.
By Faisal Roble
Email: [email protected]
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